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ART. I.—PRESBYTERIANISM:—ITS AFFINITIES.*

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THE occasion on which we are met is one on which we may speak freely of our own system of religion, with no violation of a proper respect for other denominations of Christians. Entertaining views as Presbyterians which we regard as of great value to ourselves, and of importance to the world, it cannot be improper to suggest the grounds on which we regard those views as of value and importance, or to endeavor to strengthen the hands of each other in our efforts to maintain them, and to commend them to the attention of our fellow-men. There are reasons why we are Presbyterians and not Prelatists or Independents; why we are Calvinists and not Arminians, Arians, or Socinians; why we are respectively attached to one or the other of the great branches of the Presbyterian family represented here, and not to the Greek church; to the Roman Catholic church; to the Episcopal church; to the Methodist or Baptist churches; to a Socinian

* Delivered as an address before the Presbyterian Historical Society in Philadelphia, May 5, 1863. On account of the length of this address, a portion of it (pp. 550-556) was omitted in the delivery. Though requested by the Society for publication, it is proper to say, that for the sentiments in that portion of the address, the Society can be considered in no way responsible.

A. B.

organization or a Society of 'Friends'; and there can be no want of charity towards others, if, when we come together *as* Presbyterians, we suggest those reasons to each other. Among ourselves indeed there are reasons satisfactory to our own minds, why, in our respective church relations, we are attached to one or the other of the different branches of the great Presbyterian family, but this is not an occasion on which it is proper to refer to those reasons. At proper times and places we advocate and defend those particular views, each one for himself; here we meet on a common level, to consider the import of the term which binds us all together as a distinct community, divided in form but not in heart from the rest of the Christian world, and in reference also to our own particular views, to enquire whether the grounds of difference among ourselves may not be further narrowed down, or made wholly to vanish; whether there may not be in the common term under which we are assembled—*Presbyterian*—so much of dignity, value, and importance, as to make it desirable that our minor differences should disappear altogether. The privilege which we thus claim for ourselves, we do not deny to others. We do not question the right of any other Christians freely to state the reasons why they hold their peculiar views; we do not deny that they have the right to examine with the utmost freedom the reasons which we allege in behalf of our own views; we claim, in turn, the right of examining theirs.

On this occasion, with almost no reference to what has been said before, or whether what I shall say may not have been better said—and indeed without knowing *what has been said*—I shall invite your attention to some remarks on the *affinities of Presbyterianism*—or, in this general topic, PRESBYTERIANISM:—ITS AFFINITIES.

In the investigations of science there are always two points before the mind of the investigator:—the intrinsic nature of the object, and its affinities. He does not feel that he understands fully the former of these without an acquaintance with the latter; the latter may be, in fact, practically of much more importance than the former. Many of the works of nature are little known except by their affinities; none of them are fully understood except by those affinities. The original element—the atom—might perhaps be taken out by itself, and examined *as* purely independent, and might be described as such, but this would give but a very imperfect knowledge of its real nature considered as an object of scientific research. Its hardness, its weight, its tenacity, its elasticity, its malleability, its

shape, might be ascertained, but this knowledge would be most imperfect, and of very little practical importance in the arts of life, or in understanding the world around us. Iron, gold, the diamond, might be thus described; oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen might be thus examined; the sixty or more elementary bodies which, according to the chemists, make up in combination the whole material universe, might be thus accurately investigated, and their properties *as* independent bodies defined, but we should feel that we had scarcely entered on a knowledge of the true nature of these elementary bodies. We want to know what they are in combination; what are their affinities; with what others any one of them naturally unites; in what proportions they combine; what is the compound body which they thus produce. We ask with what oxygen naturally combines, and we study the results in the air, in the water; in plants and animals; in the varieties of the vegetable creation, and the tribes of animals that people the air, the earth, and the seas; in acids and oxides; in vitality, in colors, in the breath which we inhale, in the water which we drink, in the vegetable on which we feed, in the living and the moving world around us. Science is busy in finding out these affinities:—the elements which naturally combine with each other, the proportions in which they combine, and the results of the combination. Our knowledge of nature is practically measured by our attainments in this. These sixty or more elementary bodies make up the world; make up, so far as we know, all the material universe. If they lay scattered around with no affinities; if they were like separate grains of sand on the sea-shore, or pebbles strewed over a field, or boulders lying detached from each other where they were dropped by masses of floating ice and earth, or borne from some distant mountain, there could be no world—there could be no science. The most accurate knowledge of sands and pebbles and boulders in detail, could be of no practical use; nor could that knowledge ever be reduced to a *system* of science. It is only as combined that we feel an interest in them; it is only as combined that they make up the beautiful creation around us and above us.

What is thus true in regard to the elementary principles of matter, is also true of the principles of moral science and religion. We do not know fully what they are until we understand their *affinities*. Do the principles submitted to us combine readily with liberty; with just views of the rights of conscience; with a proper sense of responsibility; with social virtues; with the progress of the race; with the cultivation of the arts and sciences; with the development of the human faculties? Are they likely to be found where there is most

intelligence, most refinement, most purity of life, most courtesy of manners, most freedom of opinion, most elevated views of the dignity of man and of the government of God? Or is there a natural affinity with despotism, with slavery, with impurity of life and morals, with scepticism, with superstition, with atheism? What were the natural affinities of the doctrines of Democritus, of Epicurus, of Zeno, of Socrates, of Plato? What were the natural affinities of the opinions of Hobbes, of Spinoza, of Mr. Hume? What were those of Fourier and of Compté? What were those of Voltaire and Volney? What were those of Calvin, of Luther, of the Wesleys, of Jonathan Edwards?

Presbyterianism, whose affinities I desire, as I may be able, to illustrate, is properly a system of *government* in the church, as distinguished from Prelacy and Independency. It has, indeed, become now so combined with a certain form of *doctrine*, from a natural affinity which I shall attempt soon to explain, that we use the term familiarly, not as referring to the form of government, but in this combination with the Calvinistic doctrine. So close is this affinity; so uniform is this connection, and so prominent is the doctrine with which it combines, that in the popular estimation the *doctrine* is the prominent or main thing, and the popular feeling against it, if there is any, is arrayed against that rather than against the system as a mode of ecclesiastical government. In fact, in its bearing on the community, and considered with reference to preaching, the mode of government is rarely adverted to, and perhaps could be made to excite little feeling in the community in any way. Considered as a mere form of government, indeed, it has so much that is in common with our civil institutions, and so much, as we shall see, in accordance with just notions of liberty and the progress of the world, that it would seem to be easy to commend it to the favorable regards of mankind, if it were not for the odium excited by a form of doctrine with which, in fact, it is now invariably combined.

Yet it is strictly, and only, in itself a *system of government*; a system which, so far as would be apparent in an abstract consideration of its principles, *might* be combined with any form of religious doctrine, or with any forms and ceremonies in the public worship of God. Nothing could be detected in it, considered abstractly as a mode of government, which would forbid the idea that it might be combined in an actual organization of the church with Arminianism, with High Arianism, with Low Arianism, with Socinianism of the lowest forms; with the worship of God by a Liturgy; with splendid vestments, with processions, with pilgrimages and with genuflexions;

with the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration; with the Mass, or with the doctrine of Purgatory. We shall see, however, whether we can explain the cause or not, that it actually *has* no affinity for any of these views of doctrine or these ceremonies, but that its whole career in the world has been in fact a career of steady repellantcy to them all:—as we understand the properties of matter by their repellancies, as well as by their attractions.

Considered, therefore, properly as a system of *government*, Presbyterianism comprises the following as cardinal principles:

1. That all power in the church belongs to Christ; or that he is the supreme Head of the church, and that all power which is not derived from him is an invasion of his prerogatives, and is in fact an usurpation.

2. That power in the church resides, under Him, with the people, and belongs to them as a brotherhood. It is not derived from men who profess to be descendants of the Apostles, and invested, therefore, with authority over the church; it is not lodged with a clergy—a class regarded as invested with authority separate from, and independent of the church—a class to perpetuate their own order with no reference to the will of the church; it is not derived from the state as having any right to legislate for the church as such, or to prescribe in regard to its doctrines, its ceremonies, or its mode of worship; it is a “self-governing society, distinct from the state, having its officers and laws, and, therefore, an administrative government of its own”. This point has been so fully and so ably illustrated before this Society by one who has preceded me in this service, that, as I should have no ability to add any thing material to what has been said, and as there would be no occasion to attempt to illustrate it farther, it is not necessary to dwell on it.*

3. A third material and essential point in regard to Presbyterianism, is the entire equality of the clergy, or the fact that there is but one order of ministers in the church. This doctrine we hold in the most absolute sense; on this point there is no difference of opinion among us. We do not, indeed, claim that the belief of this is peculiar to us. Alike in the truth and the importance of this doctrine, we agree with a very considerable portion of the Protestant world, and in defence of the doctrine we make common cause with them. Holding this doctrine, we, without any inconsistency, recognize cheerfully

* “What is Presbyterianism? An Address delivered before the Presbyterian Historical Society, May 1, 1855.” The main principles here referred to are illustrated at length in that address.

and fully the validity of the ordination and the ministrations of other denominations, and regard them as wholly on a level with us, as we regard ourselves in every sense as on a level with them. Neither in the theory of the doctrine, nor in fact, is there any spirit of *exclusiveness* on our part towards other churches as founded on this article of our belief, nor are we, nor can we, be constrained to take a position before the world which compels us to hold up the ministers of other denominations as having no right to minister in holy things; which would compel us to maintain that their ordination, or that baptism and the Lord's supper as administered by them, are invalid; or which would make it necessary to take the position before the world that the churches to which they minister, as well as they who officiate in those churches, are 'left to the uncovenanted mercies of God'—to the charitable hope that they *may be saved*—as the hope is entertained by those who hold those views on a scale not less large and broad, that Turks, and Jews, and Samaritans, and heathen, *may* in like manner be saved.

This doctrine of the equality of the clergy we regard as one of great importance. Taking the history of the church at large, we do not believe that its importance can be easily over-estimated. The effect of the opposite view—of a distinction among the clergy—of different grades of ministers—we think can be traced far back in the history of the church, by an *affinity* which is natural, and which it would be easy to explain, with pomp, and ceremony, and formality in religion; with a spirit of worldly aspiring in the clergy; with despotic civil institutions; with a want of freedom among the people; with the various forms of corruption prevailing in the Greek and Roman Catholic communions; and with the forms of despotism and of darkness which spread over Europe in the middle ages. Charles I, with more sagacity as a man than practical wisdom as a despotic monarch when a nation was struggling for freedom; with more of truth than of prudence as one who by his office was pledged to the support of Prelacy, uttered the memorable maxim, "No bishop, no king:" meaning, and stating a great truth, that "if there is no despotic power in the church, there can be no despotic power in the state; or, if there be liberty in the church, there will be liberty in the state".*

4. A fourth material principle in Presbyterianism is, that there is to be *government* in the church. This we regard as an essential principle. We attach great importance to the idea of government; of a government *as such*. We shall see, in the course of these remarks, how this idea springs from our Calvin-

* What is Presbyterianism? p. 11.

istic or doctrinal view, and by what a natural affinity it becomes, as derived from that, united with the Presbyterian mode of administration; and we shall see also, how it is connected with the idea of *loyalty as such*, and what position the Presbyterian church, when true to its principles, occupies in regard to loyalty and rebellion. It pertains to the present part of my discourse only as a principle which runs through all the arrangements in the church. Government is "the exercise of authority"; it is "direction and restraint over the actions of men in communities, societies, or states". *Webster's Dic.* It is not *advice*, however wise such advice may be; it is not *counsel*, however valuable and important such counsel may be; it is not a suggestion of *expediency*, however proper, in its place, such a suggestion may be; it is not an expression of *opinion* by those who are experienced, wise, or learned, however venerable by years, or however worthy of respect from their rank or social position; it is, as far as it is proper to be exercised, *authority*. It is power. It is designed to settle and determine things. It implies, as its correlative, obedience. The submission which it demands is not the mere submission which the mind renders to good advice, or sage counsel, or sound reason; it is the submission due to those who are appointed to rule, and who are entrusted with authority. Up to the point where it is legitimate, and is not an usurpation, it becomes obligatory on the conscience; and is to be regarded as a religious duty, an act of submission to God.

We attach great importance to this in the church, as we do in the state; an importance to be measured, when properly understood, by the evils of anarchy and disorder. We believe that the church, like the state, is to be characterized by order, and that in the one such order is not less important than in the other. We regard it as connected with all just ideas of right; with all ideas of propriety in a community. Our ideas of *government* are that it is universal. The worlds which God has made, and over which he presides, are not regulated by advice, but by law; a family listens to the expression of the will of the parent not as good counsel but as law; a civil ruler is not merely a wise man, a good counsellor, but is one who is to administer law; a judge decides a case not by giving advice, however wise, but by a sentence declaring what is the law; a community is kept in order, and made prosperous, not by good opinions, but by the steady operation of law. We regard it, therefore, as a very important principle that God has set in the church 'helps, governments', as well as 'teachers', 'miracles', 'gifts of healing', and 'diversities of tongues'. 1 Cor. xii, 28.

5. A fifth material principle in Presbyterianism, is, that it is a *representative* system of government. It supposes, indeed, as has been already remarked, that the power resides with the people—the church—and is to be exercised by them, and that in no case is power to be exercised which has not been conceded by them; yet still it is power to be exercised not by them directly, and as a body, but by those who are chosen by them, and to whom that power is delegated. In this respect it is contrasted, on the one hand, with the exercise of power as derived from the apostles by those who claim to be their successors, and on the other with power exercised by the assembly itself, or the body convened for this purpose: distinguished, on the one hand, from the monarchical principle, and on the other from strict and radical democracy. In this, it accords with the best ideas of liberty in the state. All just notions of liberty have tended to the establishment of this principle, and in the best modern constitutions it is admitted as an elementary principle. It is in fact, in the state, the result of all the conflicts for freedom. The world has made the experiment of the exercise of unrepresented power and authority in the monarchical and despotic forms of government, under the claim of the 'divine right of kings' on the one hand, and of the strict democratic principle on the other, in the struggles for freedom, and has oscillated between one and the other in the great conflicts and throes of nations—dynasties setting up the claim to a divine authority, and swaying a sceptre of tyranny when all liberty of the people was disowned or destroyed, and then a people rising in their might, and dethroning monarchs, and taking the government into their own hands, and exercising the authority directly themselves, until disorder, anarchy, weakness, and failure, prepared the way for a new claim of despotism, by an old hereditary title, or by a military usurpation. In the history of the world no safe medium has been found—no system that would combine authority and freedom; that would constitute a government, and yet not invade the rights of the people; that would secure the best administration of *law*, except that of the principle of representation. *That* combines authority and freedom; that gives to government the sanction of law; that makes the people feel that the authority exercised is their own authority; that furnishes a security against usurped power; that gives stability as distinguished from the actings of a mob; and that principle furnishes the means of defining the power to be exercised by a government, and of committing the great interests of a people where the trust will be least likely to be abused. We are confident that

this principle has been better secured in the Presbyterian mode of administration in the church than in any other form in which Christians have been organized into communities.

6. A *sixth* principle in the Presbyterian mode of government is, that the power of government is limited and bounded by a constitution. The power exercised is not arbitrary power. It is not a mere expression of *will* on the part of the people, or on the part of those who rule. It is not even by an independent and a private interpretation of the Bible, the source of all authority indeed, and the ultimate appeal in determining the government of the church. It is, in reference to government, by authority as *agreed on*; as defined and limited by a constitution. A constitution concedes power, and expresses the limits of power. It defines what may be done; and it prescribes what shall not be done by the very fact that the authority to do a certain thing is *not* found there. The fact that there is a constitution is of the nature of a compact between the church and all who enter the church. It is a public pledge that no power shall be exercised which is not specified in this constitution; and that no one, in regard to his opinions, his faith, or his conduct, shall be affected in any way except under the well-considered and clearly-defined processes arranged in the constitution. An arbitrary sovereign has no limit except that of will or caprice; a mob has no rule of action, nor can any interests intrusted to it have a basis of security. A constitution defines and limits every right; constitutes security in regard to rights; makes the principles already established permanent; encourages labor, secures the avails of industry, diffuses contentment, intelligence, the just administration of law, safety, and peace. All just notions of liberty in modern times are connected with the idea of a *constitution*, and all the progress which society makes is identified with the guarantees and safeguards found under a constitutional government. As agreeing, therefore, with these notions, and as connected with all that is valuable in the state as well as in the church, we, as Presbyterians, attach great importance to the idea of a *constitution*, and have incorporated that idea into our ecclesiastical arrangements more prominently than has been done by any other denomination of Christians.

With these views of Presbyterianism in the strict sense, considered as a system of *government*, I proceed now to notice some of its *affinities*.

The first which I notice, the most remarkable, but not the most obvious, is its affinity for the Calvinistic system of doc-

trine. I notice this first, not because it is the most obvious, but because the two, which would seem to have no natural affinity for each other, have in fact become so combined as to constitute one system in the general estimation of men, and the name *Presbyterianism* is now commonly so used as to designate the result of this amalgamation. Whatever of power there may be in Presbyterianism, for good or for evil, is now understood to be the result of this combination; whatever of confidence there is in the system by those who love it, is connected essentially with this combination; whatever of hatred there is towards the system by wicked men—and there is not a little of that—is hatred cherished not so much against the system considered as a mode of ecclesiastical government, as against a system having in itself an element of power combined with the Calvinistic system of doctrines.

I said that the combination is more remarkable than it is obvious. There would seem, in the nature of the case, to be no natural affinity—no perceptible reason, why this particular form of government should combine with this particular system of doctrines; why the Presbyterian mode of administration and discipline should not be found, in fact, combined with Arminianism, Sabellianism, Pelagianism, Socinianism; or why, when either of these forms of doctrine have effected a lodgment in a Presbytery or Synod, it should not secure a permanent hold, as they may with Prelacy or Independency.

The facts, however, are well established, in whatever way they may be accounted for; and these facts, therefore, as in the natural affinities of the gases, the acids, the metals, the alkalis, become one of the means of ascertaining the true nature of the system. As a matter of fact in the history of the church, the Presbyterian mode of government does *not* combine with Arminianism, with Sabellianism, with Pelagianism, with Socinianism, and if such a union occurs at any time it is only a temporary, and is manifestly a forced connection. There are no permanent Arminian, Pelagian, Socinian Presbyteries, Synods, General Assemblies on the earth. There are no permanent instances where these forms of belief or unbelief take on the Presbyterian form. There are no Presbyterian forms of ecclesiastical administration where they would be long retained. Arminianism combines freely and naturally with Methodism, with Prelacy, with the Greek church, with the Papacy; Pelagianism, Sabellianism, Arianism, Socinianism combine freely with Independency, and most naturally assume that form of administration. There

was doubtless some reason why Dr. Priestley, why Mr. Belsham, why Dr. Channing were *not* Presbyterians; there was a reason why Calvin, Knox, Chalmers, Witherspoon *were*.

The causes of this, not obvious at the first view, may, perhaps, be satisfactorily stated.

(a) Each springs essentially from the same idea—the idea of government, of regularity, of order; the idea that God rules; that government is desirable; that things are, and should be, fixed and stable; that there is, and should be, law; that the affairs of the universe at large, the affairs of society, and the affairs of individuals, should be founded on settled principles, and should not be left to chance or hap-hazard. Calvinism, though it seem to be, and though it is often represented as a mere system of doctrine, or of abstract dogmas having no philosophical foundation and no valuable practical bearing, is, in fact, a system of government—a method and form in which the Divine power is put forth in the administration of the affairs of the universe. It is based on the idea that God rules; that he has a plan; that the plan is fixed and certain; that it does not depend on the fluctuations of the human will, on the caprice of the human heart, or on contingencies and uncertain and undetermined events in human affairs. It supposes that God is supreme; that he has authority; that he has a right to exercise dominion; that for the good of the universe, that right should be exercised, and that infinite power is put forth only in accordance with a plan. Its essential idea, therefore, is that of authority, regularity, order, law; and hence it naturally combines with that form of administration where stability, regularity, order, are most recognized; where there *is* a government; where the government is administered on the fixed principles of a constitution, and is not dependent on the changing phases of society, or the caprices of human feeling.

(b) Each, as we shall soon see, naturally draws to itself the same class of minds. What that class is, it will be most convenient to describe in another part of this address. There is in the world, in all countries and communities, a class that characteristically loves order, law, just government, fixed principles; that seeks to lay the foundations of society and of government deep and firm; that aims to carry fixed principles into the family administration, into the intercourse of man with man, into civil institutions, and into the laws of a country; which seeks guarantees for the rights of man, and the administration of justice; which leaves as little as possible

to the feelings of a populace, and removes government as far as possible from the ascendancy and sway of passion; which seeks to preserve and send forward to future times all that has been secured of value in the past; which has a fondness for permanent endowments in education, in colleges and universities, and in eleemosynary institutions.

Presbyterianism in its fixedness, its order, and its love of law, well represents that idea, and draws to itself that class of minds—not exclusively, I willingly admit, but naturally; Calvinism, as a system of doctrine, beginning with an eternal plan on the part of God, regarding the universe as governed by settled purpose and law, and its affairs as in no sense under the control of chance, and as, therefore, fixed and stable, draws to itself also naturally—I will not here say by any means exclusively—the same class of mind. Yet though it is not in either case so universal that we can claim that all of such classes of minds are drawn to the system, yet it is so natural an affinity, the objects dear to such minds can be so well secured by the principles of Presbyterianism as a system of government, and by Calvinism as a system of doctrine, that we are not surprised to find that there *is* a large portion of the community always that finds its views better represented in this *combined* system than could be found elsewhere, or that these views are, in fact, so often found united together.

(c) Each, therefore—Presbyterianism as a scheme of government, and Calvinism as a system of doctrine—contemplates the same *results*, and we are not surprised to find them seeking a natural alliance, and often combined. That they may exist separately, I do not deny. That the Presbyterian mode of government has been found in a few instances originally combined with other forms of doctrine, or that, in some instances, as now in Geneva, and in some of the Protestant churches in France, in England, in Ireland, the form of Presbyterian government has been retained after the churches have materially departed from the original faith which bound the two systems together, is not to be denied. Nor is it to be denied that the Calvinistic doctrine may be found under other modes of ecclesiastical government. To a certain extent it *is* found in connection with Prelacy and Independency, but still the regular historical fact is, that the two seek an alliance, and that they have such a natural affinity, and are so often found together, as to justify the popular use of the term *Presbyterianism* as denoting a peculiar mode of church government combined with Calvinistic doctrines. It is the carrying out ideas of order, authority, and law as manifested in government and in

doctrine; as a statement of the way in which God controls the universe, and of the best mode of preserving order, and of securing just government on earth.

Proceeding now with this idea of Presbyterianism *as* the union of a certain mode of government with a certain form of doctrine, I shall notice some of the affinities of the system as thus understood.

The most obvious, perhaps, is its affinity for a simple mode of worship. The facts as bearing on this point are so well understood as to demand little more than a bare suggestion that they are so. Nothing is more certain than that history, as a general statement, records the progress and the prevalence of Presbyterianism as connected with the simplest forms of worship; nothing is clearer than that the word Presbyterianism suggests at once to the popular mind the idea of a repugnance to gorgeous forms of devotion, to imposing rites and ceremonies, to a liturgy, to splendid vestments, to worship celebrated in magnificent cathedrals, and to the idea of grace communicated by official sanctity in a priesthood. The lofty cathedrals of the old world were built with other ideas of worship than those which are embraced by Presbyterians. It was always difficult to adjust the old church of St. Peter's at Geneva to the worship celebrated there with Calvin as a pastor, or to keep up an idea of a correspondence between the comparatively simple worship which *he* introduced there, and the lofty edifice built with reference to the pomp of the Roman Catholic worship. Even now, with all that there is of rites and forms in the Episcopal Church, no one can enter Westminster Abbey or York Minster without feeling a sense of incongruity and unfitness between the vast and magnificent structures where the worship is celebrated, and the mode of the worship; and nothing could adapt those structures, or St. Mark's at Venice, or the cathedrals at Cologne or Milan, or St. Peter's at Rome, to the idea of *Presbyterian* worship. In the very form of the Gothic edifice there is a manifest incongruity between the structure and the modes of worship preferred by Presbyterians; and the idea which strikes the mind where such a structure is reared is that, as it was originally adapted to a mode of worship materially unlike the *Presbyterian* view of the design of devotion, so it will be forever impossible to combine the two.

So remarkable is this principle; so deeply is it, from some cause, imbedded in the very nature of Presbyterianism, that it has been impossible to retain in connection with it, or to revive permanently even those modified forms of devotion, and those

remnants of pomp and show in the worship of God, which some of the Reformers adopted under Presbyterian organizations. It is known that some of the Reformed churches under Presbyterian organizations adopted, in a modified way, Liturgical Forms of worship; it is known also that having naturally died away, from the very nature of Presbyterianism, an attempt has been made in our times to revive them. Yet these forms cannot be revived and perpetuated under Presbyterian auspices. There is, from some cause, a repellantcy between the two, and Liturgical Forms, imposing ceremonies in religion, pomp, and splendor of ritual, will seek and find their natural affinities in other denominations. They cannot be attached permanently to Presbyterianism. The history of Presbyterianism demonstrates that, for some cause, it seeks simplicity of worship, and that its true spirit flourishes only there.

It is not difficult to account for this fact. Presbyterianism, in the form in which I am now noticing it, as a combination of a particular mode of government with a certain system of doctrine, gives such a prominence to one great doctrine, and guards that doctrine with such anxious care, that it looks with a jealous eye on all those forms and ceremonies which would tend in any way to render it obscure, or to displace it in the estimation of the worshipper. That doctrine is the doctrine of justification by faith. It is in the view of all Presbyterians a great principle that the merit of our salvation is wholly in the Redeemer—in the sacrifice which he made for mankind on the cross; that that doctrine is to stand *alone* in the matter of man's salvation; that nothing else is to enter into a sinner's justification; that there is no human merit that can be urged as a ground of acceptance with God; that the single idea that the merit of Christ is the sole ground of justification is to be kept before the mind, with nothing that shall tend to obscure it in the view of the worshipper, or to turn away the mind from it.

Thus Presbyterianism as a system, and in its very nature, rejects all idea of human merit, and every thing which the mind of the worshipper might be in danger of construing *as* merit. The mind is to be held to the doctrine of justification by faith alone. *Some* forms of worship are, indeed, indispensable, from the nature of the case, but Presbyterianism insists that they shall be as simple as possible; that they shall be such that the mind shall not be in any necessary danger of mistake on the subject; that they shall not be such as shall have any natural tendency to turn away the mind from the doctrine of justification by faith; that there shall be no such

view of the sacredness of the priesthood by a pretended derivation from the apostles as having authority to forgive sin; that there shall be no such view of the sacraments as having an efficacy, derived from a priesthood, to regenerate the soul; that there shall be no such view of the power of imparting grace by the imposition of sacred hands; that there shall be no such idea of sanctity or merit attached to the bowing of the head at the name of Jesus, or to genuflexions, or to any other forms and ceremonies of religion, as to *displace* in any way the doctrine of justification by faith, the idea of entire dependence on the merits of the Saviour, in the mind of the worshipper.

We think that it is not easy to separate an idea of merit from imposing and gorgeous and painful forms of religion, and that while there is no indispensable *necessary* connection between such forms and the idea of human merit, yet, as the mind of man is constituted, there is a constant danger of obscuring the doctrine of justification by faith *by* such forms. As a matter of fact in the history of the church, pompous rites and ceremonies did effectually obscure that doctrine until it was lost from human view, and the Reformation became necessary to give it the prominence which it has in the New Testament. Nor is it easy now to secure in the view of a worshipper the prominence which the New Testament gives to that doctrine, in connection with the idea that there is a sacred order of men to whom properly pertains the office of a *priesthood*; or with the idea of grace imparted directly by the sacrament of the Lord's Supper in virtue of the official character of those by whom it is administered, or with the idea of such an efficacy in baptism as to secure regeneration. Whatever justness of view there may be in individual members in such churches, and whatever influence of evangelical doctrine there may be in such churches, yet it is rather *in spite* of such views, and of such rites and ceremonies, than by any tendency in such rites and views to secure such influences; nor are we much surprised at any defection of faith in such churches on the great cardinal doctrine of the Reformation, or with any disposition in any portions of such churches towards the views which prevailed when the doctrine of justification by faith was wholly obscured and lost amidst the imposing forms and ceremonies of the Roman Catholic communion.

The next thing which I notice in regard to this combination—this union of the principles of a certain mode of government and a certain system of doctrines which we call Presbyterianism—is its affinity for a certain class of minds, or the

probability that it will draw to itself a class of minds of a peculiar order which will not be as likely to find their views represented by any other form of government and belief.

I mean by this, that there may be presumed to be in every community a class of minds which will be more likely to be Presbyterian than to be drawn to any other denomination, Protestant or Papal; that an appeal to them on the subject of religion from the Presbyterian standpoint will be more likely to reach them, and affect them, than an appeal from any other quarter; that Christianity itself will be more likely to commend itself to them when presented in the Presbyterian form than in any other form; that they will be more likely to be converts to Christ under that form than any other; that they will see fewer objections to the gospel as presented in that form than in any other form; that they will see in that form more that commends itself to their views of what true religion is, and must be, than in any other; and that, in the Presbyterian church they will be more useful as Christians than they would be in connection with any other denomination.

While I say this, however, I would say also for myself, without now claiming to represent the views of any whom I address, that I believe that the same thing might be said by those connected with other denominations, and with just as much truth and propriety. For the same reasons why I believe that there is a class in every community which will find more that accords with their views of religion, and which will be more edified and more useful in the Presbyterian church than in any other, I believe also that there is a class of minds in every community which will find more that accords with their views of religion, and with the structure of their own minds, and which will be more happy and more useful in the Episcopal church, or in the Methodist church, or in other Protestant churches, than they would in the Presbyterian church. And as, with this view, I should regard it as indicating no want of charity, and as no evidence of a narrow and illiberal spirit, for one of another denomination to *say* this, so the remark which I now make cannot be construed as indicating a narrow and illiberal spirit, or as indicating a want of charity if said by one who is a Presbyterian. No man who has any just view of the human mind can doubt that men, equally honest, from their natural temperament; from the mode of their training; from their standpoint in religion; from their habit of viewing things; from their associations in life, will take different views on a subject so important and so difficult as religion, or that they may find more that is congenial in carrying out an honest

purpose to lead a religious life with one class of persons rather than with another. Nor, understanding human nature as it is, can it be doubted that harmony and peace can be better promoted by persons entertaining peculiar views being associated in one organization than would be if the same persons were associated with those of a different temperament, and entertaining different views. In like manner, for myself, I believe that there are not a few sincere Christians who will be more edified, and who will be more useful, in connection with the forms of religion—the Liturgical services—in the Episcopal Church than they would be in the severe and simple modes of devotion which, as Presbyterians, we regard as more in conformity with the spirit of the New Testament, and as better adapted to our comfort in devotion, to our usefulness, and to our growth in grace, and to the general interests of religion in the world.

Without, therefore, in the slightest degree desiring to interfere with other denominations in setting forth the advantages of their own modes of worship, and showing their adaptedness to promote the edification of Christians, and to extend religion in the world by such words and by such arguments as they may prefer to use, and to any extent which they may please, it is not improper for us, on an occasion like this, to state the reasons why we suppose that there is a class of minds in the community which will be more likely to be Presbyterians than to be attached to any other denomination; and to refer to our special mission in the world in securing the proper influence of religion on that class of minds.

(a) There are men whose native characteristics of mind, or whose habits of thought as they have been cultivated, incline them to the Calvinistic views of religion. They are men who in their philosophy look first to God; to government; to order; to law; to stability:—men who naturally regard all things as the result or the carrying out of a fixed plan; who see no evidence of permanency or security but in such a plan; whose minds could find no security or peace in the idea of chance or contingency, or in the results which would follow from making the human will, human wisdom, or human freedom, the centre or the standpoint in the contemplation of the universe. Such men, when their minds are turned to religion, will be Calvinists and not Arminians, and any attempt to bring them under the influence of religion from an Arminian point of view would be at a disadvantage, if not a failure altogether. Perhaps it is not too much to say that there *are* minds which sooner than embrace the Arminian views of religion

with all the appeals which Christianity under that form could present to them, would rather embrace an infidel view with which their philosophy *could* be identified; or, rather perhaps, it should be said that their views of order, of law, of plan, and of the necessity of eternal counsels and purposes would be so settled that they could not embrace religion in any form if it was to be presented only with the Arminian view. Whatever may be said of John Wesley, it is certain that Jonathan Edwards could never have been any thing but a Calvinist; and when we think of the native structure of his mind, we never associate it with any other possible idea in religion than that of Calvinism.

This class of minds is largely diffused through every community; and it has characteristics of great value in regard to religion. It will be likely to be calm and sober in its views; firm in principle; not easily swayed by passion; rigid in its adherence to truth; friendly to just government, order, and law. It will be found everywhere in religion as representing the religion of *principle*, rather than the religion of *sentiment*.

(b) Again. There are numbers of persons who by the very manner of their conversion become Calvinists, and who can never be any thing else than Calvinists. They are spiritually-born Calvinists, and the Calvinistic idea will be incorporated into all their religious convictions, and will, under any external form of devotion, attend them through life. In their conversion their sense of sin is so deep; their conviction of the native obduracy of the heart, and the perversion of the will, is so entire; they are made so conscious of their utter helplessness; they are led by their own experience to attach so significant—almost so literal—a meaning to the statement that men are by nature ‘*dead in sin*’; the manner in which their attention was arrested, and in which they were convicted of sin, was so clearly a matter of sovereignty—so entirely without any agency or purpose of their own, so clearly not the act of man, so absolutely and unequivocally the work of God; and their conversion—their change of heart—was so manifestly to their view the work of God—the result of a creative power—that they can never doubt the doctrine of the divine agency in conversion—the doctrine of the divine purposes—the doctrine of election as bearing on them—and the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints as constituting the only ground of *their* hopes that they will ever reach eternal life. Knowing as we now do, the mental process through which Dr. Thomas Scott, and Dr. Chalmers passed when they were converted, we see at once how

their conversion naturally issued in Calvinism, nor can we see how, under that process of conversion, they *could* ever have glided into Arminian views.

(c) Again. Much of the educated mind in this country, and in other lands, will be likely to be Calvinistic. In our own country, in Scotland, in Ireland, in England, in Switzerland, in Holland, a portion of the young, not few in number and destined to exert a large influence in public affairs, receive their early training in the families of Calvinists, and under the direct teaching of the Shorter Catechism. In our own country, a majority of the colleges of the land were founded under Calvinistic influences, and have received their patronage from Calvinistic sources, and are under the instruction of men who favor the Calvinistic views. The first college in the land, and the second, and the third, and the fourth, were founded by Calvinists, and no small part of those which have been since founded were originated and are controlled by those of the same faith. These, indeed, are not sectarian institutions. They are not designed primarily or mainly to give instruction in the Calvinistic views. They are not exclusive in regard to other views. But, in the nature of the case, it is inevitable that these views will give shape and form to the philosophy which is taught in these institutions; that the first impressions in regard to religion will be derived from these views; that minds educated in these institutions will go out without prejudice against these views, and that the educated mind of the country to a large extent will identify religion with these views, and be prepared to welcome that form of doctrine when such minds are brought under the power of religion at all.

(d) Again. The history of our own country has been such that that class of minds may be expected to be found extensively diffused over the nation. The class of minds for which Calvinism has an affinity, or which has been trained under Calvinistic influences, has had an important agency in the affairs of the nation, and has contributed not less than any one class of minds in making us as a people what we are.

The Puritan mind, to which our country owes so much in its character, and in the form of its civil institutions, is essentially Calvinistic. The form in which Puritanism first developed itself in the mother country was essentially Calvinistic; the Pilgrims who landed on Plymouth Rock were Calvinists; the churches which they formed were Calvinistic churches; the colleges and schools which they established were based not less on the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly than on the spelling book, on Euclid, and on Homer. That mind,

more than any other mind that constituted an element in our early history, has been diffused over this great land, and is found now *as* a powerful element in all our States and territories from Maine to California. It is still a leading mind in religion, in education, in civil and military matters; in all the powerful organizations that affect the destinies of our country. That mind is not Unitarian; not Arminian; not Prelatical; and though Unitarianism has sprung out of it, and though that class of minds may be found in connection with Arminian views, and in connection with the Prelatical forms of worship, yet we cannot but be sensible of an incongruity in those connections, and we attach almost instinctively to the Puritan mind found in those connections the idea which we attach to those who 'remove ancient landmarks'—the idea of apostacy from the appropriate form in which such elements should be found.

The Huguenot mind, one of the most noble, liberal, large, warm-hearted, and courteous, in all the classes of mind that have moulded our institutions, is essentially Calvinistic, and naturally develops itself in the form of Presbyterianism. Not a few of the most eminent, learned, and benevolent Christians in our country have had this origin, and such minds have shed a lustre at the same time on our common Christianity and on the Presbyterian church.

The Scotch mind is essentially Presbyterian. There was a natural affinity between Edinburgh and Geneva; between Knox and Calvin. Nowhere in the world have there been such staunch defenders of Presbyterianism as in Scotland; nowhere has there been so decided opposition to Arminianism and to Prelacy; nowhere have so many martyrs shed their blood in defence of Calvinistic and Presbyterian principles; nowhere has it been so difficult to establish Prelacy, or to institute an order of bishops as in Scotland. So natural, so deep and abiding is this affinity, that the idea of a Scotch Episcopalian, a Scotch Methodist, or a Scotch Unitarian, always strikes us as incongruous: a thing to be accounted for in a particular case, and not on any general principles, as any other anomaly is to be.

The Scotch-Irish mind, so extensively diffused in our country, is also essentially Calvinistic and Presbyterian, and when we meet this mind we anticipate of course that we have found, if it takes a religious turn, an ally for Calvinism and Presbyterianism.

These classes of mind have some peculiar characteristics. They are firm, resolute decided; they act more from principle

than from impulse; they are friendly to order and law; they are the friends of sound learning and science; they will be certain to found and patronize schools and colleges; they will be reliable in all times when great principles are at stake, and they will not be far off when the spirit of martyrdom is demanded. That class of mind *may* be harsh, rigid, possibly blunt, uncourteous, and rough, regarding great principles as more important than the manner in which they are defended; but it will be decided.

That class of minds is scattered extensively over our country, and it is one of the missions of the Presbyterian church to which it is especially called in endeavoring to diffuse the common principles of Christianity, so to direct its efforts and its influences towards this class of minds that it shall be Christian and not infidel. The question in regard to this class of minds is not mainly whether it shall be Calvinistic *or* Arminian; not whether it shall be Trinitarian *or* Socinian; not whether it shall be Presbyterian *or* Prelatical, Presbyterian *or* Methodist, Episcopalian *or* Catholic, *it is whether it shall be Christian or infidel*: whether it shall embrace the principles of Knox and Chalmers, *or* those of Hume and Kames and Monboddo. No men make better Christians, and no men make as dangerous sceptics, and there is no more important work to be done in our country than that which seems properly to pertain to the Presbyterian church, to see that this class of mind shall be saved from infidelity, and shall be trained to believe and embrace the Gospel.

The next thing which I notice in regard to this system of religion is its affinity for the doctrine of human rights, and the principles of liberty. It is a fundamental principle, as represented in the words adopted by each of the branches of the church represented in this Society, that "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in any thing contrary to his word, or beside it, in matters of faith and worship." Confession of Faith, ch. xx, § ii. This great principle lies at the foundation of all our notions of liberty and of the rights of man. It is nourished and sustained by all our veneration for the Bible, as a divine Revelation, as the source of law, as the fountain of doctrine, as containing a true history of man in his creation, fall, and redemption, and as an emanation of divine wisdom:—by that respect for the word of God which has always so characterized Presbyterians that the great principle enunciated by Chillingworth that "The Bible is the religion of Protestants", has been more perfectly maintained and carried

out in our denomination than in any other Protestant branch of the church. This great principle has been incorporated into all Presbyterian Confessions of Faith, and in no other branch of the church, and under no other form of belief, has there been a more stern regard for liberty and the rights of man, and a more firm resistance of tyranny and oppression.

We may begin at Geneva—abused and slandered Geneva—and move among the Huguenots, and pass to Holland, and recall the scenes in England in the time of Charles and in the Commonwealth, and retrace the bloody history of Scotland, and bring to our recollection the history of the Presbyterian church in our own country, and we shall trace all along a close connection between the principles which we hold as Presbyterians and the spread of the doctrines of civil liberty, and we may challenge the world for a record of more honorable struggles in behalf of freedom and the rights of man than have been manifested in connection with the Presbyterian Faith.

I have not time to illustrate this point properly, or to consider the full influence of our Calvinistic views on the subject of the rights of man, or as bearing on the subject of oppression and slavery.

I have already referred to the principle which we hold in regard to the right of self-government in the church, or of power as emanating, under God, from the people—a principle which as applied to civil affairs constitutes the foundation of liberty in the state. I have referred to the principle of representation as recognized in our system of Government—a principle now regarded as essential to all just notions of civil liberty. I have adverted to our idea of constitutional limits and bounds in the exercise of power—a principle so vital as a check against arbitrary power, and so essential to the protection of vested rights, to rights of property, to freedom of speech, to personal security, and to the protection of character. I have incidentally adverted to the right of conscience, and to our direct and supreme responsibility to God. As these principles are applicable in the state as well as in the church; as they pertain to men as men, and are, therefore, in our view, of universal applicability and importance, perhaps it might be proper for me to close this part of the subject here as having suggested all that is essential to the point now under consideration.

But there are a few thoughts, derived especially from Presbyterianism in its Calvinistic aspect as bearing on liberty, which it seems necessary to suggest. Part of those views are held also by other Christians; part are peculiar to us. They

are views which contemplate the human race as on a level, and as endowed by their Maker with equal rights—'life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness.'

The fundamental view on this subject, which we hold in the main in common with other denominations of Christians, but which we think we have some advantage over others in presenting in its full force, is that **THE RACE IS ONE**. The views which we entertain on this subject, partly in common with other Christians, and partly as springing from our peculiar doctrines, make it essential, if we would be consistent, that we should maintain also a steady opposition to slavery in all its forms, and that we should be advocates of universal freedom.

(a) The race, we hold, is one. "God hath made of one blood all the nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth." Acts xvii, 26. This doctrine we embrace in the strictest sense. We regard it as essential to true faith in the Bible, and as vital to all just views of religion. We could not retain our faith in the Bible for a moment if we were compelled to regard men as made up of different races of independent origin; we could not retain our views of the work of redemption except as we believe that there was one head of the race, of all human beings, as originally created; and one head of the race, of all human beings, in the work of redemption. This doctrine we maintain in opposition to all the efforts which are made to establish the idea that human beings are constituted of essentially different races, having a different origin, and having each its own peculiar ancestry or head:—that there have been separate acts of creation in reference to the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Ethiopian, or the American races. All the differences in color, complexion, cranial bones, and facial angles in the race we hold are to be accounted for on some other supposition than that God originally created different races of men, or that men have been developed from the lower forms of the animal creation. But this idea, when properly pursued and applied, is fatal to all the conceptions of slavery; to the supposition that human beings are ever to be held as property, or to be placed on a level with chattels and things. God by creating the race "of one blood" has made an impassable barrier between man and the ape, the ourang-outang, the chimpanzee, the gorilla, the ox and the donkey, and no man can be held as property without a violation of the scriptural idea in regard to the creation of man.

(b) Again. We entertain views of the relation of man to Adam such as to suggest the idea of equal human rights, and such as to constitute an argument against slavery. We re-

gard Adam as the head of the one race, as the one ancestor of all human beings, as sustaining a peculiar covenant relation to all his posterity; and hence we regard all, of all colors and conditions, as having his image, and as implicated in his act. This doctrine we hold more decidedly than it is held by any other denomination of Christians, for it is *essential* to all notions of Calvinism. It has gone into all our Confessions of Faith; it lies at the very foundation of all our system of doctrines. Whether the doctrine be held that we have been affected by his fall by 'immediate' imputation or by 'mediate' imputation; whether we regard Adam as the constituted 'federal head' of all his posterity, or as merely the 'natural' head; whether we attempt to explain the effect of his disobedience on his posterity by a direct and special act of God constituting him a 'representative' of the race, or by natural laws—by an arrangement in fact universal in its nature, but existing in the highest form in his relation to his posterity, we are unanimous in the belief that *his* act involved the race in ruin; that it made it certain that all his posterity would be born with a fallen nature, with corrupt hearts, with a proneness to sin; that his fall was the source of death—the reason why *any* human being would ever die, and why *all* human beings must die; and that thus, alike in the fact that they have derived their existence through him, and have inherited a corrupt nature from him, they are all on a level before God.

The doctrine of the unity of the race, and the equality of all men before God, is thus secured by our doctrine of the creation and fall of man. Adam in the beginning was the head of THE RACE—Caucasians, Mongolians, Americans, *Africans*; and, as in the creation, so in the apostacy, there is one great brotherhood. Each one, no matter what his color or his country, is a brother to every other one in human form, alike in creation and in ruin. As the creation made no one in the condition of a slave, so the fall has put no one necessarily in that condition, and has left to no one on any ground such superiority as to lay the foundation of a claim to be an owner or a master.

(c) The same thing is true in the doctrine which we hold in respect to redemption. In the views which we entertain on that subject, partly in common with other Christians, and partly as peculiar to ourselves, we regard all the races of men as on a level; all as ransomed by the same blood; all, so far as the work of redemption bears on them, or appertains to them, as viewed by God with the same feeling, and invested with the same privileges; all as ransomed *men*, not one of them as

a *chattel* or a *thing*. There is, indeed, as is well known, a difference of opinion among those who bear the Presbyterian name, as to the *extent* of the atonement made by Christ, whether it had reference to the whole of the race, or whether it was made only for the elect, considered as elect; but whatever difference of views may be entertained on that point, there is entire agreement on the immediate point now before us. Even where it is held that the atonement was made for only a part of mankind, still it is not maintained that the application of the atonement was determined by the question of *racess*, as if one were in any respect superior to another before God. Christ, even on that theory, did not die for the Caucasian race as such, nor was the African race as such excluded in his design in making an atonement for man. In the divine purpose the line, if such a line was run, was not between the Mongolian, the Caucasian, the African, the American races as such, or indeed with any reference to such classifications of the human family, or with any idea that as connected with redemption any one division of the human family had any superiority over the others. The line was run from causes which are unexplained to us, but it was not for *this* cause, nor can any one of these classes undertake to enslave any other class without the moral certainty that he is defrauding of natural rights those for whom Christ died; that in making a slave, or reducing any one to the condition of a chattel or a thing, he is subjecting to that wrong, one who in the work of redemption is to be regarded as a brother; or one, who, so far as the idea of *race* is concerned, has been redeemed with the precious blood of the Son of God.

(*d*) The same idea is suggested by our doctrine of election. With all of us this *is* a cardinal doctrine; a doctrine to which we trace all our personal hopes of salvation, and all our expectation of the success of the Gospel in the world. In the system of truth which we hold we do not think that its importance can be over-estimated.

But the division of the human race which the doctrine of election contemplates in reference to the church on earth, and to the final condition of the race in the future world, is not a division by any imagined upper and lower *strata* in society; it is not a division by geography, by climate, by national peculiarities. The line is not run by races. Men are chosen to salvation not as Caucasians, as Mongolians, as Ethiopians, as Americans. The eternal destiny of man, according to that doctrine, is not determined by the size or shape of the cranium, by the measurement of the facial angle, by the crispness

or the straightness of the hair, by the thickness of the lips, or by the color of the skin. What it *is*, we may not be able, with our wisdom, to determine, but we are agreed that it is not *this*. The elect of God are found in the '*quarters*'—the humble cottages on the '*plantation*' as well as in the homes of the masters; and we go to Africa, to the Islands of the Sea, to the abodes of Mogul Tartars, and to the wigwam of the American savages, expecting to find the elect *there* as really as when we preach to Teutons, Gauls, Celts and Saxons.

The African is a man redeemed by the blood of Jesus. The Caucasian is a man redeemed by the blood of Jesus. When we have said this, we have said what is the most significant thing in regard to man. We have suggested that which rises above all the distinctions of wealth, and caste, and complexion, and intellectual grade. We have referred to man as he is regarded by the Creator on his throne; as he was regarded by the Redeemer on the cross; as he is regarded by the Holy Ghost in his '*office-work*' in converting and sanctifying the soul.

It follows logically from this view—a view which we all entertain, that no one should regard another as a slave—as property—as a chattel—as an article of merchandise; that no one should rob another of the proper avails of his own industry; that no one should deprive another of access to the word of God—the sacred record of his own redemption, his guide in duty, and the foundation of his hope of heaven; that no one should interfere in the sacred relation of husband and wife, parent and child, and "put asunder what God hath joined together"; that no one should *make* a human being a slave—that no one should *own* or sell a redeemed brother.

It was in entire accordance with these principles that in the early periods of our Presbyterian history, when as yet we were few and feeble, and when as yet there was no General Assembly in the land, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia—the original of two of the branches of the Presbyterian family represented in this Society, in 1787 gave solemn utterance to the following sentiment: "The Synod of New York and Philadelphia do highly approve of the general principles in favor of universal liberty that prevail in America, and they recommend it to all the people under their care, to use the most prudent measures consistent with the interest and the state of civil society, in the parts where they live, to procure, eventually, the FINAL ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA".

And it was in accordance with these principles that the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in 1818 uttered

its memorable declaration before the world — a declaration which to this day stands on its Records unrepealed—unmodified in reference to both the branches of that church:—"We consider the voluntary enslaving of one part of the human race by another, as a gross violation of the most precious rights of human nature; as utterly inconsistent with the law of God, which requires us to love our neighbor as ourselves; and as totally irreconcilable with the spirit and principles of the Gospel of Christ, which enjoin that 'All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them'. Slavery creates a paradox in the moral system — it exhibits rational, accountable, and immortal beings, in such circumstances as scarcely to leave them the power of moral action. It exhibits them as dependent on the will of others, whether they shall receive religious instruction; whether they shall know and worship the true God; whether they shall enjoy the ordinances of the Gospel; whether they shall perform the duties, and cherish the endearments of husbands and wives, parents and children, neighbors and friends; whether they shall preserve their chastity and purity, or regard the dictates of justice and humanity.

"From the view of the consequences resulting from the practice into which Christian people have most inconsistently fallen, of enslaving a portion of their *brethren* of mankind—for 'God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth'—it is manifestly the duty of all Christians who enjoy the light of the present day, when the inconsistency of slavery, both with the dictates of humanity and religion has been demonstrated, and as generally seen and acknowledged, to use their honest, earnest, and unwearied endeavors, to correct the errors of former times, and as speedily as possible to efface this blot on our holy religion, and to obtain the complete abolition of slavery throughout Christendom, and if possible throughout the world".*

I need not say to this audience that the other branches of the Presbyterian church represented in this Society fully coincide in these sentiments. There is no portion of the whole church of Christ on earth that has been more decided in the expression of its sentiments on the subject of slavery, and more firm and consistent in its opposition to the system, than the Scotch Presbyterian churches represented here to-night. Not a slave is owned by any of their members; not one who is a holder of human beings as property would be tolerated in their communion.

* Minutes of the General Assembly for 1818, pp. 29, 30.

This is the spirit of true Presbyterianism. This is the proper carrying out in one direction of those grand principles which as Calvinistic Presbyterians we hold. In the noble testimony to which I have just referred, there is not one word which is inconsistent with the principles which as Presbyterians we all hold; there is not one word which those principles do not naturally suggest; there is not one word which could be withdrawn without a violation of those principles. First in our country, except the Society of Friends, the Presbyterian church proclaimed these views — views so much in accordance with the sentiments of the men, North and South, who fought for our Independence, and who laid the foundation of our civil institutions. Nor can those principles be abandoned without a renunciation of the great doctrines which we hold in regard to the creation of man; the unity of the race; the work of redemption; and the doctrine of God's sovereignty in choosing man unto life. He who is the advocate of slavery violates each and all of those principles; and when Presbyterians violate those principles, and the church at large becomes the defender of Slavery, it is not wonderful that God visits a people with such heavy judgments as are now spreading over the region where slavery has been established, and where it has been defended in the pulpits of our land.

It was my purpose to have noticed the affinity of Presbyterianism for learning, and for the diffusion of knowledge among the masses of men. I should not have insisted on this as *peculiar* to Presbyterianism, but I should have shown from the principles which we hold, and from the history of Presbyterianism, how it has been, and is, the patron of schools, academies, colleges, seminaries of learning; how those principles lead to sound views on the liberty of the press; how they are carried out in the arrangements for the diffusion of Christian literature.

But I have already detained you too long. There remains one point, however, in reference to which at the present time, and under existing circumstances in our country, I should be recreant to my duty to you and to the cause if I did not, at least, allude to it. I refer to the affinity of the principles which we hold to loyalty—loyalty to just government—loyalty to our country.

The very foundation of our principles of Calvinism is laid in the duty of loyalty—loyalty to God and to his government. The sum of all our doctrines, and all our efforts, is to bring men back to allegiance to the laws and the government of

our Maker. There is a government over the universe, a government of law; there is a government under which, from the perfection of the Great Ruler, there is secured in his administration all which we endeavor to secure, though so imperfectly, by a *constitution*. Beyond all the powers of any human arrangement—any wisdom or permanency in the constitutions of civil government—the constitution of the government of the universe is fixed. The limits of power and of right are determined. There is the utmost security against any usurpation of power; there is the most absolute security against any invasion of right; there are all the checks and safeguards appointed for securing the permanency and the wise administration of government forever.

The tendency of Presbyterianism, from the nature of the case, is to loyalty. Presbyterianism does not, indeed, reject the principle that there *are* cases where it is right to throw off a government, and to change it by revolution; but its tendency is to loyalty—loyalty to established government as such; loyalty to a government administered in conformity to a constitution; loyalty to the principles of liberty; loyalty to a country as such; loyalty to 'the powers that be'. Were there time, it would be easy to show how this has been illustrated in other lands than ours—but that must be now passed by.

On this subject there is time to say only that the history of our denomination, in the dark periods of our country's struggles for freedom, has been such as to fill the heart of every Presbyterian with gratitude for the past, and with a profound respect for our principles as related to human rights, to patriotism, to civil liberty. Whoever among the clergy of the land, in the time of the Revolution, were disloyal, Presbyterians were not. Whoever they were,—and there were many such, who embarrassed the government, who rejoiced in the reverses, the sorrows, and the defeat of our armies, or in the success of the enemy; whoever they were,—and there were many such,—who gave 'aid and comfort to the enemy'; whoever they were who refused to pray for the success of the armies of the struggling colonies,—and there were many such;—whoever they were who were found in traitorous communication with the enemy, Presbyterian clergymen were not of that number. By prayer; by preaching; by their presence in the army as chaplains; by their zeal in encouraging their people to leave their homes in defence of their country; by correspondence; by humble and constant trust in God, the Presbyterian ministers of that day have acquired, and deserve a noble place among the Revolutionary patriots,

and the true history of our country cannot be written without an honorable reference to the course of the Presbyterian Church. Some other denominations are, and must be, reluctant ever to refer to the history of their clergymen and many of their people in the time of the American Revolution; our denomination is willing that all that occurred—all that was done by us as a denomination—should be written in letters of living light to be read by all mankind. The past is fixed; and fixed as we would desire it to be. We would not wish to alter it. There are no Presbyterian names as connected with the trying periods of our Revolutionary history to which the world will attach the idea of dishonor. There is not a line on that subject which we would desire to expunge or change.

The struggle is again upon us; for the same principles; the same country; the same essential issues. Happy and honored evermore shall we be if in this struggle we are found evincing the spirit of our fathers; like them sustaining the government in the great struggle; loyal to its principles and to our own; commending our country and its cause in no ambiguous language to God in our prayers; encouraging our people to the work of patriotism; frowning on treason; rejoicing in the success of our arms; standing in our place boldly, firmly, nobly, in the support of the government, the constitution, the laws, the liberty of the nation.

ART. II.—THE SOURCES OF CRIME.

By E. C. WINES, D.D., LL.D., New York.

Annual Reports of the Prison Association of New York from 1844 to 1862.

An examination of the 18 Annual Reports of the New York Prison Association has produced in our minds a profound conviction of the excellence of this organization, and of the importance and value of its labors. These Reports not only show a vast amount of work done, and well done, but they embody many able and luminous discussions of questions connected with crimes and their punishment, with prison discipline and prison reform, and with the treatment of criminals, both while undergoing the penalty of the law and subsequently to their discharge.

Prominent among the discussions to which we refer, we place those which relate to the sources of crime. Numerous and valuable hints on this subject are scattered through these Reports; but in the fourth and tenth we find two extended and elaborate essays upon the question. They are in the form of letters, addressed to the Corresponding Secretary of the Association, by the Hon. John Stanton Gould, one of its Vice-Presidents. We propose to make these essays the basis of the present paper, condensing within the limits of a single article the great mass of facts and suggestions, which Mr. Gould has embodied in his inquiries; not, however, to the exclusion of other facts and arguments, drawn from the remaining portions of the Society's Reports, as well as from independent sources.

Before entering upon the direct inquiry into the sources of crime, we offer a preliminary explanation of the term.

Crime, then, we take to be such a violation of the rights of others, as is cognizable by human laws and punishable by human tribunals. It is any conduct, which is liable to judicial investigation and punishment at the hands of the civil authorities. It is by no means uncommon for crime, in the popular apprehension and dialect, to be confounded with vice and sin. It will make our path of inquiry clearer, and the results more valuable, if we can succeed in discriminating wisely and defining accurately the meaning of these several terms. According to the strict etymological derivation of the words, crime is that which is punishable; vice, that which ought to be avoided; sin, that which is hurtful. Crime is injurious to the rights of others, violates human enactments, and may be punished by the laws of the land. Vice is injurious to ourselves, and ought, on that account, to be avoided. Sin has its seat in the heart, violates the divine law, and, by a reflex action, is in the highest degree hurtful to ourselves. Murder is a *crime*, because it invades the rights of the murdered person, violates human laws, and may be punished by human governments. Opium-eating is a *vice*, because it is injurious to the eater, and should therefore be shunned by him. Ingratitude is a *sin*, because it has its seat in the heart, is a breach of the law of God, and hurts him who is guilty of it by drawing upon himself the divine displeasure: sin, accordingly is a generic term, embracing every form of guilt, and including, as species, both vice and crime. Every crime, every vice, is a sin; but every sin is by no means either a vice or a crime. It is the province of the theologian to investigate the nature and remedy of sin; of the moralist, to trace out the causes and cure of vice; and of the legislator, to provide for the punishment and prevention of crime.

While, therefore, we freely admit and contend, that the purification of the heart is a work which belongs only and wholly to God, we nevertheless maintain that crime may be almost if not entirely suppressed by the conjoint efforts of government and people, wisely, vigorously, and perseveringly put forth. In making this assertion, that it is within the ability, and is the duty of the legislator, to prevent the commission of crime, we invest him with no attribute of Deity, nor any power over the hearts and consciences of men. Let it be remembered that crimes are, properly speaking, only those violations of public or private rights which are susceptible of accurate definition and of clear and undoubted proof; and all theological difficulty vanishes. We may conceive crime to have been entirely suppressed in a given community, while the aggregate of sin shall have been augmented; and, conversely, that the number of crimes may have increased, while there shall have been a general growth in holiness among the masses of the people.

Crime is one of several channels through which the sins of the heart make themselves seen and felt. Sin develops itself generally through this channel, when moved upon by certain external causes. These external causes being, to a considerable extent at least, under the control of the legislator, he may, by arresting them, prevent the crimes to which, without such arrest, they would be sure to give rise.

Having thus cleared the question of ambiguity, we proceed to inquire into the causes which move men to act out the natural and inborn depravity of their hearts by the commission of crimes.

I. Grog Shops of every description, are a prolific source of crime.—That establishments for the sale of intoxicating drinks are nurseries of crime, is now generally conceded. Even those who keep such establishments admit the fact. The only justification which they attempt, is the allegation that men are so in love with intoxicating drinks, that they will get them in some way; if not openly, then secretly; if not legally, then illegally. And they allege that, great as the mischiefs are which flow from the legalized vending of such drinks, yet, upon the whole, greater mischiefs would be caused by the illicit sale of them. Since, then, the very dealers in liquors admit the tendency of the traffic to produce crime, there need be no fear of a denial of it from any other quarter.

It is certain that the convicts in our State prisons, penitentiaries, and county jails, with singular unanimity, ascribe to the use of intoxicating drinks the crimes, of which they are there suffering the penalty. "If it had not been for the grog shops,

I should never have been here," is the stereotyped complaint (says Mr. Gould), which issues from almost every cell, and swells, in melancholy chorus, through all the corridors of our prisons.

In the year 1851, there were 756 places where liquor was sold in the city of Albany. During three months of that year the police arrested 1707 persons, of whom 433 were arrested in a state of intoxication, and 1300 were known to be of intemperate habits. In 1851 and 1852, 1125 prisoners were sentenced to the Albany penitentiary. Of these, only 112 claimed that they were temperate; the remaining 1013 were notoriously intemperate.

Mr. Gould makes a statement, from his own personal observation, most significant and astounding. He says that he has visited most of the prisons in the United States,—some of them frequently; that he has had much personal conference with the prisoners; and yet that he has not found more than 20, who did not acknowledge that they had been frequenters of dram shops and in a greater or less degree, addicted to the use of strong drink.

In 1850, there were five persons lying under sentence of death, in the prisons of Connecticut, for murders committed in a state of intoxication; and while these five were awaiting their execution, a sixth murder was committed from the same cause. In 1851, of 158 convicts confined in the Connecticut State prison, 134 were habitual drinkers of ardent spirits.

In 1856, a committee of the Senate of New York visited and examined all the county jails of the State, 63 in number. Their report throws much light on our present subject of inquiry,—intemperance as a source of crime. In regard to 11 of the jails, no statement as to the drinking habits of their inmates is made by the committee. In reference to 5 others it is stated that all the inmates were of intemperate habits. Of the remaining 47, an average of at least three fourths of the prisoners were, by their own admission, intemperate. And it would be safe to assume that a large proportion of those who claim to be temperate, are in reality intemperate; Mr. Gould thinks at least two thirds. Assuming this to be a correct estimate, the true proportion of intemperate prisoners in the jails of New York, in 1856, would be eleven twelfths, instead of three fourths, as stated by the Senatorial committee.

Of 361 persons committed in 1850 to the jail of Providence, R. I., 282 (more than three fourths) were intemperate. Of 962 prisoners received into the eastern penitentiary of Pennsylvania, 745 (still more than three fourths) were addicted to

intoxication. Out of 975 prisoners received at Auburn prison, 736 (over three fourths as before) were drunkards; 219 were moderate drinkers (their own notions of moderation being the standard); and only 20 claimed to be total abstinents; while 589 (considerably more than one half) were under the influence of strong drink at the time of committing the crimes for which they were sentenced; and 367 had intemperate parents, one or both.

According to the police records of France, 1129 murders were committed in that country during four years; of which 446 (more than a third) were perpetrated amidst drunken brawls at taverns.

Let us now look at the proof in another form. In 1850, there were 60,000 drunkards in the State of New York; of which number, 3912 were convicted of crime. There were at the same time 2,540,000 persons in the State, who were not drunkards; and of this number, 3690 were convicted of violating the laws. These are astonishing facts. One drunkard out of every 15 is convicted of a breach of law, while only one sober man out of every 661 is guilty of a like breach. More crimes by 222 were committed by the 60,000 intemperate than by the 2,540,000 temperate inhabitants of the State. Nothing could more clearly evince the active agency of intemperance in the production of crime.

Still another form of proof. The number of taverns and grog shops in any given territory of considerable extent will be found to be a pretty fair index of the relative amount of crime committed in that district. In the ten counties of New York, where crime most abounds, there is one grog shop to every 240 inhabitants; whereas, in the ten counties, where the fewest crimes are committed, there is only one groggery to every 396 of the population. Again in the second ten worst counties, the grog shops are one to 292 inhabitants; in the second ten best counties, they are one to 341. Here, then, in these four divisions of the State, the relative number of grog shops is a perfect barometer of the relative amount of crime committed in each. The results, thus indicated, are another demonstrative proof of the influence of intemperance in impelling its victims to an open violation of the laws of the land.

The proofs, thus far exhibited, show very clearly that intemperance tends to produce crime. Let us now advance a step in the argument, and inquire whether, conversely, temperance has any tendency to diminish crime.

The great Washingtonian movement for the reformation of

inebriates, which began in 1842 and continued with no little vigor for a number of years, is fresh in the recollection of the public. A marked revolution took place about that time in the drinking usages of society. Numbers of inebriates were reformed; moderate drinkers became total abstinent; intoxicating drinks were, to a considerable extent, banished from the field, the work-shop, and the drawing-room; and the motto "touch not, taste not", was inscribed upon a large proportion of the dwellings of our land. This revolution soon began to make itself strikingly manifest in the diminution of crime. The average number of convicts in the State prison of Maine had been, for several years previously, 80; the average number for several years subsequently was less than 60. Thus it appears that the number of prisoners diminished a full fourth, while, according to the census, the population of the State had increased one fourth; making the real diminution of crime as the result of increased temperance fifty per cent. In Vermont the effect of the revolution in diminishing commitments and convictions was still more marked. The statistics of the eastern penitentiary at Philadelphia show a considerable falling off in the number of convicts; there having been, for the six years preceding 1842, on an average, 387, but for the three years following, 328; while the population of Pennsylvania had increased, within that time, nearly one third. As early as 1831, the number of prisoners in the State prison at Sing Sing had reached 1000 and upwards; and the inspectors estimated that thereafter it would mount up to 1200; instead of which, after the inauguration and vigorous prosecution of the temperance reform, and, beyond a doubt, as a consequence of that reform, the number fell to 763, notwithstanding a vast increase in the population of both the State and city of New York. These facts show conclusively that, while intemperance is a powerful agent in producing crime, temperance tends no less powerfully to diminish it.

Results of a like character have occurred on the other side of the water. In 1849, an act of Parliament, requiring public houses to be closed from 12 o'clock on Saturday night to 12½ o'clock on Sunday night, went into operation. In the city of Bristol, the average annual arrests during the three years prior to that date were 4063, for the three years subsequent thereto, 2903; in the city of Manchester, for the three years before the act, 3609,—for the three years after the act, 1950; and in the city of Leeds, 423 before, and 341 after, for the same number of years. The average diminution of crime for

the three places was over 30 per cent ; while, for the city of Manchester, it was nearly 50 per cent.

Under the operation of the Maine law, that is, of the principle of an absolute prohibition of the traffic in intoxicating liquors, in the few States where the authorities have been able to enforce it, scores of jails and poorhouses have been emptied of their inmates. The prohibitory law went into effect in Maine in the spring of 1851. In Portland, at the March term of the police court for 1851, 17 indictments were found ; at the same term for 1852, but 1 indictment was found, and that was the result of a malicious prosecution. During the nine months prior to the date when the law went into operation, 279 persons were committed to the jail of Portland ; during the nine months subsequent to that date, deducting 72 liquor dealers, there were but 63, a diminution of nearly three fourths in the short space of nine months. And everywhere similar results have occurred, under a real enforcement of the law.

But a question of no little importance is here suggested which we will briefly consider in this connection : How drunkenness when it impels to and produces a criminal act affects the responsibility of the inebriate—his responsibility to God for the sin and to society for the crime.

An impression is widely cherished, that a man, if at all, is at least not fully responsible for what he does while he is drunk. A madman is not held responsible for his actions, and the drunken man is, for the moment, mad. It is not unnatural, nor, at first blush, altogether unreasonable, to transfer to the one madman the absence of responsibility attached to the other. How far this popular impression is correct, and how far erroneous, we will presently inquire ; but the fact of its prevalence is, meanwhile, indisputable ; and that, in despite of copious argument and eloquent declamation by the theologian in the pulpit, the lawyer at the bar, and the judge upon the bench ; who all concur in enforcing the doctrine, that madness produced by drink in no degree lessens the criminality of a breach of law, whether human or divine. Still, the doctrine of responsibility for crimes thus committed, inculcated in its naked and absolute form, does, it cannot be denied, some violence to the understanding. On the one hand, it is hard to believe that the man who kills his wife with the poker at night and weeps tears of anguish over it in the morning, is as much guilty of murder, as if he had planned and executed the deed with all his senses about him. On the other hand, it would be fraught with infinite peril to

the public morals and the public weal to admit even the shadow of a doubt as to the full responsibility of the criminal. In this state of the case, the public, like the double-minded man, wavers in its judgments; neither thoroughly believing nor thoroughly disbelieving the responsibility of the drunken man for a crime done under the influence of drunkenness.

Nevertheless, a compromise here, by which something should be yielded to each opinion, is, in every view, wholly inadmissible. To conceive that a portion, but not the full measure, of responsibility attaches to the inebriate for his crime, is neither good philosophy nor sound policy. What, then, is the solution? We must find some principle, which will allow that the madness caused by strong drink removes responsibility as completely as any other madness, and which will yet hold the drunken perpetrator of crime guilty, to the full extent, for his evil deed, before God and man. And this principle, we think, is found in the fact that the dethronement of reason in the drunkard, which is often as complete for the time as that which exists permanently in the inmates of a lunatic asylum, is voluntary in his case, caused by his own free choice and act. It is a self-created, self-imposed madness. This principle lifts the responsibility from the maniac, without removing it from the man. It carries back the guilt, till the intelligent cause of the criminal act is reached; and it leaves it there, in all its weight and all its turpitude. If the man who, in madness, has committed a crime, was once intelligent, and wilfully caused his own madness, the guilt of that crime, whatever it is, was contracted when he voluntarily and knowingly destroyed his reason. A man, under the insanity of drink, quarrels with his friend and kills him. Now, where-in lies the guilt of that homicide? Not in the act of killing, for the man was, at the moment, as mad and unintelligent as the lunatic, who is suffering under a total and permanent loss of reason; but in the fact that, being sober, intelligent, and sane, he voluntarily made himself drunk, senseless, and mad. In drinking to madness, he was not guilty of a mere indiscretion; he was guilty of his brother's blood. In the act of maddening his brain by drink, he knowingly fired a train, whose other end was dipt in murder; and, being fired, it must run its course; he had no power to extinguish it. The soundness of this principle will be the more obvious, if we suppose the man to have been deprived of reason, not by a voluntary drinking of the poison which dethroned it, by a forcible pouring of it down his throat by others, against his own will and in spite of his most earnest struggles to the contrary. Let us

assume that now, as before, the murder is done. But who, in this case, is the guilty party? Is it the man who, against his own remonstrance and efforts, was compelled to swallow a draught, which robbed him of his faculties, and, for the time, converted him into a maniac? Or is it the men who forced the draught into his stomach and brain? There can be but one answer to this interrogatory. He whose reason was overpowered by the draught, thus compulsorily taken, was guiltless of the murder,—as much so as if his reason had been removed by the direct act of God. The guilt is theirs, who, by forcing the draught, violently took away from him, for the time being, the guiding and controlling power of reason. But if this be so, it follows, by inevitable deduction, that the guilt of a crime committed under the influence of insanity, caused by excessive drinking, lies in that excessive drinking itself, and in nothing else.

This reasoning sets in a fearful light the sin of drunkenness, even when drunkenness is but an isolated act; much more, when it is a confirmed habit. Murder, arson, rape, and all the crimes in the calendar are wrapped up in drinking to intoxication. They are in that act seminally and essentially, even as the oak is in the acorn, and the harvest in the seed-corn. That they do not all follow every such act is owing to the providence of God, and not to the controlling reason of the inebriate. One man staggers home, and beats his wife to death; another is borne home, too drunk even to stagger; is thrown upon the floor; and sleeps off the drunken fit. Has the latter committed a less sin in the sight of God than the former? Not if the logic of this argument be sound. Though the law, while it punishes the one, allows him to go free, yet, we verily believe, in the eye of reason and the judgment of God, he is the more guilty of the two.

It is no uncommon thing for drunkenness to be treated with levity, and even with merriment. The view here submitted, of the terrible responsibility inhering in it, takes away all lightness from the subject. Nothing can be more serious, nothing more awful, if our reasoning be correct, than drunkenness. It is not only a crime itself, but the mother of crimes. To it, in effect, belongs the guilt of all the crimes, which either do or might issue from it. This principle, in respect to other matters, is recognized in the jurisprudence of all nations. A merchant stores powder in his warehouse for a single night, and removes it safely the following morning. If prosecuted, will the plea that his act caused no injury, though true in itself, be admitted in bar of punishment? Cer-

tainly not. He is punished for the injury which his act might have done; that is, for the risk to which he thereby subjected his neighbors. And this principle is, in ethics, if not in law, as sound when applied to drunkenness, as it is when applied to the storing of gunpowder, or to any other act, the doing of which involves risk to the community. A risk may be valued, and is every day valued, equally with the destruction of the property involved in it. Insurance against fire or disaster at sea is a familiar illustration. "If the risks to which drunkenness exposes men and things were accurately calculated, and the drunkards imprisoned or fined accordingly, prison-walls or empty pockets would soon compel them into sobriety."*

II. Brothels are another prolific fountain of Crime.—This (as Mr. Gould observes) is not a pleasant subject to discuss, but our survey would be essentially incomplete without it; and we cannot decline the discussion without a conscious dereliction of duty. Too many fathers have had their gray hairs brought with sorrow to the grave through this agency, too many mothers have been subjected by it to life-long anguish, too many families have been desolated by the monster; the evil is too widely spread, too deeply seated, too rank in its growth, and too deadly in its influence, to permit us to pass it in silence.

We find a very significant testimony as to the power of licentiousness in producing crime, in the following extract from a report of the chaplain of the Connecticut State prison, cited in the 12th Annual Report of the Boston Prison Discipline Society. "Will you please, sir, preach from this text next time?" "What text?" "This here in Hosea, 4th chapter and 11th verse, where it says, 'Whoredom, and wine, and new wine take away the heart.'" "Why do you wish to have that text preached from?" "Because, sir, they are what brought me here, and I guess most all the rest of us." "This man", adds the chaplain, "guessed right. Scarcely a man can be found, who was not in the habit, when at liberty, of going to those who 'put the bottle to their neighbor's mouth', or to those 'whose feet go down to death'. Some particular places may be pointed out, where, under the blighting influence referred to, criminals are multiplied, as it were, by wholesale. In a period of about five years, some 40 colored persons have been sent to this prison, who had been convicted of crime in New Haven. Nearly all of these indi-

* This topic is much more largely handled in an *Essay on the Criminality of Drunkenness*, read by the Rev. Dr. Arnott, of Scotland, before the British Association for promoting Social Science.

viduals have referred to their nocturnal visits to a den of infamy kept in that city as being closely connected with the crimes for which they were convicted."

The following testimony from Dr. Francis Lieber, a member of the Board of Managers of the Prison Association of New York and a gentleman of large experience in prison matters, is in point: "I have taken pains to ascertain the character of a number of convicts, and as far as my experience has gone, it shows me that there is, almost without exception, some unprincipled or abandoned woman, who played a prominent part in the life of every convict; be it a worthless mother, who poisons by her corrupt example the souls of her children; or a slothful, intemperate wife, who disgusts her husband with his home; or a *prostitute, whose wants must be satisfied by theft*; or a receiver of plunder; or a spy of opportunities for robbery".

Mr. Gould adds upon this subject: "We, too, are enabled to corroborate these assertions of Dr. Lieber by as extensive a range of inquiries at the cells of our State prisons as usually falls to the share of a single individual. We are satisfied that licentiousness is a mighty engine of the Devil for the production of crime. A moral instructor in the eastern penitentiary at Philadelphia investigated the cases of 962 prisoners committed to that institution, and found that 182 of them were directly caused by licentiousness. And the chaplain of the Auburn State prison found that 251 out of the 425 who were willing to answer the question were guilty of the same thing."

Mr. Gould relates the story of a fallen woman, whom he encountered in one of our penitentiary-hospitals, which casts a terrific light upon the tendency of licentiousness to produce crime. She had been a woman of exquisite beauty and elegant culture. Her father, a wealthy merchant of New York, failed in business, and gave up every thing to his creditors. She was reduced to the necessity of learning the trade of a dress-maker to earn her daily bread. She became a proficient in the business, and her taste and skill commanded liberal wages, which enabled her to provide an ample wardrobe for herself. She had been intensely devoted to the glitter and gaiety of fashionable life, and hope, which "springs eternal in the human breast", whispered that a fortunate marriage might yet restore her to the charmed circles, whose delights she had once tasted, and which she longed to reënter. She used every effort, by the charms of person, dress, voice, and manners, to attract the notice and win the love of eligible young men. At length, she thought she had succeeded in her object; but

the young man, whose affections she dreamed that she had won, proved to be a cold-hearted villain, who was in pursuit only of amusement and gratification for the passing hour. One evening he invited her to ride. Driving into the country, he alighted at a house of refreshment in the neighborhood of the city. He offered her a glass of wine, which she drank. The liquor had been drugged. A profound stupor ensued, and she awoke the following morning to find herself ruined.

With returning consciousness, the whole magnitude of the injury burst upon her. She instantly resolved upon revenge, and the plan for its accomplishment flashed upon her mind with the suddenness and rapidity of lightning. She betrayed no emotion. She uttered no reproaches. She treated what had happened as a harmless jest, and blandly invited a continuance of the intimacy.

The young man exulted in the ease and completeness of his victory; but from that moment she became the evil genius of his life. Professing the tenderest and most unselfish affection, she drew money from him continually, with which she hired sharpers to furnish him with provocatives to drinking, gambling, and all the forms of vice and debauchery. At every rally of his better nature, by a skilful alternation of persuasion, banter, and menace, she choked the rising impulse of virtue, chained him to the car of dissipation, and confirmed him in his career of vice.

Full well did she know whither all this would lead him; nor was she disappointed in her malignant expectation. Drunkenness clouded his understanding; debauchery ruined his health; and gambling reduced him to poverty. Not until this point, the goal of all her prayers and efforts, had been reached, when poverty and disease had done their work, and he was unable to procure a wretched bed or a scanty meal, except through her charity, did she wreak upon him the full measure of her vengeance. Then it was her daily delight to visit him to load him with reproaches, and to reveal to him, in bitter exultation, the whole scheme, so cunningly devised, and so steadily pursued, by which she had wrought his ruin. And when the closing scene drew near, she sat by his bedside, and mingled her execrations with the shrieks extorted by his dying agonies.

Nor was her vengeance even yet satisfied. Her warfare was against the whole sex, whom she regarded as accursed; and her insatiate revenge cried out for still other victims. Whenever she could fasten her fangs on a young man of genteel family, whose unclouded prospects foretokened a

brilliant career, she never relaxed her hold. She studied, with a keenness sharpened by experience, every point in his character,—his tastes, his passions, his hopes, his fears, whatever attracted and whatever repelled him; and then, with an almost unerring sagacity, adapting the means to the end, she seldom failed in her demoniac purpose. She claimed in this manner to have hunted down 32 young men, involving them in disgrace, crime, and ruin. Some of them had ended their days in prison, and others, hopelessly fallen, were on the road to the drunkard's and the felon's grave.

When asked whether all her sisters in infamy felt the same hatred to mankind, she replied that she thought the feeling to be general, if not universal, among them; adding that, when a woman had once fallen, she desired to revenge herself, not only on her seducer, but on all his sex; that no game was followed with greater relish than that of involving all who came within their toils in crime and its consequent punishment; that most of them could number at least two or three victims, whom they had ruined, and that many of these victims went to the length of the actual commission of crime.

Now, when we remember that there are, in the city of New York alone, over 20,000 prostitutes, and a proportionate number in the other cities of the State, we may arrive at a proximate idea of the amount of crime in this commonwealth, which is directly caused by the vice of licentiousness.

III. Theatres are a source of crime.—Whether theatres might be so conducted as to be places of innocent recreation, or even, as some contend, schools of refinement and morality, is a question which we will not now discuss; much less do we assume to decide it. But we maintain that, as at present managed, they are schools of vice and nurseries of crime. They operate to the production of this result both directly and indirectly; being in themselves active causes of crime, and at the same time serving as avenues to other sources of wrong doing.

Theatres tend, directly, to produce crime, by filling the minds of youth with impure thoughts, sentiments, images, and principles; and by clothing vice in an attractive and virtue in a repulsive and often ludicrous garb. Actors and actresses are, with a few honorable exceptions, notorious for the looseness of their lives; and, as their society is apt to be sought by the frequenters of theatres, the latter are gradually but surely corrupted.

Theatres tend, indirectly, to produce crime, by begetting in the minds of the young, a distaste for the pursuits of honest

industry. The glitter, the radiance, the mimic kings, queens, and heroes of the stage dance, like phantasmagoria, before the mental vision of the votary of the theatre. He is haunted with the memory of the brilliant revels, the obscene jests, the witty *double-entendres* of the previous evening; and they disqualify him for the plodding industry required at the merchant's desk or the mechanic's bench. As the mania for the theatre grows upon its victim, he becomes neglectful of his duties, despises the homely details of every day life, loses his place or fails in business, and is cast adrift upon the world. Unable to forego his customary excitements, he still frequents the theatre, and is subject to the expenses incident upon the indulgence. But as his income has stopped, his exchequer soon becomes exhausted, and he resorts to theft, burglary, forgery, the utterance of counterfeit money, or some other unlawful means of replenishing it, until the State relieves him of the necessity by providing him quarters in a prison.

That such is the course run by numbers of those who are known as frequenters of theatres, is heard at the door of our prison cells too often to leave room for doubt upon the subject. That theatres are frequented by prostitutes, that they are supplied with bars, and that they are recognized houses of assignation, are facts which admit of no dispute. Even their apologists are obliged to admit that they are the vestibule of the grog shop and the brothel; and certainly their habitual attendants gravitate towards these places, which are but so many manufactories of crime, as naturally as the stone sinks to the bottom of the well.

IV. Gambling houses and lotteries are prolific sources of crime.—Two classes of men are found in gambling houses, sharpers and their dupes. The former, having long since cast off all the restraints of virtue, make no scruple of resorting to robbery, forgery, and even murder, to recruit their finances, when exhausted. The latter are under skilful training for these crimes, and will be fully prepared for them, when their education is complete.

As with the grog-shop and the theatre, there is an infatuation connected with gambling, which, fastening on its victim, robs him of the power to escape from the habit, however much he may desire to do so. It is not difficult to understand the way in which gambling operates to produce crime. It works, beyond perhaps all other vices, a paralysis of the moral powers, while it stimulates the selfish propensities to the highest pitch; so that the gambler will stake all he is worth rather than renounce this passion. In case of failure,

he is compelled to resort to crime for his subsistence; at first, no doubt, reluctantly, and with no little violence to his better feelings. But familiarity inures him to its commission, and the ruined gamester, by an easy and natural transition, soon becomes an expert and daring criminal.

Such is the rationale of the influence of gambling in the production of crime. Do facts justify and sustain this reasoning? They do, to the fullest extent. Of 975 prisoners at Auburn, 317 were habitual gamblers. Of 962 convicts in the eastern penitentiary at Philadelphia, 19 attributed their first introduction to the paths of crime to gaming and lotteries; how many have been accelerated in their career, commenced by other causes, is not stated. Out of 156 prisoners at the State prison in Connecticut, 53 were gamblers. The chaplain of the last mentioned prison bears the following testimony on this point: "Many prisoners hasten their ruin by buying lottery tickets; but rarely is one known to commit crime, when he has money in a savings bank".

V. *Our prisons themselves, especially our jails and lock-ups, all whose influences ought to be restraining and reformatory, are fruitful, as they are disgraceful nurseries of crime.*—Few persons, probably, are aware that the costly structures, for whose erection they have been taxed, and which they have been wont to look upon as barriers, to beat back the rushing waves of vice and crime, are themselves active agencies in producing the very evils, which they were designed to repress and to eradicate. And yet, it is the opinion of those most competent to judge, that there are few more prolific causes of crime than the one now under consideration. How can it be otherwise under the system, if system it can be called, of non-classification and promiscuous intercourse, which prevails in these institutions? The pick-pocket, the burglar, the gambler, the drunkard, the vagrant, the witness, and persons charged with various offences, some justly and others unjustly, as their future trial will show; all mix and mingle together. Many a youth, locked up for his first offence, or perhaps on the groundless suspicion of wrong doing, there meets with professional thieves, who instruct him in their diabolical arts, and who, when he comes out of prison, meet him, claim acquaintance with him, introduce him to their comrades, persuade him to join their fraternity, and initiate him into a career of wickedness and crime.

Miss Dix says: "If it were the deliberate purpose of society to establish criminals in all that is evil, and to root out the last remains of virtuous inclination, this purpose could

not be more effectually accomplished than by incarceration in the county jails, as they are, with few exceptions, constructed and governed". Of some of the jails in Pennsylvania, she thus speaks: "At York, the prisoners were promiscuously associated, men and women. At Franklin county, all ages, colors and degrees of offenders associated. At Washington county were congregated old and young, the black and the white, men, women, and babies. At Beaver county, the prisoners were together, a child, the middle aged, and the men of gray hairs. At Bucks county, two men and two women, committed for immoralities, all occupy one room by day. At Chester county, two males and a female were all together." The above description, with the exception of herding men and women together, will apply to New York, and to the other States of the Union.

The British inspectors for the home district, in their first report, among the evils arising out of the indiscriminate associations prevalent in our common jails, enumerate, "Blasphemy, obscenity, demoralizing intercourse, profane jesting, instruction in crime, boasting of criminal adventures, gambling, combinations to defeat justice, concerted efforts at escape, conspiracy to effect future depredations, and many others". In their third report they say: "The comparatively innocent are seduced; the unwary are entrapped; and the tendency to crime in offenders, not entirely hardened, is confirmed by the language, the suggestions, and the example of more depraved and systematic criminals".

The French Minister of the Interior thus spoke to the Legislature of his country in 1840: "It is in this prison that criminals make their first appearance; from the inexperienced youth, the child even, whom a first trivial offence, and one in which he had been a forced accomplice, brings before the tribunal of justice, to the hardened old man, who is destined, after a long series of convictions, to find a tomb in the galleys. It is in this class of prisons that is unceasingly accumulated that population of dangerous idlers, of consummate malefactors, of intrepid villains, who form the dregs of every community. They are the first and most fatal schools, whether of vice or crime; and he who enters them, for any offence, too often goes out more depraved, to appear before his judge. Sad contradiction to the law! The precautions of justice become a source of corruption; the prison makes criminals; it develops, under the very eyes of the magistrate, the germs of future crimes".

The Inspector-General of French prisons says: "To unite

in a common inclosure all the inmates of a prison is to put into fermentation, in an impure vessel, all the bad thoughts and bad actions which are engendered by mutual corruption. In these places, crime is recruited, nourished, and multiplied. The bad man becomes worse, the honest man becomes criminal, the sceptic becomes impious, the delinquent becomes a robber, the established villain more perverse, the debauchee more shameless, the depraved more corrupted, and the scholar in crime takes a master's degree. In fine, all that a prison can beget of physical or moral degradation, of persistence in evil, of vice, of crime, of all kinds of unlawfulness, has its explanation and its cause in the melancholy signification of these words—*association in prison*”.

The Boston Prison Discipline Society say: “An acquaintance formed in prison has led many a youth to houses of ill fame; to a familiarity with the names, places of abode, principles of trade, and language of counterfeiters; to the arts of pickpockets and thieves; to dangerous combinations in villainy; and to personal degradation, which the most hardened prisoner has blushed to name”.

The Prison Association of New York, referring to the contaminating influence of promiscuous prison intercourse, says: “So injurious in its consequences is the present system of imprisonment, that, with many doubtless good men, it is a question whether the interests of society would not be equally subserved by its entire abandonment as by its continuance under its present organization”.

The Senatorial Committee, who inspected the jails of New York, in 1856, in their account of the Albany county jail, say: “There are found in the jail 37 men and 8 women; and it was represented to the committee that prisoners awaiting trial are frequently allowed to remain in this place for months. The character of the prisoners and the effect of such associations can be judged by the commitments, which are—1 for murder, 2 for rape, 6 for grand larceny, 4 for burglary, 1 for robbery of post-office, 6 for petit larceny, 4 for misdemeanor, 3 for assault and battery, 2 for vagrancy, 1 for damages, 1 for rescuing prisoners, 7 for drunkenness, 5 for disorderly conduct, and 2 witnesses. All these had free intercourse during most of the day. It would seem that those long resident in such a place and in such company, if not lost to all hope of reformation on going in, must be ruined in morals on coming out”.

It would be easy to multiply testimonies of this kind; but we forbear. Enough has been said to satisfy all that there are evils connected with the construction and administration of

our common jails, which call loudly for a prompt and appropriate remedy.

In view of the pernicious influence of these prisons, it is painful to think on what large numbers that influence operates. Not less than 35,000, probably a much larger number, are every year locked up in our common jails. It is frightful to contemplate the germs of crime, which must in this way be planted in so many minds. And the horror is increased, when we consider how large a proportion of these persons are either absolutely or comparatively innocent. From 1500 to 2000 of them are committed, not for crime, but as witnesses against those who have, or are supposed to have, committed it. And these were confessedly innocent when committed to jail; but numerous cases are on record, some of them of a heart-rending pathos, in which persons entered jail simply to appear as witnesses on the trial of others, and came forth, after the instructions they had there received, to pursue a career of crime and infamy. But witnesses are not the only innocent prisoners exposed to the contamination of our jails. According to the testimony of ample and unquestionable statistics, nearly or quite one half of those arrested are either discharged without trial or acquitted by the jury; that is, they are all legally innocent of the crimes charged against them, and a large proportion no doubt really so. When we consider, in view of this statement, the thousands upon thousands of innocent persons who are every year subjected to the corrupting influence of our jails, many of whom give way under that influence, and are ruined by it, the contemplation becomes truly appalling. Surely enlightened legislators ought not, cannot, much longer overlook the crime-producing tendencies of our common jails.

VI. *Carelessness on the part of the officers of justice in making arrests is a source of crime.*—This cause is kindred to that treated under the last head, inasmuch as it operates through recklessness or abuse in the administration of the law. The criminal statistics of the country already given show that nearly fifty per cent of the persons arrested on a charge or suspicion of crime are either acquitted on trial or discharged without trial. It is easy to see how this wholesale system of false accusations is calculated to lead the persons who suffer from it to the commission of crime, independently of the exposure to corrupt and corrupting associations in the prisons, to which they are thereby subjected. Public accusation of crime and imprisonment in a jail tend to destroy, even in the innocent, that pride of character, that feeling of self-respect, which all experience shows to be one of the most efficient safeguards

against crime, and one of the most powerful incentives to virtue, especially among that class of persons from whom the ranks of crime are usually recruited. Would you make a child a liar? You have only to evince habitual doubt of his veracity, or to ply him with perpetual accusations of falsehood. Would you convert an honest man into a thief? The surest way to do it is to undermine the confidence of the community in his integrity. Would you destroy the chastity of a woman? Be continually whispering slanders against her purity. Let your imputations on her virtue never cease. Finding that virtuous conduct is no shield against suspicion, and even open accusation, she ceases to preserve it. She revenges herself on society by doing that with which society had falsely and cruelly charged her.

How often do prisoners, when urged to reform on returning to the world, give back the desponding reply, "What can I do? my character is gone". The mortification, the shame, the anguish felt by innocent persons, when arrested on suspicion of crime, and confined within the walls of a prison, are often intense and indescribable. And can we doubt that causes known to be operative in all other cases, will operate here also? Must not this great amount of false accusation produce, in the end, an immense amount of crime, by destroying that sentiment of self-respect, which springs from a fair and honorable reputation? No matter how clearly the innocence of the accused person may be established on his trial, he carries the taint of the prison wherever he goes. He is scorned, insulted, and shunned. The very boys in the street cry "*jail bird*", as he passes along. How can a man, whose only capital is his labor, bear up under such a pressure? His only resource often is either to steal or starve; and for a crime which the law virtually compels him to commit, it punishes him by long years of confinement and labor in its prisons! What the appropriate remedy for this enormous wrong may be, we are not prepared to say; but that some remedy ought to be applied we are clear; and that the wisdom of man, when once it shall have been earnestly directed to this inquiry, is competent to devise a remedy that shall be adequate and effective, we cannot doubt.

VII. Another source of crime is bad books.—Good men have ever lamented the pernicious influence of a depraved and perverted literature; but such literature has never been so systematically and widely diffused as at the present time. This is owing to two causes, its cheapness and the facility of conveyance by steamboat and rail car. Lines of railroad radi-

ate from all the great centres of trade, and form a network of communication over the whole surface of the country. Mr. Gould estimates that more than 26,000,000 persons are transported over the railroads of the United States a year. Multitudes of these, probably, one in twenty at least, purchase books at the depot or in the cars, to while away the time. This would give over a million of volumes circulated in this way annually; and perhaps an equal number are sold and circulated in steamboats, at watering places, at hotels, and at other places of public resort. Now a very large proportion of the works thus put in circulation are of the worst character, tending to corrupt the principles, to inflame the passions, to excite impure desire, and to spread a blight over all the powers of the soul. Brothels are recruited from this more than from any other one source. Those who search the trunks of convicted criminals are almost sure to find in them one or more of these works; and few prisoners, who can read at all, fail to enumerate, among the causes which led them into crime, the unhealthy stimulus of this depraved and pernicious literature.

VIII. Orphanage, though perhaps little thought of in this connection, is, nevertheless, an active and prevalent cause of crime.—To secure respect for the laws and for the rights of others, the discipline of restraint and of education is necessary; and this discipline can, as a general thing, be had only under the paternal roof. Here, if at all, under the training of parental love and wisdom, the child must be taught to curb his passions, to practise self-denial, to respect authority, and to render unto all their dues. Even if the orphan child falls into the hands of those who are disposed to lead him in the right way, he is restive under their restraints, and will not receive their rebukes and corrections, as he would similar discipline from the hand of parental affection. But, unhappily, the orphan child rarely falls into the hands of a truly conscientious guardian, or at least of one who takes a comprehensive and Christian view of his duty in that relation. The greater part satisfy their conscience with the care of the ward's property, leaving his moral sentiments and principles to the blind operation of chance. The majority of orphans, however, do not enjoy, even nominally, a guardian's care. Having no property, they are left to the cold charity of reluctant relatives, or the still colder charity of the almshouse, where the weeds of vice are left to grow unchecked, while the tender plants of virtue are choked beneath their shade.

Thus do we perceive that, from the nature of the case, orphanage is a preparation for crime. Facts support this view.

Of 11,510 convicted criminals in the State of New York, 7232—62 per cent—were either orphans or half orphans. In Pennsylvania, 515 out of 962 prisoners—more than 50 per cent—were virtually orphans; that is, 375 were literally so, and 140 were sent away from home in very early life and thus deprived of all parental care, guidance, and discipline. In Maryland, out of 537 prisoners, 260—nearly 50 per cent—were orphans. Another fact, connected with this subject, is shown by the statistics of our prisons, viz. that a much larger proportion of the criminal half orphans had lost their fathers than their mothers. This fact evinces, very clearly, how much children and youth need restraint, and how directly and strongly the want of it tends to crime.

Want of proper parental restraint and discipline might be mentioned as a distinct source of crime; but, as whatever has been said under the present head is, in the main, applicable here also, we have not thought it necessary to give to this topic a separate treatment.

IX. Insanity is still another of the numerous sources of crime.—This subject is far from having received the attention which it merits. Even those who have made crime their study, are but beginning to turn their thoughts in this direction. The plea of insanity, which is often advanced by the prisoner's counsel, is looked upon with disfavor both by juries and the general public, being considered as almost equivalent to a confession of guilt. One reason, and probably the principal reason, of this general disbelief in insanity as a cause of crime is the fact that, in a large proportion of cases, the derangement of the intellect is confined to a single subject, while, on all others, the criminal may evince a high degree of intelligence and shrewdness. It is difficult for persons unused to watch the varying forms of insanity, to understand why a man, who evinces the greatest ingenuity in planning the details of a murder or a robbery, should yet be wholly void of responsibility for the murder or the robbery itself. And yet nothing is more certain than that this is sometimes, perhaps more frequently than is commonly supposed, the case. The story of the British Chancellor, Lord Eldon, is well known, who, after having for six hours examined a person with a view to test his lunacy, without detecting any evidence of it, was upon the point of adjudging him *compos mentis*, and therefore competent to manage his own property, when a gentleman whispered a suggestion that he should ask him who Jesus Christ was? Instantly he replied, "I am he?" and went into the wildest rhapsody concerning his celestial functions, and

the Chancellor at once issued a decree, affirming his insanity and consequent incapacity to manage his estate.

Mr. Gould tells of a man whom he personally knew, who could reason with clearness and force on the obligations of justice and humanity, and was skilful and accurate in his application of the rules of morality to the ordinary affairs of life; yet this man, under the hallucination that he himself was God, would violate every rule of rectitude which he had so clearly laid down, and would justify the breach on the ground that, being himself the sovereign of the universe, he was not bound by the laws which it was his pleasure to impose upon others.

But let us see what the testimony of competent persons is in reference to this question. We cannot doubt that not a few crimes, i. e. acts which would be criminal if done by persons of sound minds, are committed under the influence of insanity, and that numbers of insane persons are annually committed to prison.

Miss Dix, in memorializing the Legislature of Pennsylvania on this subject, writes: "I have said that within two years, 27 insane persons have been committed to the eastern penitentiary, charged with various crimes. The history of many of these I have traced. I have resolved that no labor shall be spared on my part to bring facts to light. The testimony of medical men and the opinion of intelligent citizens throughout the State, acquainted with these cases, having had them under their care as patients, settle these cases definitely. Men, having been known to be insane for years, committing recent crimes, still under the influence of insane delusion, are, every month, tried, condemned, and sentenced, precisely as if they were in possession of a sound mind, and were responsible for their speech and deeds. The fact of their *known insanity* is often recorded in the books of the prison by the officer who brought them there."

Dr. Given, for some time assistant physician to the Lunatic Asylum at Blockley near Philadelphia, and subsequently principal physician of the eastern penitentiary, a gentleman whom Mr. Gould pronounces better fitted for a prison physician, than any man he ever met with, writes as follows: "Those who are acquainted with the protean nature of insanity, its often slow and insidious invasion, and frequent development in the passions and moral sentiments, long ere the intellectual faculties show any signs of disturbance, will readily acknowledge how difficult, nay, how impossible it is, in many cases, to pronounce, with any degree of certainty, upon the actual

state of a prisoner's mind, when first admitted; for, if the incipient stages of the disease have frequently escaped for several months the detection of intelligent relations, in daily contact with the patient (the experience of physicians connected with insane hospitals furnishes many such instances), is it not possible, or indeed very probable, that acts are frequently committed under the influence of mental derangement, which is not fully developed, until the sufferer may have been long in confinement, as a punishment for his so called crime?" Upon this Mr. Gould remarks: "There are very many of the class of cases alluded to by Dr. Given, to be met with by the careful inquirer, where the insanity manifests itself, not apparently in a deranged intellect, but in an entire obliteration of the moral faculties. Sometimes this condition is congenital, and sometimes arises in after life; but, in either case, it arises from bodily disease or physical malformation. It sometimes exists in a latent state, producing copious harvests of crime, before the insanity of the intellectual faculties is clearly manifested; but this is sure to become patent sooner or later." How far men may be justly regarded as not responsible for criminal acts done under this species of insanity, while yet their intellectual faculties remain clear and vigorous, we are not prepared to express an opinion. But we have no doubt that insanity is the cause of more crimes than is commonly supposed.

X. Ignorance is a source of crime.—In Pennsylvania, of 2961 prisoners, 1620—only a little more than one half—could read and write; 632 could read but not write; and 709—nearly a fourth—could neither read nor write. Of the whole population of Pennsylvania, 97 per cent are able to read and write. Out of 491 convicts in the Massachusetts State prison, 98, or about 20 per cent were unable to read and write. Of the entire population of Massachusetts, over 97 per cent have the ability to read and write. Of 215 prisoners in the Connecticut State prison, 77, or more than one third, could not read and write; while of the whole population of the State, 98½ per cent are able to read and write. The criminal statistics of other States exhibit results altogether similar to the above.

Now, on comparing the proportion of the whole population of the State to the proportion which the prisoners who can read and write bear to the whole number of prisoners, we get a clear idea, as well as a striking illustration, of the influence of ignorance in producing crime. Thus, for example, in Pennsylvania, since 97 per cent of the population can read and write, if want of education has no tendency to produce

crime, the number of prisoners who can read and write ought to be 97 per cent of the whole, and the number who do not possess that ability ought to be only 3 per cent. But how does this statement tally with the actual facts? Not at all; for, in reality, only 55 per cent of the prisoners can read and write, while the enormous proportion of 45 per cent are without that power. Hence it is evident that 45 per cent of the crimes in Pennsylvania are committed by 3 per cent of the inhabitants. Thus a very large proportion of the criminals come from a very small proportion of the population. The Romish church teaches that "ignorance is the mother of *devotion*". How much more true the declaration that ignorance is the mother of crime?

It must be remarked that even the foregoing exhibition, striking as it is, fails to set forth, in its full power, the tendency of ignorance to multiply crime. A large proportion of those reported as able to read have no such mastery of that art as to be of any practical utility, either as a recreation and consequent barrier against improper and injurious amusements, or as an aid in gaining a living, or as enabling them to read the Bible and other good books and so to learn the way to holiness; the only three ways, as observed by Mr. Gould, in which learning can operate as a preventive of crime. If a prisoner can read by spelling out the words ever so slowly and miscalling the greater part of them, he is enrolled as able to read, although for all practical purposes, he might just as well be without that ability. An illustration of the extreme ignorance of prisoners, who are classed as being able to read and write, is afforded by the following statistics: 57 prisoners were committed in one year to the State prison of Connecticut, who were classed as follows: 27 could read and write; 16 could read, but not write; and 14 could neither read nor write. Forty three of the number, therefore, stood on the records as being able to read. These 43 were requested to spell the words "read" and "write." Only eleven spelled them correctly, the remaining 32 being unable to do it. One of the best of the readers was not able to tell whether the book of Matthew was in the Old Testament or the New. The truth is (as Mr. Gould has remarked), that nine tenths of the prisoners in the United States are ignorant men, who, although they may be enrolled on the prison books as able to read and write, are unable to do so for any practical or useful purpose.

XI. *Want of a trade or profession is a source of crime.*—Ample and reliable statistics show that, in the State of New

York, men of no occupation, or liquor sellers, sailors, boatmen, and drivers, none of which occupations can be properly called trades, constitute 65 per cent of all the persons convicted of crime; that in Connecticut they constitute 60 per cent; in Maryland, 51 per cent; and in Pennsylvania, 45 per cent. These statements show a close relation between the want of a trade and the commission of crime. They show that the ranks of criminals are, in great part, recruited from the idle and shiftless classes of the community. But they do not reveal the whole truth. As a large proportion of the persons enrolled in our prison books as able to read and write have no such mastery of those accomplishments as to be of any practical utility, so those prisoners who profess to have learned trades have, in general, acquired them so imperfectly, that they are of little avail in enabling them to earn an honest livelihood. Half learned trades, almost equally with no trades, are a cause of destitution and crime. This is made abundantly apparent from the statistics of the eastern penitentiary at Philadelphia, which exhibit the following results. Of 3043 convicts confined in that prison, 442 were apprenticed and served their whole time; 556 were apprenticed, but did not serve out their time; and 2045 served no apprenticeship at all. Of the whole number apprenticed, considerably more than one half, by reason of not serving through their full time, acquired their trades imperfectly. Of the whole number reported, 67 per cent served no apprenticeship at all; and 85 per cent either never learned trades at all, or learned them so imperfectly as to be of little use. The following statement is no less significant: 48 prisoners of 24 years and under were received into the eastern penitentiary during the year 1853. Of these, only *one* had served out his time; 9 had been apprenticed and had left before the expiration of their apprenticeship; and 38, more than three fourths of the whole, had never been apprenticed at all. "It is worthy of remark", say the Inspectors in their report, "and suggests serious reflections to the inquiring mind, that of the 48 prisoners received during the year under 25 years, so few have ever been taught any useful business".

XII. *Poverty is a source of crime.*—Far be it from us to speak on this subject in a way to wound the sensibilities of the virtuous poor. Among this class are often witnessed the brightest examples of purity, gentleness, self-denial, and uprightness; too often, indeed, to permit us to doubt that poverty is compatible with the development and exercise of all these virtues. But we must not shut our eyes to facts, which, occurring every day, show that pauperism and crime advance

in parallel lines, and with equal step. They act and react upon each other; and each is, in turn, both cause and effect. This may be seen both in the cities and the country; but chiefly in the former, for it is there that poverty most rapidly and certainly generates crime, and there likewise its peculiar workings can be most easily observed.

XIII. *Inefficient preventive police is a source of crime.*—This is too obvious to require argument or illustration. Within the memory of men now living, highway robbery was common on the roads leading to London. Now, however, in consequence of the increased efficiency of the police, such robberies are unknown.

But the general public has a responsibility here, as well as the police. Within the past few years, the police of New York, and some other of our large cities, have been required to enforce the law in relation to the closing of the grog shops on the Sabbath; and, wherever public opinion has been such as really to demand the measure, it has been successful. A like public sentiment, on the part of the moral and religious portion of the community, would enable the police to close up the brothels and gambling houses, which, as we have seen, cause so large an amount of crime and misery.

XIV. *Foreign immigration is, in our country, a source of crime.*—Of 14,504 convictions for crime made outside of the cities of New York and Brooklyn, 38 per cent of the persons convicted were foreigners, while only 21 per cent of the aggregate population are of foreign birth. The commitments in the city of New York for the last year (1863) were 41,299. Of the persons thus committed, only 10,477, about one fourth, were native born citizens, while all the remaining 30,822 were foreigners; and this is about the usual proportion. In view of these facts, it is evident that crime is increased by the influx of immigrants from other countries.

XV. *Proximity to great thoroughfares of trade and travel is a source of crime.*—In the 18 counties bordering upon the Erie canal, there is one crime to every 1276 of the population; while in the 17 counties, lying south of the canal, and not adjacent to it, the ratio of the convictions to the population is as one to 2876; which shows an immense preponderance of crime in the canal counties. But there are other circumstances which evince still more strikingly the crime-producing tendency of such thoroughfares as the Erie canal. Schenectady, Monroe, Niagara, and Oneida, the principal points of transshipment, are the most remarkable for crime, with the exception of Erie and Albany, the two termini of the

canal, in which the relative amount of crime is greater than any other counties in the State, not even excepting that of New York. Comparing the nine counties bordering on the Hudson river with the nine counties which lie secluded from great thoroughfares, we find in the former one conviction in 1518 inhabitants; in the latter, one in 2864; nearly the same proportion as before, and showing still the tendency of great thoroughfares to generate crime.

XVI. *Density of population is a source of crime.*—This might be argued *a priori*. A certain amount of separation, seclusion, and quietude seems to be essential to a healthful development of the moral faculties. There is a tendency to contamination and degeneracy in the crowding of men together. But the tendency of crowding, in itself considered, to produce crime, is doubtless much less influential than the opportunity it affords for the action of other causes. Indeed, nothing can be clearer than that all the more active causes of crime are forced into a hot-bed fertility and productiveness by crowded populations; as grog shops, theatres, brothels, gambling houses, the circulation of bad books, etc., etc.

But what is the testimony of facts on this point? The criminal statistics of the State of New York show that crime follows compactness of population with almost mathematical precision, so that a statement of the ratio of crime in any two groups of counties will be, at the same time, a statement of the ratio of the density of population in the same groups. In 1850, there were 59 counties in the State. Alleghany stood midway as respected the relative amount of crime committed in it; there being 29 counties more criminal than it, and 29 less criminal. In the 29 counties above it in criminality, there were 10.7 acres to each inhabitant; in the 29 below it, there were 16.5 acres to each inhabitant. In the 10 most guilty counties, there were 6 acres to each inhabitant; in the 10 least guilty, there were 24. In the second 10 most guilty counties, the average number of acres to each inhabitant was 8.7; in the second 10 least guilty ones, it was 15. The average per cent of convictions in the 10 worst counties, was .070; in the 10 best, .018. It is surprising to see how exactly the ratio of crime corresponds with the ratio of density of population. Thus 6 : 24 :: .018 : .072, which only varies .002 from the actual percentage, as exhibited in the criminal records of the State. So exact, then, in the State of New York, is the relation between density of population and crime, that, if the density of population and the percentage of crime be given in one district, and the density of population only be given in

another, we can at once and with scarcely less than mathematical certainty calculate the percentage of crime in the latter.

The same remarkable result is exhibited in the criminal statistics of England and Wales.

XVII. *Sabbath-breaking is a source of crime.*—This proposition is amply established by the criminal statistics of New York, as set forth in the documents of the New York Sabbath Committee. It appears that for 18 months prior to August 1st, 1859 (the date on which the Sunday liquor shops were closed by order), the excess of arrests made on Sundays over those made on Tuesdays was 1852; or about 25 per cent of the whole. The Sunday arrests since that date down to January 1st, 1863, were 27,272; the Tuesday arrests, 36,363; showing an excess of arrests on Tuesdays over those on Sundays of just 25 per cent. The relative gain on Sunday crime has, therefore, been just about one half. No wonder, then, that in a recent general order issued by the Superintendent of Police, that officer holds the following language: "The good order that has been preserved in the cities of New York and Brooklyn on the Sabbath day, since the enforcement of the forty-second section of the police law, has marked an era in the history of both these cities". The Sabbath Committee, in giving the results of the reform aimed at by their labors, say: "A comparison of the data furnished by the police returns of arrests for crime and disorder on the Sundays and Tuesdays of successive years warrants the following generalization: 1. The enforcement of the Sunday laws has resulted in making the Sabbath day the most orderly of the days of the week, instead of the most immoral, as formerly. 2. The arrests for crime have increased or diminished in the measure of obedience to these laws, not only on the Sundays, but on all other days. 3. The two years of civil war have been the period of improved public morals in this Metropolis, as compared with any recent period of our history."

XVIII. *Privation of ministerial instruction is a source of crime.*—Dividing the counties of New York into groups of ten, as we have already in several instances done, we find that in the 10 counties where crime most prevails, there is one clergyman to every 678 inhabitants; in the 10 where crime least prevails, there is one to every 503. In the second 10 most criminal counties, the average number of inhabitants to one clergyman is 572; in the second 10 least criminal counties, the average population to one clergyman is 511. Thus it appears that crime increases as clerical force diminishes, and that the multiplication of ministers of the Gospel is a means of

promoting virtue, as well as piety, and tends to the prevention of crime, no less than to the growth of holiness.

We close with the remark that, although we have enumerated, *seriatim*, eighteen distinct sources of crime, yet it is seldom that they act separately and alone in working out their deplorable results. Separate acts of drinking, gaming, and the like may not lead to the commission of crime; but one of these acts leads to another, and that to a third, and so on, till their conjoint operation is to plunge into crime and its consequent wretchedness and ruin those who practise them. Thus going to the theatre may introduce a young man to the society of prostitutes; these may incite him to drink; drink may lead him to the gaming saloon; gambling may and probably will land him in poverty; and from the pressure of poverty he may be impelled to the commission of criminal acts. Each successive step has its own corrupting power; each individual lapse leaves its sting to fester in his moral nature. And when, at length, the goadings of poverty drive him to replenish his exchequer by the robbery of others, conscience has become deadened, its voice has been silenced by vicious indulgence, the temptation meets but a feeble resistance, and the youth falls an easy prey to the enemy, who is striking at the precious life, and seeking, but too successfully, to involve virtue, honor, health, and happiness in one common ruin.

But our analysis of the sources of crime would be essentially defective without the statement, that, back of all these causes and far down in the depths of our fallen nature, is the *causa causans*, the primal source of all crime and all sin,—that inborn depravity, that universal corruption of all the elements and powers of our being, which belongs to all mankind in their lapsed estate. It is in this original corruption of nature that the Word of God places the fountain of all moral evil, the original and spring of all the vice, the crime, and the sin, which darken and deform our apostate world. In the first chapter of Romans, we have the Bible theory of crime. There we learn that as men “did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful.”

In a future number we may inquire into the means of preventing crime, and the agencies by which it may be removed, as far as possible, from the body politic.

ART. III.—FALSE TENDENCY AND RADICAL DEFECT IN EDUCATION.

By REV. J. R. HERRICK, Malone, N. Y.

EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL, MORAL AND PHYSICAL, by HERBERT SPENCER, Author of "Social Statics," etc. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1861.

TWENTY-FIVE years ago the literary fame of Thomas Carlyle was attracting attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Before this he had written for Reviews, and had published some of his works. He seemed to have an utter abhorrence of the superficial in literature, in morality and in religion. He possessed a keen eye for detecting "shams", and a corresponding tact in exposing them; and the foundations of modern civilization appeared almost, through his exposures, as if built on rottenness. All saw and could not but admit the justice of many of Carlyle's sharp criticisms; and not a few were hoping his work might be the beginning of a successful attempt to clear away the rubbish and superficial foundations of the past, in order that better institutions might be reared, or at least, so that necessary institutions might be better, because more truthfully founded, and a higher state of civilization ensue. But while waiting, and waiting patiently too, to see the new foundations laid on which society should positively advance, the world—always ready to be taught, by the *men* who are capable of instructing it, if not by the *God* who can do it infinitely better—discovered that the mission of Carlyle was not to reconstruct, but only, if he had rightly apprehended it, to tear down what was already built, making his attacks at points most vulnerable. This being discovered, with how much less favor were his writings received, although no less able and vigorous than before! And the fact need occasion no surprise, for the world, bad as it is, is not pleased to find a chaos when it was looking for a cosmos.

But what appears in Carlyle as a marked example, appears in many others also, and has in fact become a prevailing tendency of our age. And this tendency—which exists in England and America, as well as in France and Germany—we

ought to understand, is the disposition to overturn and destroy things most sacred and fundamental. It shows itself in efforts to subvert Christianity itself. And here, too, it works most covertly. In other words, the fundamental error towards which the tendency is very strong, is, to discard what is supernatural and superhuman as essential for raising and perfecting humanity. It disguises itself under the following forms: It is claimed that every thing in existence has developed out of an original creation: 2. An attempt is made to give a rational or philosophic development of the race: 3. Then follows the assumption that nature's laws are supreme: 4. Comes an argument against the supernatural: 5. A virtual, but not direct, denial of the validity of Revelation. By these several roads the way is direct to the same general conclusion, viz., that man, as an individual, and of course the race as a whole — or *vice versa*, the race, and of course the individual also — by a wise process of development and education, let this only be adopted, will arrive at perfection,—towards which goal, it is assumed, both race and individual are advancing, spite all the blunders of leaders in reform, and the hindrances interposed by those who preach the necessity of a supernatural interposition.

Though we must not here discuss the process, we should gain as just a conception of it as possible, and in order thereto, a more full statement of the mode in which the error works may be desirable. It may also bring us to the best point of view from which to form a just estimate of Spencer's book on Education.

The first hypothesis, then, is like that of the "Vestiges of Creation", which declares that all the creative work ever performed by God was in the dark and far off past, and that then he simply formed original germs, capable of development into different kinds of objects, first reptile or plant, as the case might be, then animal, and lastly man. This theory, though annihilated by Hugh Miller in his "Footprints of the Creator", and "Testimony of the Rocks",—in which he shows to all candid minds, according to Scripture statement, that every different *kind* of existence, animate and inanimate, *must be* the result of a direct "*fiat* of the Creator"—that nothing higher can possibly be produced by any thing lower in kind;—still, the theory is determined to live again, like the beast in the Apocalypse, wounded to death, but whose deadly wound was healed.

Closely allied to this is the philosophic development of the race. This takes man in a rude state as the undoubted type

of the original genus, assuming that he had then nothing more than the crudest notions on any subject, but that from necessity and by degrees, he went on learning, and that in this development, not only is experience his teacher, but reason still more, and that he advances in perfection only in proportion as he develops and is guided by the light within. Underlying these assumptions, it is implied that there has never been a *fall* of the race, but that it is now more perfect than ever before. It is pre-supposed of course that the plausible theory will be readily admitted, for then it can easily be substantiated. And as there are facts in the growth and development of objects, that seem, to a superficial view, to favor the first theory, so there are facts in the history of the race, that can be so put together as to throw around this second theory a great show of plausibility — provided we only start by ignoring the fact of sin and an original apostacy.

The working of *natural law* comes in here as a great helper. The laws of heat, laws of electricity, laws of magnetism, laws of attraction, are fixed and certain. And are not the laws of vegetable and animal life sharply defined and invariable? And is not the same true of the laws of thinking? In short, the whole universe is pervaded by law. What place is left then, it is asked, for spiritual laws, and laws of freedom? Will it do to assume that there are such, and that they are higher than the laws of nature which are invariable and necessary?

This prepares the way for an argument—a logical argument *against* supernatural agencies. But the argument here, it should be observed, is not one framed expressly in the interest of pantheism. It aims to show directly how inconsistent it is, since the laws of nature are immutable, to hold to an agency above nature, like that of miracles, for example. It may be a direct argument, as that of Leibnitz, to prove that *no miracle can take place*; or, as that of Hume, to show that no proof from testimony, can be sufficient to warrant, against the uniformity of nature, a *belief* in miracles: or, an attempt may be made, like that of Strauss,—which virtually assumes both the above points,—to turn the narrative of each miracle into myth or fable. And if no miracle-working power is to be admitted, so neither can a direct agency of the Divine spirit or the human spirit be maintained. Thus this theory, although that is not its professed aim, would indirectly establish *pantheism*.—It also prepares the way for a *denial* of Revelation and the inspiration of the Bible. The tendency strikes obliquely here also. First some parts of this book are doubt-

ed; next, certain doctrines; then a comparison is made between Paul and John, on the one hand, and Plato and Socrates, on the other, as teachers; and then Paul and John are declared to be, like Socrates and Plato, only stepping-stones to something higher, which is being evolved from the human reason and being enounced by Hegel, Emerson, Parker and others; finally, it is assumed that the magi of the West are wiser, in these modern times, than Inspiration itself, or, in other words, that the Bible is nothing more than a common book. And if so, of course, the religion of the cross can have no peculiar claims, and Christianity, as the hope and salvation of the world, is a vain pretence.

Such is a more full statement of the modern tendency to pantheism and infidelity by ignoring the supernatural. It should, however, be borne in mind that some of the views connected with this tendency may be embraced without any just conception of their bearing. Nay, even those who, at heart, are firm friends of Christianity, may fall into the current without being aware of it. In many cases the ultimate, to be sure, is not reached; but this does not alter at all the nature of the tendency itself.

Moreover, since the mode of speculation indicated enters into prevailing views of the development of the race, it would, in like manner, be expected to enter into theories of *individual* development. Indeed, education being a drawing out of what is in man, how, it is asked, can we claim for it any thing more than a mere outgrowth of nature?

Herbert Spencer's book, whose title stands at the head of this article, is a good illustration of the *manner* in which religion and the supernatural are set aside, as well as of the *disposition* to set them aside, in the work of education. This we think to be one good reason for calling attention to the author's tendency. Another is the fact that, at the present time, Spencer seems exerting, in certain directions, perhaps more influence than any other writer on education. A third is because it is announced in the Introduction to this book that its author proposes to give to the world soon—as would appear from the synopsis—his views on all the leading interests of man, considered both individually and socially. Those in America and Great Britain who stand eminent in the departments of literature and science give their names as subscribers to the forthcoming work. This, as well as Spencer's confessed ability, will help give popularity to his works. And, now that we have the first-fruits, it might be well to form

therefrom, if possible, a just estimate of the future harvest of what his teaching is likely to be in its religious bearings.

A just criticism of the work before us would perhaps distinguish three varieties in the utterances of its author—*good things, partial truths, and defects*. It is under the 2d and 3d heads that Spencer favors the fundamental error in education, and discards, though it may be covertly, the supernatural. It may be freely admitted that the author has said many excellent things, and it may be hoped that his work, setting forth so forcibly his views on the subject, will awaken inquiry in regard to what education is, and what it demands. Only it should be added that these views leave a stronger impression and are more striking, because of the important omissions of much that belongs to a safe and symmetrical presentation of the true idea of education.

He speaks well of physical education. A proper diet, not over stimulative nor under stimulative; exercise, for females as well as males, in kind and degree adapted to the constitution of each, and so applied as to develop strength from day to day; pure air in the school-room and in the bed-room; in the house as well as out-of-doors; the laws of health known and observed by parents and teachers, and rightly applied and taught to children, that they may properly observe them. All these things have an important bearing, no doubt, on the proper development of the young. It gives satisfaction to know that this branch of education is likely to be more faithfully attended to than heretofore, in schools and colleges in our own country as well as in foreign countries. For a proper physical culture will give a generation stronger in mind as well as body.

Spencer has done well, too, in calling attention to the neglect of that kind of training which is adapted to fit the young for the positions of responsibility which they will soon be called to fill in the *family* and in the *State*. Our schools rarely indicate the fact that boys will soon be men, become voters, and that they must manage, well or ill, the affairs of the commonwealth. Certainly, very little instruction is given them in respect to the principles of government and the duties of citizenship; although free institutions can have no firm or sure basis without the intelligence any more than without the virtue of the people.

And though nine tenths of both sexes, as Spencer says, will, in all probability, sooner or later become parents, how poorly fitted, nevertheless, for the responsibilities of parents are nine tenths of both sexes! If the responsibilities of the family lie

before the young, why should they not be taught something that may help fit them for an intelligent discharge of the duties of parents? Simply Youman's "Handbook of Household Science" would teach most heads of families many things of which they are ignorant.

Justly, likewise, does Spencer assail the false tendency to put the ornamental before the useful—provided he always judges rightly as to what the useful is. The popular error here is, in fact, twofold. 1. To prize the ornamental more highly than the useful: and, 2. To attempt to gain the latter before the former, and without any substantial basis for it to rest upon; thus doing violence to nature, which puts forth her blossoms and emits her fragrance, after the root that nourishes them and the stalk that bears them are developed. "It is", says Spencer, "a vice of our educational system, that it neglects the plant for the sake of the flower; in anxiety for elegance, it forgets substance".

No doubt, too, he is right in demanding a process of education that shall be more one of pleasure. For it is while the mind acts pleasurably that it acts healthfully and vigorously. Knowledge gained in a sour mood is no better than that gained in a singing mood. And we need not be afraid of awakening a little pleasurable emotion in the minds of children even in school. We may cultivate a better nature by so doing.

The author speaks well, also, of the importance of self-education—of such a direction and discipline of the youthful mind as will make it self-reliant. "Unfortunately, education among us", says Horace Mann, as quoted by Spencer, "consists too much of *telling*, not in *training*".

Another point of importance is that in regard to the order of calling forth the powers of knowledge. The senses are first developed by the objects with which they come in contact. This fact suggests the propriety of giving an early attention to the development of the powers of sensation and perception, and before the reason is much cultivated. The order is, the thing before its principle; the concrete before the abstract; objects learned through the touch and the sight, before rational principles and ideas. Not that reason and the higher intuitions of truth can be developed *out of* the senses: rather the proper unfolding in childhood of the lower faculties forms the proper condition and preparation for the later and higher development. But since this fact is liable to abuse, we may properly pass over upon it to the *half-truths* of our author, of which we will here present some illustrations. These may be good when taken with their proper limitation, as half, and not as whole, truths.

Though Spencer is undeniably right in placing the useful before the merely ornamental, it may be, nevertheless, a query whether he gives altogether the right impression as to what constitutes the useful. If education is only to fit us to become parents and citizens, he may be right. What he says on this point is very forcible, if we look only to our present existence. But if man is rational and immortal, his interest extends beyond time; and may we not say, in a still better sense, that that study and discipline are useful which are best adapted to fit him for a higher and immortal existence?

So in respect to the prominent study of the laws, or science, of nature, recommended by this author: certainly, these laws should be known; natural science should be, if possible, well understood; and if there is nothing higher than nature for the soul of man to know, and to which it stands related, then let nature be her mistress and guide. But if there is an Author of nature, a personal God and other laws than those of nature—laws of freedom,—then would it not be quite as proper and not less “useful”, to know this Being and those spiritual laws which he has made for moral action, as to limit our study by the fixed laws of nature?

Just here a word, too, in regard to giving up the study of *language* for the study of physical law, which Spencer advocates. Whether it is always wise to devote so much time to the study of the languages, unless this study can be made more life-like, hence more productive, may be a question. Dead languages need to have a resurrection power put into them. But that would not be a reason for *discarding* them, which would be a good reason for *reforming* the study of them. While the history of the world and the life of nations, is written in language; since theology as well as philosophy is written in language; and since we can have no true history of philosophy or true philosophy of history, without a study of language, we cannot consent to forego such study, in order to make so prominent as this author desires, the study of mathematics and physical law.

Once more, in what Spencer calls the moral discipline of the young, he would make very prominent these fixed laws. He would have children trained from the first to feel the ill effects of breaking them. And this study is right. That it is not done more may be a serious defect. It may, moreover, be right to have the penalty such as a violation of the law naturally demands. But after all, this is no more than a half-truth. For children are constituted to be under authority. Moreover, by properly learning obedience to parents, they

are to learn obedience to God. Nor can they feel too early that they are under direct authority, both human and divine. And whatever may be said of natural penalty, when we speak of free beings, their immediate relation to personal authority, is the indispensable supplement to the side of natural consequences ; if we do not say that truly moral discipline is impossible without it.

But half-truths are defects on the one side ; and since those of this book, connect themselves with the radical defect, we will pass to this omission of the religious part of our nature in education. Nor can we help saying as we pass, that, after a careful reading of this work, it seems more remarkable for the sharp manner in which it presents half-truths than for any new matter it contains.

Some who have glanced at the work may be disposed to say that it is unjust to charge Spencer with an omission of the religious element, since he does not pretend to treat this phase of the subject. He does indeed, at the end of his chapter on Moral education, make a caveat of this kind, which, for the sake of doing justice to the author, shall here be quoted in full. "Nor have we introduced the religious element, we have confined our inquiries to a nearer and much more neglected field, though a very important one. Our readers may supplement our thoughts in any way they please : we are only concerned that they should be accepted as far as they go". (pp. 217, 218).

Now, the objection, be it distinctly observed, to Herbert Spencer, is not, that he does *not choose* to discuss the religious element in education. The objection is, that, notwithstanding his caveat, he still leaves the impression that he has covered the whole ground—the objection is, that, if we do accept him as far as he goes, and take him for our guide, we shall not be disposed to go any further—the objection to him is, that he says nothing opposed to a system of neology, pantheism and infidelity, while all he *does* say, taken in its total impression, favors a tendency in that direction, more than towards a supernatural religion and the soul of a positive Christianity. Nor would it surprise us in the least, should Spencer—when the popular mind, now left free, as he says, to form its own religious supplements, adopts what he has said as he intends it,—if he should then fill up the important blank with a direct argument in opposition to religion and Christianity, and not in their behalf. Let this, however, pass for mere opinion.

Still, the view which we feel bound to maintain—and that from the book itself,—is this, that Spencer's ideal of education does not contain properly a religious element—that he did not wish to include any other agencies than these which he so strongly advocates ;—and that thus this omission is in accordance with the fundamental error spoken of in the beginning and illustrates its introduction into this important sphere.

Surely Spencer had the ability to prepare a chapter on religious culture, had he been disposed. Although Review articles are necessarily limited, books may be enlarged at pleasure. And if the author's theory admitted a truly religious element by a divine and supernatural agency, there is no reason why he should not have spoken as boldly on this point as on any other.

Another fact is suggestive. The most enthusiastic admirers of Spencer, are those who occupy themselves most with the laws of natural science and have least to do with the study of spiritual laws. Furthermore, the first and leading part of the work, was originally published in the Westminster—a Review which is the well known advocate in England, of Neology and Infidelity. This, to be sure, may be accidental.

But can it be merely accidental that he confines his "curriculum", or round of studies, so essentially to natural science? (p. 93, *passim*). Can it be accidental that he advocates so strongly the study of objects, as the fit preparation for the study of nature's laws, with no allusion to the development of spiritual ideas? Can it be accidental that he gives the impression that children naturally grow better as they grow older, and only need the true system of education to perfect them? (p. 206.) And is it accidental, that while he would have education imitate nature, he would also have his system so completely circumscribed *by* nature? (pp. 122, 93 and on).

Nor can it be accidental that Spencer insists that "the education of the child must accord both in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind considered historically", and that what is true in the one case must be true also in the other (pp. 97-99 and 122). It is not, let it be observed, for the sake of opposing this affirmation, that we here present it, but to indicate that Spencer had in mind a *complete* system of education.

"How to live? that is the essential question for us", says he, "not how to live in a mere material sense only, but in the widest sense. The general problem which comprehends every

special problem is—the right ruling of conduct in all directions under all circumstances. In what way to treat the body; in what way to treat the mind; in what way to manage our affairs; in what way to bring up a family; in what way to behave as a citizen; in what way to utilize all those sources of happiness which nature supplies—how to use all our faculties to the greatest advantage of ourselves and others—how to live completely? And this being the great thing needful for us to learn, is by consequence, the great thing which education has to teach” (pp. 30, 31).

This appears very much as if the author intended to give a complete idea of education. He furnishes us also with what he calls a “naturally arranged” classification of the “leading kinds of activity which constitute human life”. And what, in his view, are these? “1. Those activities which directly minister to self-preservation; 2. Those activities which, by securing the necessities of life, indirectly minister to self-preservation. 3. Those activities which have for their end rearing and discipline of offspring. 4. Those activities which are involved in the maintenance of proper social and political relations. 5. Those miscellaneous activities which make up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of the tastes and feelings” (p. 32).

Now, this determining the activities that constitute human life, is *in order* to know positively what things are most deserving of attention and what it most concerns us to know—this being essential, if we would attain a “rational curriculum” (p. 29, etc). Do we not here gain the impression that Spencer intends to cover the whole ground in education? But yet the classification gives no religious “activities”—unless perchance we are to look for them among those “which make up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of the tastes and feelings”!! And of course, as we perceive, the “rational”, not Christian, curriculum includes nothing in regard to the religious side of our complex being. *Nature* is to be studied that we may know how we are related to her, not *God*, that we may know how we are related to him.

In what is said of moral training, it is still more evident that Spencer's religion is only one of nature, and not one of supernatural revelation. “Have we not here then”, says he, “the guiding principle of moral education? Is it not manifest that as ‘ministers and interpreters of nature’, it is the function of parents to see that their children habitually experience the true consequences of their conduct—the natural reactions; neither warding them off, nor intensifying them,

nor putting artificial consequences in their place?—and therefore they cannot too anxiously avail themselves of this discipline of rational consequences—this system of letting the penalty be inflicted by the laws of things” (pp. 178 and 191). And to show that he holds the process to be true universally, he adds: “Thus we see that this method of moral culture by experience of the normal reactions, which is the divinely ordained method for infancy and for adult life, is equally applicable during the intermediate childhood and youth” (p. 191). This is that field of moral culture which to our author’s mind lies nearer and is more neglected than the religious!

But we find a yet clearer intimation of what Spencer’s conception of religious culture was when he wrote this book, and that his own mind did not demand any thing more than he has given us to complete its idea of education. If his readers should deem it needful, they might supplement his thoughts as they pleased. He was only concerned that they should accept his thoughts as far as they go! Among other things to justify the almost exclusive study of science, he says: “We repeat, then, that not science, but the neglect of science, is irreligious. Devotion to science is a tacit worship—a tacit recognition of worth in the things studied, and by implication in their cause”. If this is not sufficiently positive, he is more explicit. “Nor is it thus only that true science is essentially religious. It is religious too, inasmuch as it creates a profound respect for, and an implicit faith in”—this is so near a definition of religion that we almost expect the words “a personal God” to follow; but instead of these we have—“a profound respect for, and implicit faith in, those uniform laws which underlie all things”. . . . “Instead of the rewards and punishments of traditional belief, which men vaguely hope they may gain, or escape, spite of their disobedience”, the man of science, he proceeds, “finds that there are rewards and punishments in the ordained constitution of things. He sees that the laws to which we must submit are not only inexorable, but beneficent. He sees that in virtue of these laws, the process of things is ever towards a greater and a higher happiness.” Here is Spencer’s remedial system—not the religion of the Bible and the grace of God, but the “process of things” working out “a higher happiness!” But let us hear him still further as he commends the piety of the man of science. “Hence he is led constantly to insist on these laws and is indignant when men disregard them. And thus does he, by asserting the eternal principles of things and the neces-

sity of conforming to them, prove himself intrinsically religious" (pp. 91, 92).

This then, in the view of Herbert Spencer, is what constitutes religion! The exposition of his religious belief is about as evident as that of Parker or Hegel; and the religion advocated by the three seems very much alike. Their system for the education of the race, and his for the education of the individual, well agree! And they are not very unlike in saying many good things sharply, half-truths plausibly, and, when they prefer, in leaving others to guess at their omissions.

Thus this work of Spencer on education not only falls into the wake of the modern tendency to a pantheistic infidelity; but is also an illustration of the manner in which this tendency works to ignore the supernatural and to strengthen the fundamental defect in the education, as well of the individual, as of the race. This is not by directly denying revelation, but by saying very little about it. It is not by affirming that there is no need of the grace of God and a life above nature begotten by God's Spirit, to perfect and save humanity, but by insisting on the necessity of a rational, nature-development, with the implication that this is all-sufficient. Nor yet is it by omitting to mention God and religion, but by using these and other sacred terms in a new sense, of the real import of which the uninitiated are little aware. Neither is it by openly advocating pantheism, but rather a reverence for the mystery and science of nature. Nor yet is it, in fine, by saying that the Bible is not worthy of being believed and taken as an infallible guide, but by making the laws of nature supreme, and demanding that they, and not God's law, shall be our guide practically as well as intellectually.*

* If we were to compare Spencer's "Essays", we might find further intimation that he favors a pantheistic development, a deistic progress, an absolute supremacy of natural law, and that he ignores the supernatural, and hence, would disregard and set aside Revelation. "The general doctrine that all kinds of government exercised over men were at first one government—that the political, the religious, and the ceremonial forms of control, are divergent branches of a general and once indivisible control—begins to look tenable." "That law, religion, and manners are thus related—that their respective kinds of operation come under one generalization—that they have in certain contrasted characteristics of men a common support and a common danger—will, however, be most clearly seen by discovering that they have a common origin." (The conquering chief in a remote era being) "alike legislator and judge, all quarrels among his subjects are decided by him; and his words become law. Awe of him is the incipient religion, and his maxims furnish its first precepts. Submission is made to him in the forms he prescribes; and these give birth to manners. From the first, time develops political allegiance and the administration of justice; from the second, the worship of a being whose personality becomes ever more vague, and the inculcation of precepts ever more abstract; from the third, forms of honor and the rules of etiquette" (Essays.

Whether then, notwithstanding the many forcible and valuable suggestions of this author, he is not liable to mislead, through omissions of important complementary truths, and whether the result of his teachings will not be, according to their tendency, to rationalism and pantheism, and not to religion and Christianity, are questions that ought to be well considered, before Spencer, or those who follow in his footsteps, are taken as guides in education.

We know that every system for the race that leaves no room for man's free relation to a personal God, and no room for revelation and the grace of God as a remedial system, will, and must, in the end, prove a failure. So every system of individual culture, or school education, in so far as it does not rest, and because it does not rest, on a truly religious and scriptural basis, must fail. A mere system of naturalism, whatever be its application, and however attractive in some of its phases it may be, while it disregards the world to come, cannot make men perfect either for this world. All its theories, after being tried, will be found wanting. Hegel and Carlyle and Emerson and Parker and Spencer, and so all man-devised theories of reform, may have their day. But at length an infidel system of philosophy, an infidel system of theology, and infidel systems of education, must give place to a Christian philosophy, a Christian theology, and a Christian system of education. Of this we are confident. And yet,

London Ed. '58, pp. 112, 129, 130). Man needs something done for him, it is true. "The aboriginal man, coming fresh from the killing of bears, and from lying in ambush for his enemy, has, by the necessities of his condition, a nature requiring to be curbed in its every impulse" (p. 130). Science may, indeed, do something for him: "Whenever established, a correct theory of the historical development of the sciences must have an immense effect upon education, and through education, upon civilization (p. 226, on "Genesis of Science"). But it seems desirable to get rid of the control of law, religion, and manners—the common origin of which the author so admirably sets forth—as soon as possible. "The discipline of circumstances which has already wrought out such changes in us, must go on eventually to work out yet greater ones. That daily curbing of the lower nature and curbing of the higher nature, which out of cannibals and devil-worshippers has evolved philanthropists, lovers of peace, and haters of superstition (almost equivalent, one would think in Spencer's view, to religion)! cannot fail to evolve out of these, men as much superior to them, as they are to their progenitors." "When human nature has grown into conformity with the moral law, these will need no judges and statute books; when it spontaneously (?) takes the right course in all things, as in some things it does already, prospects of future reward or punishment will not be wanting as incentives; and when fit behavior has become instinctive, these will need no code of ceremonies to say how behavior shall be regulated" (p. 137). "Simultaneously with the decline in the influence of priesthoods, and in the fear of eternal torments—simultaneously with the mitigation of political tyranny, the growth of popular power, and the amelioration of criminal codes, has taken place that diminution of formalities, and that fading of distinctive modes, now so observable" (p. 133).

however much there may be that is valuable in Spencer, his false tendency and fundamental defect should be exposed. For the truth's sake and the gospel's sake, it should be done. And surely for the sake of humanity, that cannot be perfected without a supernatural agency, it should be done. It is demanded in behalf of our children and youth, who should be brought under the influence of a system able to accomplish what it undertakes, and not under one, which, after making large promises, must at last prove a failure.

We repeat, if there is a supernatural world, and man is related to it; if there is a personal God, and man as a free being is accountable to him; if the Bible is true, and we have need of that Christ who is revealed in it; then any system that sees no need of God and the religion of the Bible, is *fundamentally* erroneous, whether it be one for the individual or the race.

We do not say that the objects and laws of nature are not to be studied. But if there are also laws of freedom, spiritual laws, *these* are not to be discarded. If man has a conscience and a will, the centre of moral action, and a God, the centre of religious action, why should he not know moral science and theological science, as well as the science of nature? If there are, indeed, moral laws distinct from nature's, then the former ought to be known as thoroughly as the latter. If there is a God, there is a theology, and this heaven-descended science is as worthy our attention, to say the least, and may as justly claim it, as any that is earth-born. And, in education, instead of shutting up the mind to the uniformity of nature and her necessary laws—what is well adapted to quiet the sense of responsibility—it should have given it a system that will reach to the full compass and supply of its real wants. And why do we discard, under the term "education", the idea of the *new-life*, which, though it cannot be edu^ced *from* the human, is yet to be developed *in* the human? Let nature's laws be studied till they show the need—and they will show this if studied aright—of something higher than themselves to perfect humanity; or rather, let humanity itself, in its actual condition and capability, be studied, till "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus" is felt to be necessary, in order to its emancipation and true freedom. Let philosophy be studied—if studied aright—till its weakness is thoroughly appreciated; but how shall the inefficiency of all human wisdom be seen, if not in the light of a Divine philosophy?

And if this Divine wisdom is for all, when shall we *begin* to learn it? If it is a revelation from above, and if he is the

author of it who knows truly our wants, it surely must be safe to teach it to children; and, for the same reason, it must be likewise the most valuable of all knowledge. Furthermore, that *moral discipline* is best for the young which is secured by, and in accordance with, God's truth, however some popular theories may be opposed to it. It is best for the moral and for the religious discipline of the young, for their present life as well as for the future one for which they are to prepare, that they should, from the first, feel the restraints and force of positive authority, not only that of earthly parents, but that also of their Father in heaven; and that they learn to submit to this authority, as that of a being wiser and better than they. This is needed not merely as a supplement to the discipline of natural consequences. It is needed primarily. We should begin with it.

Finally, then, let us demand, for the young, a system of education, — as we need a system of government, — based on the truth of God and conformed to the religion of Jesus Christ. Let us reject an infidel and a semi-infidel system as well, and adopt a Christian system that shall make our children more truly religious, and not tend to raise up a generation of pantheists and infidels. We are to bear in mind, that to err fundamentally, is not to succeed, but, necessarily, to fail. It avails not to affirm with Spencer that our theory is good, provided only it could be well applied. Our want of success results from not building on the right foundation, and from leaving out the corner-stone of our edifice. God has made the human mind for himself and immortality, and we must treat it accordingly. He declares it to be in need of a divine renewal: we must accept the fact. He has provided the means by which we can be formed in the divine image: we must accept of this also, as the sole effectual remedy for our ruin by sin, and not trust in that which we may draw out of, or develop in, ourselves.

The world's real progress is due to the vital power of Christianity; those nations are most prosperous that are most Christian; those parents and teachers succeed best, whose efforts are regulated by Christian principles; and those schools and colleges, other things being equal, are most successful which are most truly religious in their influence. And since these things are so, we ought to have such confidence in the Divine means and method of elevating and training the human soul, that we shall make our views and methods conform to his. If we would do this, our effort will be to give greater prominence in education, not to *nature's* laws, but to *God's* laws.

ART. IV.—AMERICAN NEW TESTAMENT COMMENTARIES.

By HOWARD CROSBY, D.D., New York.

NOTES EXPLANATORY AND PRACTICAL ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. By ALBERT BARNES. NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. By M. W. JACOBUS, D.D. — A COMMENTARY, CRITICAL, EXPOSITORY, AND PRACTICAL, ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. By J. J. OWEN, D.D.

THE Holy Scriptures contain a Divine light; but this light shines through the defective medium of human language. Hence, to elucidate Scripture is not an absurdity, but a religious duty. It is not enlightening a light, but removing the obstacles from the path of the light. Human language is a defective medium, both from the inadequacy of all representatives of thought, and from the diversity of language among men. The former defect belongs to language as such, and the latter to the adventitious fact that language is various. The former is remedied to some degree by iteration, parallelism, analogy, and illustration; the latter is remedied by translation.

But there is still another defective medium through which the light of Scripture has to shine if it produce an illuminating effect upon the life of man. This is the perversity of the heart, which, by the accumulations of sin, obscures or distorts the rays which seek to enter and renew it. To remove this difficulty man can make tentative efforts (made effectual by the Holy Spirit), by argument and exhortation, and so far he elucidates Scripture.

In the Commentaries which have issued from the English and American press, both the defective media are generally attacked. The commentary treats of the letter and the spirit. Linguistic difficulties are examined, discussed, and often removed, while the doctrine is developed and earnestly impressed upon the reader's mind. In the older English and the most popular American commentaries the latter elucidation is the most prominent; in the German commentaries the former. The former is most important in its position, but not in its direct effect. It holds the place of a foundation in an edifice. Without the comprehension of the letter we cannot reach the spiritual import of Scripture. And yet the analysis of the letter is a work of far lower rank than the development and

inculcation of the spirit, as it only requires an intellectual apparatus, while the other requires for its proper performance both this and the far rarer preparation of an awakened and discerning heart. Indeed, we may modify our assertion regarding the criticism of the letter by saying that often the want of this spiritual experience is the cause of error in linguistic interpretation, as in cases where the laws of grammar and grammatical analogy allow an ambiguity, but where a spiritual discernment would discover none, and where, accordingly, the mere letter critic might choose the wrong interpretation. It is for this reason that we cannot be too careful when under the guidance of German Biblical criticism, which is too often tainted by neological admixture, even in men of evangelical fame, where perhaps even an evangelical spirit will not use its own discernment, but will, with untimely modesty, cleave to its rationalistic teachers.

As the danger with letter-criticism is in the want of spirituality in the guide, so, conversely, the fault frequently in spirit-criticism is the want of adequate ability to comprehend the letter, when vapid truisms or pious common-places spring from the mere surface-knowledge of the text. A Biblical commentator ought therefore to be a skilful grammarian, a scholar in Hebrew and Greek, an archæologist in matters Oriental, classical, and Rabbinical, and a man of elevated piety. These embrace both sides of his preparation. As secondary qualifications we would mention an acquaintance with the host of commentators who have preceded him, and sufficient knowledge of a dozen other modern languages to read the kindred versions. We call these secondary because a man's relation with these helps is one move from the original text, and they may sometimes darken counsel by words without knowledge. Too much stress has often been put on what some human authority has said, when the face of the original rebuked the reliance.

A letter-commentary may be addressed to any one of three classes, and will differ in its method according to the class it addresses. First, there is the uneducated mind, which must be fed with babe's food. Milk is given it in Sunday-school compilations. Secondly, there is the other extreme of the Biblical scholar, who needs the independent and profound research of erudition and genius, whose results he can compare with his own. But, thirdly, between these two is the great class of educated but not learned minds, who need strong meat, but yet, from their lack of habit, or their want of special investigation into Biblical lore, cannot bear very highly con-

denser food. From this class comes the large army of Bible-class leaders and Sunday-school teachers, who have to do so largely in this age with the spiritual training of the church, and upon the faithfulness of whose efforts, therefore, depends so largely the growth of true piety. Their weapon is the Bible. According to their knowledge of its use will be their success against sin in the hearts of their pupils. A certain amount of Biblical study is to them a necessity, and the same amount should be performed by every Christian parent.

It is to this class that American commentators have especially directed their efforts, as, with the practical tendencies of the American mind, it might have been expected they would, and as was most proper they should. Men among us like Stuart and Alexander have, in fragmentary commentaries, addressed the learned, and their works are of lasting value in the apparatus of the Biblical scholar. The former's originality and the latter's masterly discrimination equally rank their productions with older recognized standards. But the commentators whom we have enumerated at the head of this article are more distinctively American than either Stuart or Alexander, who, appealing to the student, are necessarily more German, as the large mass of Biblical criticism comes to us from Germany. By "American" we mean "full of practical tact" to meet the real wants of the Bible-reading community. It is the peculiar characteristic of an American that he adapts himself to circumstances. He has a quick perception of a want, and an equally quick invention for its supply. It is so in trade, in social life, and in politics. It is equally so in things moral and religious. In the commentaries mentioned above there is just the right form of letter-criticism for the educated mass of Bible readers, learned dissertations and infant-class explanations being equally avoided. The results of learning are seen in judicious expositions and valuable auxiliary information; but the comparison of codices and the hypercriticism of verbal forms are not found. With this style of letter-criticism there is mingled the spirit-criticism, or practical commentary, enforcing by the methods already alluded to the great truths of which the verbal text is but the vehicle. In this the pious heart speaks forth and performs its great work of evangelization. Just such commentaries were needed for our nervous American people, who have not, or will not, take time to explore all the sinuosities of Biblical learning, even under the best guides, but who will eagerly seize upon and use the clear testimony which he who runs can read.

We group the three works of Barnes, Jacobus, and Owen together, as they are, we believe, the only complete New Testament commentaries from American pens. Indeed, the last two are as yet incomplete, reaching each only to the Epistles; but their authors purpose to continue their labors until the whole New Testament is annotated.

The commentary of Mr. Barnes began to appear about twenty-five years ago. Until that time the commentaries of Matthew Henry and Thomas Scott were the principal Biblical helps of the mass of American readers. Adam Clarke, Matthew Poole, Doddridge and Whitby, were less frequently seen, while Hall, Mayer, Wells, Fawcett, and many other English commentators, were almost wholly unknown. Mr. Barnes' work has very largely superseded Henry and Scott, and by doing so has been, strange to say, the innocent cause of an evil; for where Henry or Scott was taken as the family commentator, the Old Testament as well as the New was studied; but where Barnes has entered (and by entering has excluded the others), the want of an Old Testament Commentary has led to the comparative neglect of that portion of the Bible.

The great want of such a commentary as that of Mr. Barnes was shown by its immense sale, and we may safely say that it had a large share in increasing the study and knowledge of the New Testament throughout the United States. Its author bestowed great pains upon its preparation, and has enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing the fruit of his labors.

Since Mr. Barnes wrote his commentary Biblical science has made rapid advances, the benefit of which has been reaped by Dr. Jacobus, and still more by Dr. Owen, whose work was last issued, if we except the fourth volume of Dr. Jacobus, on the Acts. Dr. Jacobus, occupying the chair of Biblical Literature in one of our most esteemed theological seminaries, is a diligent and methodical scholar. His careful system is seen in his Catechetical Question Books, where the questions of the Westminster Catechism are admirably interwoven with his own. In the volume on the Acts the same trait is shown in the clear divisions of the chronology, and, in the volumes on the Gospels, in the discriminating introduction of the Harmony.

Dr. Owen's volumes are especially distinguished for a clear and vigorous style, while his occupation for many years as a linguistic professor has given him great advantages in the independent examination of the text. A strong common sense, as distinguished from narrow bias, marks his treatment of the more contested subjects, and throughout his notes there is a manly avoidance of trite generalities.

A good instance of these characteristics is seen in his management of the question of demoniacal possession, as given in his note on Matt. iv, 24. This note forms a clear and condensed essay upon the subject. He first gives the six different significations of the Greek word *δαίμων*, and shows the method of its adoption into Biblical writing, corresponding to the adoption of *θεός*. He then combats the notion of the identity of demoniacal possession with ordinary disease, by asking "What kind of disease is that which cries out, 'What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God? Art thou come hither to torment us (*i. e.* the sickness or disease) before the time'? Who ever heard of a disorder that begged permission to enter, and actually did enter, swine"? This leads the commentator to the positive exhibition of the doctrine of the possession by evil spirits, as clearly revealed in Scripture, and to the conjecture that the same activity of these spirits may be found at this day.

Another instance of Dr. Owen's clear and manly treatment of a difficult and contested passage is found in his notes on the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew, where he shows the applicability of the whole prophecy (to verse 43) to the destruction of Jerusalem, where so many commentators have led their readers into a maze, mingling up the destruction of the city, the Adrianic overthrow, the second coming of Christ, the end of the world, and the individual man's death.

The fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of Luke's Gospel are admirably treated by Dr. Owen. The closely related parables of the lost sheep, the piece of silver, and the prodigal son are traced in their characteristic arrangement, the increased emphasis being vividly educed in the discussion, while the preliminary remarks to the chapter form a brief yet exhaustive review of the great doctrine of these inspired and beautiful teachings.

We cannot forbear from calling attention to Dr. Owen's rich exposition of our Lord's last prayer, in John xvii, especially to the portion beginning with the twentieth verse, where the commentator's heart, elevated by the glorious subject, is poured out in a strain of pious eloquence, perhaps not exceeded in any other part of his work. Indeed, his volume on John is his best (the volume on the Acts is not yet published), and well exhibits Dr. Owen's peculiar fitness for the task of a commentator.

We regard these commentaries as of vast importance to the future of our nation. They cultivate a taste for Bible reading, and define the truth in the minds of the readers. The Bible

is the source of all true theology. Natural theology and rational theology are but hideous, distorted shadows (man being what he is) without the positive teachings of inspiration. Any thing which will encourage Bible reading will disseminate sound theology, and sound theology (in its wide sense) is the basis of sound morals, which form a nation's richest element of prosperity and worth. Blessed be God! the cry of our age is, "to the law and to the testimony"! Men are becoming Bereans both in Protestant and Romanist lands. The same fact is noticeable in the countries cursed by the Oriental churches, and even Islamism and Paganism are learning to doubt their Korans and Vedas, and seek the meaning of the Christian Bible. These commentaries are fanning the flame, and the result is clearly visible already, in the more general knowledge of those archaeological and linguistic facts which make more easy the comprehension of the sacred page. These commentators stand as the middle men between the original explorers into texts and versions and the reading masses, while they are, as in Dr. Owen's case, original investigators to some extent themselves. They take the ore, laboriously dug from many a linguistic and archaeological mine, and as laboriously work it into beautiful and useful vessels of gold and silver for the service of a large multitude, to whom the mere ore would be comparatively useless. In America scholars are not properly equipped with apparatus for the former portion of this two-fold work, but the eminently clear discrimination and practical tact of the Anglo-Saxon scholar fits him in a remarkable manner for the latter portion, which is really the nobler and more important.

It is no reproach to American scholarship that it has not a Masoretic knowledge of facts. Manuscripts and time are plenty in Europe and scarce here, and we must be content to obtain most of our elementary material from beyond sea, where scholars admirably fitted for this primal work by teaching, habit, and opportunity, abound. But it is an honor to American scholarship that it makes most judicious use of this material, and therein takes rank behind none. A more comprehensive view and a sounder judgment render American scholarship in this, its higher plane, superior to that of our German cousins. To the enlarged grasp and correct discrimination of the American scholar we may add a rapidity of adaptation (tact) and clearness of definition, in both which he compares most favorably with the scholars of continental Europe, whose subjectivity (if we may use the word) makes them too often clumsy and obscure to the world without them.

We make these observations, because of the readiness which some have to denounce all domestic scholarship and to exalt the German cultivation to the prejudice of our own. This cant error is founded on a lack of discrimination between the very different fields in which German and American scholarship are engaged. If an American Hebraist does not happen to know that Pazer may be preceded by one, two, three, or four *Munahhs* in prose, but only by three conjunctives at farthest in poetry, his scholarship is called in question, although he may be of keenest discernment in the analysis of a Hebrew passage, and be thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the language. It is as if a drill sergeant should condemn a Napoleon as an ignoramus for a lack of acquaintance with the last edition of Hardee. Mint, anise, and cummin form the standard of a vast army of critics. It is for Americans themselves to live down these unjust criticisms, by refusing to join in the self-denunciatory cry of false modesty, and by refusing to worship foreign idols.

We are full of the appreciation of the immense benefit which we have received from German sources, but at the same time we recognize a vigor and independence of thought in the American mind which we would not have marred by a base acolytism. The commentaries of Jacobus and Owen are not servile. Their authors think for themselves. They do not bow down to Bengel or Olshausen, but greet them as co-laborers, as brethren in the same great work. They are as ready to differ from them as to agree with them; and, where they differ, Jacobus and Owen are quite as likely to be right as Bengel and Olshausen.

There is one phase of evangelism which is still to greet our eyes. It is when the clear vision and sound judgment of the Anglo-Saxon commentators send a current of orthodox teaching back over the mysticism and rationalism of Germany, paying back that land of laborious scholarship for its raw material of letter-criticism in the made-up goods of true and consistent doctrine. This reflux has already begun, but it is not yet distinctly apparent to the world. The semi-orthodoxy of prominent theologians in Germany to-day is much indebted to this source, but they are not yet released from the commingled muddy waters of wordiness and worldliness.

We wish that the authors to whom we have particularly referred in this article, or others equally well fitted for the work, would devote their energies to a clear and compendious commentary upon the Old Testament. We need such a sensible exposition as American scholarship could furnish, with an

especial view to the development of the New Testament in the Old. The want is largely felt, and constantly lamented. Why may we not expect this desideratum from the scholarly, laborious, and attractive pen of Dr. Owen?

ART. V.—MARK II, 23, AS COMPARED WITH MATTHEW XII, 1,
AND LUKE VI, 1.

By Rev. C. C. STARBUCK, Union Theol. Seminary, New York.

IN our version there seems no special necessity for instituting a particular comparison of these three passages. They all appear to state the same fact in nearly the same words. But recurring to the original we find that the words in Mark ii, 23 translated "as they went" are in the Greek *ὁδὸν ποιεῖν*. Had the middle voice been used *ὁδὸν ποιεῖσθαι* there could have been no difficulty in this translation. *Ὀδὸν ποιεῖσθαι* has the idiomatic sense: *iter facere* "to make one's way, to proceed". But on the other hand the phrase with the active voice has a sense quite distinct. *Ὀδὸν ποιεῖν* signifies: "to make or break a way" *viam sternere*. If the phrase in Mark then be translated according to its established signification, it would read, "and the disciples began to open a way by plucking up the ears". *τίλλοντες* of course lends itself equally well to the gerundive or to the circumstantial use.

If this rendering be given—and it rests upon the established signification of the phrase *ὁδὸν ποιεῖν*—an entirely new circumstance is introduced into Mark's narrative, and one not alluded to in either of the parallels, namely that of plucking up the ears "to make a path". The same action, in the two other Evangelists appears only as a means of *satisfying hunger*. Hence arises an apparent discrepancy, which commentators have endeavored to remove by transferring to *ὁδὸν ποιεῖν* the peculiar idiomatic force of *ὁδὸν ποιεῖσθαι* namely *iter facere*, "to proceed".

Now where the middle and active voices have a sense substantially the same, even classic Greek not unfrequently interchanges them. And where the middle only differs from the active by expressing a reference to the subject with greater delicacy, the later Greek, and especially the N. T. Greek undoubtedly often neglects the distinction. But whatever negli

gence of later and especially of Hellenistic use may be allowed, it is sufficiently established, since Winer's day, that the N. T. language is essentially correct Greek for all real distinctions of meaning. With the multiplying proofs of heaven-guided accuracy in N. T. style it is not to be assumed that it neglects to mark the difference between two phrases entirely distinct and opposite in sense. If repeated perusals of the New Testament have shown us any thing it is that the distinction of voices so vital to the Greek language is observed, if not with Attic delicacy, yet with classic accuracy. Finer shadings of use are often neglected but essential differences of signification such as between *iter facere* and *viam sternere*, never.

It is true De Wette thinks the one to be taken for the other in the passage before us. But as he brings no lexical authority, even the weight of his name cannot counterbalance the presumption against the confusion of two senses so opposite as "to proceed" and "to break a way". Dr. Robinson regards ὁδὸν ποιεῖν as a Hebraism translated from דרך פתח and instances Judges xvii, 8. But though hesitating to question the authority of an eminent and esteemed instructor, we must say that we cannot see that he has established his point. The phrase in Judges xvii, 8, translated in the Septuagint ποιῆσαι ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ undoubtedly shows that Hellenistic Greeks have used the active where Attic Greeks would have used the middle.

But there is here only a difference of delicacy, not a difference of sense. Ποιεῖσθαι ὁδὸν is an idiomatic phrase: ποιῆσαι ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ is not. The difference may be defined thus: an ordinary phrase retains the distinct sense of its parts; an idiomatic phrase melts them together, so that the resulting signification is something different from that obtained by merely joining its words together. The one is a mechanical, the other a chemical union. Now in the phrase ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ, as an Athenian would have translated the passage in Judges xvii, 8, the verb and the noun retain a perfectly distinct and separable force. And the independent strength of the noun is enhanced by the addition of its two attributives, one of which remains in the Septuagint. The genitive αὐτοῦ moreover defines ὁδὸν as referring to a definite journey, and removes all ambiguity. In this phrase then the verb is sufficiently disengaged from the noun to admit any change of voice that leaves the sense of the whole not materially affected. Neither ποιῆσαι ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ nor ποιεῖσθαι ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ can possibly mean any thing else than "to accomplish his journey". The only difference is that the middle adds a reference

to the subject as undertaking the journey *on his own account*, which the active does not express. The substantial sense with either voice is the same. But in the idiomatic phrase *ποιεῖσθαι ὁδόν* in the sense of "to proceed" we submit that the case is different. Here the verb and the noun are, as we have said, melted together, so that the resulting sense of the whole strikes the mind without any distinct apprehension of the sense of the individual parts. The noun has here no attributives to keep it from this coalescence and the phrase may be regarded as naturally a single word. It is evident then that a change in either of the component parts is much less likely to occur than where the verb and the noun are still felt as distinct forces. The ordinary inflections of the verb would be felt as the inflections of the phrase. But a change in the voice would be felt as affecting the verb individually, and such a change we think unlikely when once a noun and a particular form of the verb have settled together in a specific use. Idioms we know remain in a language distinct and uncorrupted often longer than single words. There are idioms in our language still in use whose separate words have become obsolete while the combination has a yet living force. It appears therefore safe to assume that when the Greek language detached from the general *ποιῆσαι ὁδόν* the more specific *ποιεῖσθαι ὁδόν*, in the sense of "to make a progress", and afterwards, except where an attributive to the context preserved to the noun its distinctness, blended the two into an idiomatic unity with the simple sense "to proceed", that the phrase thus formed and crystallized, would remain in this settled sense as long as the language was spoken. To suppose then that Mark, had he wished to express the sense of proceeding, would have left the idiom lying ready to his hand to revert to the active, from which that sense had long withdrawn and which, unless defined by attributives, had a sense entirely distinct, would seem rather to attribute a blunder to Mark than to give him credit for that essential accuracy which the lamented lexicographer would have been the first to accord except for the insensible influence of a supposed harmonistic difficulty.

Dr. Robinson cites however two passages from late writers in support of this supposed confusion in use between *ὁδόν ποιεῖν* and *ὁδόν ποιεῖσθαι*. One is from Xenophon Ephesius. On examining the passage we find that the editors of Teubner's edition have corrected it, to the middle. If the active stood however it would read *ἐποίησεν τὴν ὁδὸν ἐς Μαζάκα*. The attributives specify a particular journey. So with the other pas-

sage, cited from Polyænus *ποιεῖν τὴν πορείαν*. In neither of these is there an idiomatic fusion of verb and noun as in *ποιεῖσθαι ὁδόν*.

Alexander in his commentary on Mark, it is true, disposes of the matter with a somewhat dictatorial confidence. But the venerated commentator can no longer assign the reasons which he has failed to produce and we may reasonably decline the decision of simple will.

It appears to us that the reasons adduced above for supposing that Mark has not confounded voices to the confusion of senses are, we do not say conclusive, but strong; and that the instances adduced of similar negligence are not really parallels. So much we think may be assumed with all deference to the supporters of the correctness of the English version of this passage, namely, that the evidence of negligence, amounting to confusion of sense on the part of Mark, is not sufficient to warrant us in departing from the first principle of sound interpretation which requires that we should assign to every word and phrase its established sense, unless required by the context or some other source of knowledge to depart from it. Let us inquire whether there is any such necessity here.

And first: in the relation of the circumstances of events we have a right to esteem Mark as more precise than the other two synoptics; than Matthew, because this Evangelist, full and orderly in his report of our Lord's discourses, is comparatively negligent of outward details. To have the essential point is enough for him. Luke, again, deriving his accounts more at second hand would naturally care less for minutely shading his narratives of events, though he is preëminent among all the four for his delicate shadings of parables and discourses.

Mark, on the other hand, the convert and ultimately the assistant of Peter (1 Pet. v, 13), whose gospel, according to the final concurrence of both rationalists and orthodox appears now to be ratified as approximately the gospel of Peter, as the early Fathers held it, has apparently derived wholly or in part from this apostle of government and order, this apostle of externals as contrasted with Paul the apostle of doctrine, and with John the apostle of contemplation, a peculiar love for the outward frame-work and setting of our Lord's activity. In his report of discourses, less sententious than Matthew, less delicate than Luke, and infinitely less copious than either, he is for his part as much before them in the subordinate, but by no means insignificant details which give to our Lord's life a

distincter form for our human conceptions. In the narrative of an event he may commonly be presumed, therefore, where there is a difference, to have retained more completely its original shape and progress. Let us see if in the passage in question, as compared with its parallels, we can verify this peculiarity. It is of course understood that we assume for ὁδὸν πατεῖν the ordinary sense of "to open a way".

Mark ii, 23. The disciples passing on the Sabbath through the standing corn begin to feel their course impeded by grain which here and there has overgrown the neglected path. They accordingly begin to remove the ears that thus choked up the way. Alexander objects that σάχνας means *ears* not *stalks*. But as the ear is all that makes the stalk of account it is certainly no very violent metonymy to take it as denoting the whole.

V. 23. This question might mean, Why do thy disciples on the Sabbath do that which is unlawful in itself? That is, Why do they by plucking up another man's grain commit a trespass, aggravated by being committed on the Sabbath? But the words more naturally mean simply, Why do they in this way break the Sabbath? A right of way through a field implies the right of removing obstructions, as the "village Hampdens" of England have often proved against wealthy landlords. And as our Lord's answer takes no notice of any such charge it is not probable it was implied.

V. 25. Our Lord himself (αὐτὸς) taking up the answer for his disciples asks the captious *micrologists*, if David their theocratic king had not on similar necessity violated the ceremonial law, not by inference but beyond doubt. What had evoked no disapprobation from God's ministers in one man ought not on similar necessity to be condemned in others. Neither the Pharisees' question nor the reference to David decides whether the original offence were rooting up the grain or eating it. If the lighter labor were unlawful much more the heavier, and the essential point of comparison between the disciples and David is not their both eating, but their both violating the ceremonial law, David unquestionably, the disciples according to Rabbinic scruples.

Referring now to *Matthew*, as usual fuller in reporting the discourse, if more meagre in detailing the event, we see that our Lord after meeting the Pharisees on their own ground now takes higher ground. *Mat.* xii, 5, 6. He refers to the temple Sabbath service, in which the priests while doing what no ordinary necessity even would excuse in others, by toiling at the sacrifices, while it would have been death for a layman

to kill an ox on the Sabbath, not only did not break the law of God but fulfilled it. Even so the Son of God in calm majesty asserts for those who ministered to him a character which rendered every act of theirs performed in this high service not less sacred than the temple-worship. "But I say unto you in this place is one greater than the temple."

Mt. xii, 7. Then leaving the defensive, he in turn charges upon the Pharisees an ignorance of the very principles of God's own being, who has declared that mercy (which would have here been exemplified by a charitable indulgence to real necessities), is in this view so much above ceremonial observances that in comparison he rejects the latter, or at least rates the two as the infinite to the infinitesimal. Then leaving the ground of argument altogether he rises into the amplitude of divine authority, and declares (Mt. xii, 8) that as the Messiah (*ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*), one in counsel and working with the Father whom he represents on earth, he is the final judge of the nature and extent of the law of the Sabbath, which was made for man and for which man was not made (Mark ii, 27); which being like all outer observances intended as the flexible means of man's good and not as the inflexible object of man's worship, is subject to his good pleasure who is intrusted with the destiny of man.

We see thus that the three Evangelists harmonize admirably and supplement each other as to the essential fact and our Lord's divine deductions from it. There remains the less important inquiry, whether Mark relates precisely the same point of the event. We see no necessity for supposing it. Allowing that *ὁδὸν ποιεῖν* has its regular sense and *τίλλοντες* the naturally inferred gerundive sense, thus indicating a path made more open by pulling up encumbering grain, still nothing could be more natural than the rubbing out of more or less of the wheat and eating it. It is an almost instinctive action in such circumstances, as any one that has ever helped pick up apples in an orchard will know. Both actions being equally opposite to Pharisaic scrupulosity their question may easily have included both. Mark, true to his peculiarity, seizes the main circumstance of opening a path, the other two Evangelists the incidental circumstance of eating some of the ears thus plucked up, either act equally well suiting the question of the Pharisees, and the latter act remaining longer in the general memory from its correspondence in form as well as in principle with the first instance adduced by our Lord.

We do not see why we cannot thus secure a harmony between the three narratives, complete in the essential particu-

lar, that is, the relation of the disciples' act to what followed, impeaching the literal truth of no one of the three, and at the same time preserving to Matthew and Mark the appreciation of their respective excellencies, the latter as exact in details, the former as complete in records of discourse.

ART. V.—DRAPER'S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE.

A HISTORY OF THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE. By JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, M.D., LL.D. New York, Harper and Brothers. 1863. 8vo, pp. xii. 631.

THE subject of this work is of the highest importance, and beset with great difficulties. Any scholar who should give a complete account of the intellectual development of Europe would win a noble guerdon in the fame of the achievement. It demands a union of the highest intellectual powers, with a scholarship adequate to sweep the whole realm of literature and thought. Such a development must comprise at least an outline or summary of what has been accomplished by the human race in the way of grasping and solving the great problems of human destiny. Whatever science, art, religion, morals and politics have done or are doing for the race, is to be set forth in order. Few scholars have the encyclopedic attainments, combined with powers of analysis and generalization, adequate to master and marshal this vast accumulation of materials. Those familiar with the progress of literature are aware that the production of such a work has been the aim of the most comprehensive learning, and of the loftiest philosophical speculations, in Germany, France and England. Each recent system of philosophy has had this in view. The various, almost innumerable, productions on the history of civilization, of literature, of art and the arts, of the different branches of science, of philosophy in all its departments, and of morals and theology, are contributions to this result. And masters in the sphere of thought have endeavored to combine all these in one general view, which should exhibit the rationale and the end of human progress. The elaborate researches and speculations of Schelling and Hegel, of Comte and Buckle, and of many others, bear upon this question, attempt to solve this problem.

One of the most striking facts now, about this new work

of Dr. Draper, is, that he seems to ignore, or to be ignorant of, all that has been done by previous explorers. Ever since the time of Vico, and in every cultivated nation, there have been men of the ripest qualifications devoted to this task, and yet they are here hardly recognized even by name: Condorcet, Herder, Schlegel and Guizot, besides Schelling and Hegel, Comte and Buckle, are not mentioned in this treatise. Even Mr. Dove's work on the *Theory of Human Progression* contains a more careful scheme, better worked out, than the one here presented.

It may be said, that the scheme is new, that the theory is original, and therefore could not receive much aid or elucidation from the labors of others. But so far as we can get at the theory of Dr. Draper it seems to us, in its main drift, quite identical with that which Comte, Buckle and Mill have been elaborating for the last quarter or third of a century; though it is not so carefully or logically stated by him as by either of these three masters of positive science. Differing from them in some points, his tendency is in the same direction. Human progress in general is confounded with progress in the so-called positive sciences. The substance of the age of reason, according to him, is an increased knowledge of the laws and forces of nature, brought into the service of man. In morals, theology and metaphysics, he sees no progress, and finds no hope for the future. In fact, all the ground of intellectual progress which seems to him to remain is in the advance of physiology. And this he indicates as the main discovery and fruit of his researches. This position is so strange, that it deserves a somewhat fuller examination. Here, too, he leaves the broad ground of other positivists, and defines and circumscribes his main object. Comte and Buckle make induction from facts subject to the senses to be the main instrument of progress, but they do not condition the advance of intellect upon any one science; Dr. Draper finds in physiology the source, test and law of the intellectual development of Europe.

In the Preface he announces his theme: it is "a history of the progress of ideas and opinion from a point of view heretofore almost entirely neglected". "Social advancement is as completely under the control of natural law as is bodily growth. The life of an individual is a miniature of the life of a nation. These propositions it is the special object of this book to demonstrate." "No one, I believe, has hitherto undertaken the labor of arranging the evidence offered by the intellectual history of Europe in accordance with physiological

principles, so as to illustrate the orderly progress of civilization, or collected the facts furnished by other branches of science with a view of enabling us to recognize clearly the conditions under which that progress takes place. This philosophical deficiency I have endeavored in the following pages to supply." "Seen thus *through the medium of physiology*, history presents a new aspect to us. We gain a more just and thorough appreciation of the thoughts and motives of men in successive ages of the world." The same general propositions are reiterated at convenient stages throughout the volume, which is in fact only an expansion of the last chapter of the author's *Physiology*. How far are these views original? How far are they true?

The propositions are these three: the life of the individual is completely under the control of natural laws: society, made up of individuals, is under the control of the same laws: and these laws are physiological. Hence, physiology is the science of the sciences—all development is to be explained by it.

Is the life, now, of each individual, under the control simply and solely of natural laws? Is that a demonstrable proposition? Has Dr. Draper proved it? No; he just assumes it as an axiom, as if it were incontrovertible; and he nowhere examines or defines it more specifically. And yet, in his own view, every thing hinges just here. He seems to identify the whole life of the individual with his physical life. Physical life, bodily growth, physiology, if you please, is under the control of natural law, or rather, is a part of the system of natural laws. But is there nothing more in man to be developed than his bodily structure, his anatomical and nervous system? The latter may be first developed, it may be the substratum of the other developments; but is it identical with these other developments? In short, has man a soul as well as a body, and a soul distinguishable from his nervous system? If he has, and if that is developed, and developed according to its own laws—then the whole theory of the book is null. And the author concedes that man has a responsible, immortal soul. This concession is fatal to his theory. He says (p. 589), "while man agrees with inferior beings in the type of his construction, and passes in his development through transformations analogous to theirs, he differs from them all in this, that he alone possesses an accountable, immortal soul". Further (p. 594): "Animals remember, man alone recollects. Every thing demonstrates that the development and completion of this instrument of

intellection has been followed by the *superaddition* of an agent or principle that can use it". "From the silent chambers and winding labyrinths of the brain the veiled enchantress looks forth on the outward world, and holds the subservient body in an irresistible spell." Now if there be in man a soul distinct from the body, a soul which uses the body only as an instrument, a soul with an immortal destiny, then we say that there is no sense or reason in the position, that the whole development of man is under the dominion of bodily or physical laws. On the contrary, reason demands of us the assumption, that the soul may have its own law of growth and progress equally with the body. Physiology is not, and cannot be, all; there is also a psychology—there is a psychological as well as a physiological development even of the individual life.

And this is still further evident as soon as we come to a closer analysis of the growth of the individual man. By what physiological laws can you explain perception, memory, imagination, logic and reason? What analogy even is there between the processes of reasoning and any physiological processes that can be named? A body, in this life, may be needed for all these mental operations; but the operations are quite distinct from any of the laws of bodily growth and development. The mind does not grow in the same way that bones, flesh and nerves grow. The law of the one cannot be the law of the other. What is there in the nervous system that resembles the phenomena of consciousness—the distinction of subject and object? Can our ideas of universal and immutable truth be derived from aught of which the senses are directly cognizant? In sensation itself is there not an element which cannot be deduced from any properties of the nerves as a material substance? Nay, in the very idea of natural law itself, as constant and orderly, is there not a factor, which reason alone, and not the senses, can recognize? And when we attempt to educate and develop the soul of the individual in art, in morals, in religion, even in science, are we not obliged to resort to very different methods from those we make use of in training and unfolding his bodily powers? Where then is the sense of saying, that the laws which control man are bodily or physical or physiological?

This first proposition then of Dr. Draper's book is unproved, and is inconsistent with his own concessions. That it is original, we suppose neither he nor any body else would dream of asserting. It is the common place of all material-

istic philosophy. It can be proved only as materialism is demonstrated.

The second proposition is, that society, being made up of individuals, is under the control of the same laws with them. Individual and social life, he tells us over and over again, "are physiologically inseparable from one another; the course of communities bears an unmistakable resemblance to the progress of an individual; man is the archetype or exemplar of society". "Nations like individuals are born, proceed through a predestined growth and die. One comes to its end at an early period, and in an untimely way; another, not until it has gained maturity. One is cut off by feebleness in its infancy, another is destroyed by civil disease, another commits political suicide, another lingers in old age. But for every one there is an orderly way of progress to its final term, whatever that term may be" (pp. 615-16). "The march of individual existence shadows forth the march of race existence, being, indeed, its representative on a little scale." "A national type pursues its way physically and intellectually through changes and developments answering to those of the individual, and being represented by Infancy, Childhood, Youth, Manhood, Old Age, and Death respectively" (p. 11). And upon this general view, the author rather prides himself, as his consummate work: "Whoever has made the physical and intellectual history of individual man his study, will be prepared to admit in what a surprising manner it foreshadows social history. *The equilibrium and movement of humanity are altogether physiological phenomena.* Yet not without hesitation may such an opinion be frankly avowed, since it is offensive to the pride, and to many of the prejudices and interests of our age" (p. 2). This is what he calls "primordial law".

It is difficult to believe, that any scholar at this day can imagine that there is in this general scheme the slightest degree of novelty; or, that it helps us one jot in understanding the intellectual development of the human race. Certainly from the time of Pascal this idea has been one of the common places of literature. Vico brought it out distinctly in relation to each nation, marking the stages of growth and decay. All historians of any reflection have made use of it. The analogy is on the very surface of things. You have mastered all there is in it, just as soon as you have said to yourself that nations and races begin to be, grow, become mature and pass away. This is one of the most trivial reflections which school-boys are taught. And the analogy with the individual life is

just as common and tells us just as little. The analogy holds about as well of animals and plants, as it does of men : these all have a beginning, a youth, a maturity, and at last die. A fact common to botany, zoology and history, can hardly be a very special fact in history, or tell us much about its laws and order.

How much does it tell us ? Only what nobody ever doubted, or ever could doubt : that all that exists in this world, in space and time, has had and will have a beginning, a growing and an ending, in the individual form in which it is here manifested. And when we have learned that, what have we learned about the specific nature, characteristics and growth of that which thus appears and thus passes away ? Why, just nothing at all. We have still to find out all that from a study of the objects themselves in their interior structure. The analogy does not help us here at all. What the plant is, what the animal is, what man is, what society is—what are the laws and developments of each and all these—we are still to discover from a particular examination of each by itself. The analogy is then, just good for nothing, as a help in the most important part of our investigation.

Is human society, as a whole, under the same laws as the individual, and under no other ? How can we answer this question ? Manifestly only by studying society itself, as developed in different times, races and nations, and seeing whether there is that in the whole which is not in the parts ; or, rather, whether any thing is developed in the social state, in nations, in races, which could not, and would not, be developed by the individual alone. Society may come and go like individuals ; but in coming and going it may unfold powers, capacities, and ends which the individual alone could never attain unto. All men may be alike in living, growing, and dying ; but that does not prevent one man's history from being a very different sort of development from that of another. Society may live, grow, and die like the individual ; but then its development may have resulted in something more than can be comprised in this abstract formula for transient existence in time and space. This physiological law, protruded with such parade of science, as the culmination of thought, is in fact one of the most barren schedules of human progress that can well be excogitated.

Society is indeed made up of individuals, but there is that developed in the combination which could not be developed in the parts. Even chemistry might teach us that atoms combined produce entirely different results from what they ever would, or could, in their isolation. Doubtless there is that in each

atom which fits it for such combination; but yet the combined result is a new and different product. Still more must this be the case when the elements brought together are human souls, with all their boundless capacities and infinite possibilities of union, conflict and adjustment. The result must be such as we can find no strict analogy for in the individual life. Even in the narrow sphere of the family, in its relations of parents and children, brothers and sisters, there is an unfolding of the moral nature and of the affections, of the principles of love and duty, such as the merely individual life cannot attain unto. And in the ordering of human society, in its government, laws, and institutions, in the progress of art, science, and religion, and in the aims which every great nation has in view, there are principles, means, and ends involved, which far surpass any possible analogies drawn from the individual life, and still more from physiology. And when we come to the vast and unfolding drama of human history, as this has been developed in the successive races and nations that have led the march in this grand and solemn procession, there are, and must be, principles, aims, and ends that will forever elude the grasp of him who tries to hamper and contract our vision by crude formulas about "physiological laws". Schelling has well said that "There can only be a history of such beings as have before them an ideal which can never be realized by the individual alone, but only by the race as a whole".

The analogy between individual and social life also fails in another aspect. All individuals die; nations rise and fall; but individuals and nations are not all that we have to consider in history. There are also the different races, and there is also the race as a whole. The races of men do not die out, as do the separate nations. With few exceptions, they reappear under other national forms, and perpetuate their life from age to age. And the human race, as a whole, has had, and must have, a continuous being until the great end of its creation and historic growth is reached. Now, it is just with this progress of the race as a whole that the philosophy of history and the law of its development have to do; and it is just here that the analogy with the individual life cannot be carried out. There is as yet no decay, but rather progress, of the race as a whole. And this there must be if we can have any general scheme of human history. And even when particular nations lose their geographical boundaries and limits, and are said to die out, this is true only in a very partial and limited sense. Their descendants mingle with, and help to make, other nations. Their laws, literature, arts, and science survive, and become

the property of other generations. And there is thus a continuous life of the human race, which abides in the midst of all the changes of the individuals. What is natural and physical decays; what is moral and spiritual survives, and shapes the future.

This analogy, then, between the individual and social life, and the attempt to explain all history by such an analogy, must be barren and fruitless. It can only issue in eliminating from the life of the race its most essential and important developments and ends. It narrows our view of man's whole historic career. It is difficult to reconcile with the view that Providence is educating the race for moral ends, by means of a moral government, and that the physical is subordinate and subservient to the moral. In fact, as we shall see, the author excludes the moral element from his theory of the progress of the race.

The third proposition of Dr. Draper's theory is, that individual and social life is under the control of physiological laws. History is to be read by the light of physiology. The history of "the intellectual development of Europe", it is claimed, is here written for the first time "in accordance with physiological principles". "The equilibrium and movement of humanity are altogether physiological phenomena." To show this is the main object, that it is shown is the grand pretension, of the volume. The author has written a work of physiology of considerable repute; and this is the complement of that work, treating of man in his social relations, in the light of physiological principles. This claim struck us as so unique that we have examined the volume with special care, in the hope of finding some light cast upon the bewilderment into which we must confess the project cast us. We could not at all understand what the writer meant, and we have searched for explanation and evidence. But our investigations have been utterly fruitless. After reading the volume, its arguments, its summaries, we are still as much in the dark as ever. It will scarcely be credited, yet it is still a fact, that there is not in the whole work any attempt to explain what is meant by applying physiology to history; there is no enumeration of the "physiological principles" by which history is to be elucidated; there is no proof, and no attempt to prove, at any point or juncture of the historic series, that the development has been of a physiological sort. And, upon reflection, we think we can see a reason for this; and that is, that it could not possibly be proved; that there is no way by which it can be shown, and that there are no facts to show, that history is a

branch of physiology—that historical laws and physiological laws are identical. In the first place, the author has not proved this thesis; in the second place, he could not if he tried; in the third place, if he did, it would lead to a variety of absurdities.

He has nowhere, we say, proved his prime position—that history moves according to physiological laws. The only appearance of an attempt at this is found in a few passages, in which he repeats over the formula about Infancy, Childhood, Youth, Manhood, Old Age, and Death, as applicable to societies and nations as well as individuals; and, as if parallel with this, the division of the progress of Greece and Europe into periods of Inquiry, of Faith, and of Reason. But the analogy here is of the slightest. Infancy may be credulous, childhood inquiring, youth believing, manhood rational. But are the laws by which childhood is led to inquire, or youth to believe, the same with the laws by which the body of the child is made and the physiology of youth is developed? The physical transition from youth to manhood is in accordance with certain well-known physiological laws regulating the growth of the body. Now, is it these same laws, and no other, which regulate the transition in a nation from the age of faith to the age of reason? Is there any thing in the age of faith which resembles the structure and laws of the human body when that body is in its youth? Is there any thing in the age of reason which resembles the structure, functions, and growth of the human body when it is about forty or fifty years old? Is reason developed out of faith by the same process by which a man of forty-five is developed out of a man of thirty-five years of age? Physiology, as Dr. Draper treats it, in his manual on that science, is “a branch of natural philosophy”, and is divided into two parts—“statical physiology”, containing “the conditions of equilibrium of an organized form”, and “dynamical physiology”, or the “development” of the organized form, its “course of life”. Until history can be resolved into some definite organized form, with members and functions physically connected, it can never be shown that it is only “a chapter in physiology”. As soon as it is attempted to make the analogy strict and scientific, it evaporates into a fancy.

Not only does the author thus neglect the proof of his cardinal position, but, we add, he could not possibly prove it if he tried to do so. No human ingenuity is sufficient to show that history is controlled by physiological laws. All that there is in it is the simple fact that the human beings who go to make up history are in part animals, and, so far forth, each one of them

is under the laws of physiology. But that the historic laws are the same with the physiological laws which shape their bodies, is a very different sort of a proposition. Take, for example, any of the main interests of society on whose progress the welfare of the body politic is conditioned, and try to find out the amount of physiology which is contained in it. There are in history, says the author, "five intellectual manifestations to which we may resort—philosophy, science, literature, religion, government". Now, what physiological principles are illustrated and exemplified in the progress of mankind in any one of these higher intellectual manifestations? The growth of philosophy, for instance, is conditioned upon the discovery and organization of ideas and truth. What physiological law is illustrated by the processes of induction and deduction, which are necessary to the unfolding of truth? What is there akin even to the inductive formula in any of the laws by which the nervous system is fashioned and grows? What physiological law is exemplified in those intuitions by which we recognize, and rest in, ultimate and universal truths? Do we pass from the premises to the inference in a logical argument in the same way in which digestion is carried forward in the bodily system? The subjects compared are manifestly so disparate that we cannot conceive of even a fugitive analogy, much less of an identity, between them. So, too, it is with literature, religion, and government. The fundamental ideas in each are entirely different from the fundamental idea of physiology, and consequently the laws of their growth or development must be different. The idea of animal life is the germinant idea of physiology; the idea of God is the essential idea of religion; the idea of justice is the controlling idea of government; and until it can be shown that animal life, God, and justice are all identical, it cannot be shown that physiological laws control the progress of religion and of government.

And this also in part establishes our third remark upon this remarkable scheme, that is, if it were proved that physiological laws are the same as the laws of history, we should be landed in a variety of absurdities. One absurdity is this—that physiology is the queen of the sciences; that all art, ethics, politics, and religion are but branches of the science of animal life. For if physiological laws make and control all historical developments, then whatever appears in history is but an efflux of this stream of animal life. We should have to reform all our processes of education, and all our theories in art and morals, to say nothing of religion. The central idea of philosophy would henceforth have to be that of the growth of a

physical germ. Instead of discoursing of the laws of beauty, we must talk about the physiology thereof; instead of enforcing the moral law we must enjoin obedience to physical law; instead of commending religious duties to the conscience we must insist upon our physiological duties. The category of physical development must displace that of an immutable rectitude. And how would the other sciences fare in the light of such a theory? Can they, too, be reduced to physiology? Might they not also set up equally good claims to such universality? Why not just as well attempt to explain all history on chemical, or astronomical, or mathematical principles, as on physiological? We recommend the attempt to the experts in these sciences, not doubting that they can show as many and as good reasons in their favor, as this volume adduces in support of its physiological hypothesis about the intellectual development of Europe.

Such are the main propositions of this volume, so far as it lays claim to originality; and we have dwelt upon them more fully because they fall in with some tendencies of the times which the author may not wish to favor, but which such vague and unscientific treatment of the most momentous theories surely encourages. There may be in some religious thinkers what scientific men call cant and prejudice; but there is also among some of the devotees of science a flippancy in talking about moral and religious truth which is far more detrimental to the best and highest interests of man. Religious convictions have a strong background in the nature and necessity of religion itself. Religious truth is vital; scientific truth is valuable. Science will vindicate itself; the tendencies of the times, the progress of investigation, favor it. We have no quarrel with it, and no fear of it, in its proper sphere. But yet it must learn and know its own metes and bounds, and not obtrude its partial principles into other and different spheres. Just as soon as it takes up the assumption that natural science is all in all, that induction is the only road to truth, that all history and progress are conditioned by physical laws, and these alone, just so soon it arrays, and must array, against its pretensions, not only the religious convictions and belief of the race, but also the prescripts of the moral sense, and likewise that instinctive belief in the reality of spiritual truth, which has led the greatest thinkers of every age to elaborate systems of metaphysics. We are far from classing Dr. Draper with those sceptical materialists who deny moral truth, the immortality of the soul, the being and government of God, and the beneficence of the Christian faith. There are incidental statements

scattered through his work which imply that he holds to these. But yet the undoubted drift of his theory is to encourage those speculations which run in a different direction, and enthrone physical laws as supreme. His better nature may here be inconsistent with his philosophy; but it is with his philosophy that we have to do in criticising his labors.

And there are several points in which this tendency is manifest, besides the main theories on which we have already commented. One is in expressly subordinating the moral to the intellectual, denying in fact the reality of a proper moral development of the race. A kindred error, involved in this, is, that he makes intellectual development, especially in the domain of the natural sciences, to be the aim and issue of the whole historic course. He also casts contempt upon all metaphysics, properly so called, taking the position, that metaphysics is to be fashioned and reformed by physiology.

As to the subordination of the moral element in human progress, the broad ground assumed is, "that the aim of Nature is not at moral, but intellectual development". "The intellectual has always led the way in social advancement, the moral having been subordinate thereto. The former has been the mainspring of movement, the latter passively affected. It is a mistake to make the progress of society depend on that which is itself controlled by a higher power. In the earlier and inferior stages of individual life we may govern through the moral alone. In that way we may guide children, but it is to the understanding of the adult that we must appeal" (p. 591). What the author means by 'moral' and what by 'intellectual' it is somewhat difficult to say, for he nowhere defines the terms; but taking them in their ordinary sense, we have here the theory of Comte, Buckle and the positivists expressed in an unqualified way. How a believer in God and a divine government, and in man's immortal destiny, can advocate such a view we cannot conceive. Morality, from its very nature, sets before us as our ideal the great end of human life — a life of love to God and love to man, of justice, truth and righteousness. The objects for which states labor, in their highest functions and aims, are essentially moral objects. Unless intellectual and scientific progress contribute to the development of human rights and the establishment of justice, freedom and civil equality, they fail of their best end, and may only entail evil upon society. In constructing a scheme of human life and of human society, the intellectual must subserve the moral, for the moral includes the great and permanent interests of mankind. Still more emphatically is this

the case, when we turn from human to divine government and laws. By the consent of the conscience and reason of the race, God is essentially good and holy; and to diffuse goodness and establish righteousness is the great end of creation. Nobody can believe that God's chief end for man is to develop his intellect. Even Plato taught that to escape evil we must be like God, and that to be like God we must be righteous. God's government of his rational creatures is essentially a moral government; and as soon as we doubt or deny this there remains for us no God to love, worship and obey, but only some blind force or unconscious and impersonal reason. Only materialism or pantheism can consistently subordinate moral to natural or intellectual ends. It is indeed true that there is not in human history such a development of new moral principles, as there is of new scientific facts and laws: but this rather attests the glory of moral truth, and proves the real dignity and worth of human nature. New moral truths are not discovered, any more than new intuitive truths are discovered; for these prime principles are the original endowment of man as a moral and rational being. But there are as conspicuous and new applications and developments of moral truth in the progress of society, as there are of scientific and of intellectual truth. The truths are unchangeable in their nature and evidence, but ever varying in their applications to human society and life. Human rights, justice among men, forms of government, the principles of benevolence and charity — are not these advancing in their application to society as the race advances? Is not here very much of the real progress of the race to be found? Dr. Draper tells us that moral motives are for "inferior stages" of culture, for children and youth. But what kind of a culture is that which leads a person to put the moral virtues, such as justice and love, below intellectual attainments? In spite of the positivists we must still hold, that a man may know all chemistry, geology and even physiology, and yet if he have not charity he is nothing. The fallacy here seems to consist in this, that because science brings to light some new facts and principles, and morals remain immutable in their nature and obligations, therefore there is progress in science and none in morals. But in the development and application of moral truth there may be as conspicuous progress in human society, as there is in the growth of the knowledge of physical laws. Bishop Butler might still give a few useful hints even to men of science: "Knowledge is not our proper happiness. . . . Men of deep research and curious inquiry should

just be put in mind not to mistake what they are doing. If their discoveries serve the cause of virtue and religion in the way of proof, motive to practice, or assistance in it, or if they tend to render life less unhappy and promote its satisfactions, then they are most usefully employed; but, bringing things to light, alone and of itself, is of no manner of use any otherwise than as an entertainment or diversion". (Butler's Works. Sermon xv.)

Kindred with this theory, is that which makes intellectual development, especially in the domain of science, to be the aim and issue of man's historic career. The refutation of the above scheme in fact includes the refutation of this. We do not doubt that the physical sciences are to advance and prosper, and contribute to the well-being of mankind. We welcome every addition to this stock of human knowledge, and neither condemn nor fear its progress. Natural philosophers are aiding in the great work of giving man dominion over nature. But to make such conquest of nature the great end of the race is to restrict our view of man to his earthly and temporal condition — to cut him off from God and immortality. Dr. Draper makes "the improvement and organization of national intellect" to be the aim of the social progress of great communities, and chiefly through and by the advance of science. This he insists upon in the last chapter of his work, in a curious and artificial comparison of Chinese with European civilization, as if these were the two great types. There is a double error here: one, that of making intellectual development the main thing; another, that of confounding intellectual progress with the growth of physical researches. Of the former we have perhaps said enough. As to the latter, it shows in a striking way, how a proficient in one branch of investigation is inclined to assign to it an undue prominence. The author's whole argument runs into the conclusion, that the age of reason is identical with the age in which the positive sciences are most fully developed — that reason is unfolded fully and consciously only or chiefly through the progress of physical discovery. That some intellectual faculties are fostered and developed by the study of the natural sciences is indisputable. But the intellect of man has a wide scope. It includes the art of reasoning; but we do not always find our most expert logicians among the geologists and physiologists. It embraces imagination also: but our highest poets are not necessarily deep in anatomy. Intellect, too, should be conversant with ultimate truths; yet we cannot say that the natural sciences directly contribute to elucidate such truths.

The highest effort of the intellect must be in the attempt to construct a complete system of truth, to organize the realm of ideas in one scheme. Of that scheme, the natural sciences may give an important part, but yet not the most important. To reduce all reason and intellect to the attempt at understanding physical law alone is to degrade and not ennoble human nature. Such a reason would not be reason in any recognized or intelligible use of the term.

In harmony with this theory is Dr. Draper's contempt of metaphysics, and his strange assumption, that future metaphysical systems are to be written on physiological principles alone. In giving his sketch of the Greek culture he introduces a superficial account of the Greek philosophy, evidently drawn from second-rate sources. But in his whole narration about European civilization, he totally ignores its mental, moral and metaphysical sciences. A man who can write a history of "the intellectual development of Europe", and say nothing of the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza, pass over Leibnitz and Kant with a word or two, utterly neglect Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, not refer to Cousin, and pass by in silence Reid, Stewart, Mill and Hamilton, must have a very singular notion of the task he has set before himself. In fact, the last part of his work is really not much more than a sketch of the progress of the natural sciences. He says himself, "the reader has doubtless remarked that, in the historical sketch of the later progress of Europe given in this book, I have not referred to metaphysics, or psychology or mental philosophy. . . . It is only through the physical that the metaphysical can be discovered". This deficiency, if there were no other, stamps the volume as really worthless in respect to its professed object. For the intellectual history of Europe is in great part summed up in its psychologies and metaphysics. The author might just as well write a physiology without alluding to the circulation of the blood, or a botany without allusion to sap. It would be no more of a blunder. And from the specimens he has given us of his knowledge and acumen about metaphysical systems, we are inclined to think that there is some reason for this silence. He does not know or understand these great speculative attempts of modern thought. He is not able to grapple with the subjects which they present. Thus his account of Kant is all a mistake. He ascribes to him the view (p. 172) "that there is but one source of knowledge, the union of the object and the subject — *but two elements thereof, space and time*". This is an inexcusable blunder. So, too, in his speculations

on the criterion of truth, he comes to the conclusion, "that in the unanimous consent of the entire human race lies the human criterion of truth". What a valuable criterion! With all deference to the author's scientific knowledge, we must say that he is not the man, qualified by either his attainments or his grasp, to pass sentence on the works of the great thinkers of modern Europe, to scoff at metaphysics, or proclaim the decrepitude of theology.

He intimates, indeed, that metaphysics is to be reformed by physiology. This crops out in several passages. But the idea is not further developed. We wish he would undertake the task. We should like to see the result. Metaphysics on physiological principles would certainly be a novelty. Metaphysics is the science of truth and being: physiology is the science of natural organisms. Has the author any idea of what he means when he says, that all truth, all ideas, the philosophy of being, can be evolved from physiology, and developed on strictly physiological principles? We should just as soon think of developing the moral law from geology, or constructing the science of government by means of botanical principles.

There are some other incidental points in this work which we had intended to comment upon, but we can only make a passing reference to them. His judgment on Lord Bacon is absurdly unjust, describing him as "a pretender in science, a time-serving politician, an insidious lawyer, a corrupt judge, a bad man". His judgment on the Baron of Verulam may perchance react on himself, that "with the audacity of ignorance, he presumed to criticise what he did not understand". Of Milton's *Paradise Lost*, we are told, that, "a Manichean composition in reality, it was mistaken for a Christian poem". His account of the early Christian controversies, the Athanasian and Augustinian, is loose and incomplete — giving the mere surface of the matter; as is the case too with his allusions to the scholastic theology, and the central question of nominalism and realism. He repeatedly discredits miraculous interventions. His sketches of early Christian and mediæval history do not betray any acquaintance with the latest and best literature of the subject. He talks of the "grim orthodox productions of the wearisome and ignorant fathers of the church". His estimate of the value and power of the Mohammedan influence is greatly exaggerated. It is only in the account of the progress of the natural sciences, and in some of his speculations, analogies and groupings in this department, that the volume can be considered as having added to

our stock of knowledge, or can be recommended for use. In its main theory and aim it is a mistake and a failure, and in some of its principles it favors pernicious tendencies.

Theology and metaphysics have interests to guard, as sacred, to say the least, as those of the positive sciences. Both these high branches of thought have their own history, their fitting methods, their proper domain. Science also has its rightful sphere, its appropriate methods, its legitimate principles and results. It is to study and interpret nature. Let it do its work well and thoroughly. But it has no right to impose its processes and principles upon the spiritual world. Spirit cannot be explained by matter, nor the laws of spirit by the laws of matter. Physiology is excellent and useful in its place: but it is not ethics, it is not metaphysics, it is not theology — nor does it give the law even to history. History includes it, but it includes a vast deal more, the development of man's whole nature, under a divine guidance, towards the highest moral and spiritual ends. And this development and these ends are to be explained, if at all, not on physiological, but on moral and spiritual principles. Providence, and not natural law controls the course of history and determines the destiny of the race.

ART. VI.—THE CHINESE CLASSICS.

By Prof. ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D.D., New York.

The Chinese Classics: with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes. By JAMES LEGGE, D.D., of the London Missionary Society. In seven volumes. Vol. I. containing *Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean*. Vol. II. containing the *Works of Mencius*. Hong Kong and London. 1861. 8vo. Pp. 376, 497.

By the kindness of the Rev. Dr. Cox, a friend and correspondent of Dr. Legge, we have been permitted to examine these most interesting and important volumes. The author went as a missionary to the East in 1839, having previously bestowed some months of study upon the Chinese language, which he appears since then to have thoroughly mastered. He no sooner found himself face to face with the civilization of the Middle Kingdom than he felt the necessity of investigating for himself "the whole field of thought through which the sages of China had ranged, and in which were to be found the

foundations of the moral, social, and political life of the people". But of the several translations which had from time to time been made from the writings of Confucius into the Latin, French, and English languages, not one seemed to him sufficiently critical and exact to answer his purpose. He therefore resolved at once upon the gigantic task of translating the entire collection of the Chinese Classics, to be published with the original text and annotations upon it, so that nothing might be wanting to occidental scholars in order to a full acquaintance with the whole Confucian system. Twenty years of diligent study have at length borne their first fruits in these two stout octavos which are now before us. A richer contribution to science, more sure of bringing solid and lasting fame to the author of it, has not been made for a long time. The Chinese, who have been called "the Yankees of the Orient", are at once an ancient and a modern people, constituting full a third part of the present population of the globe, with a history and a literature, and with deeply ingrained characteristics, which render their conversion to Christianity one of the most perplexing and stubborn problems of our age. This great work of Dr. Legge, when completed, will be accepted as the most important contribution yet made towards, first the appreciation, and, finally, the solution of this problem.

The Chinese Classics, which are to that utilitarian people what our Bible is to us, consist of nine books: "The five *King*", and "The four *Shoo*". "The five *King*", or canonical books, are: The *Yih*, or "Book of Changes"; the *Shoo*, or "Book of History"; the *She*, or "Book of Poetry"; the *Le K'è*, or "Book of Rites"; and the *Ch'un Ts'ew*, or "Spring and Autumn", a chronicle of events from 721 to 480 B.C. These have all been ascribed to Confucius; but only the last-named is wholly his, the fourth but in part, while to the first he added only appendices, and had no hand at all in the second and third.

"The four *Shoo*", or "Books", are: The *Lun Yu*, or "Analects of Confucius", made up chiefly of the sayings of the sage; the *Ta H'ë*, or "Great Learning" by Ts'ang Sin, a disciple of Confucius; the *Chung Yung*, or "Doctrine of the Mean", ascribed to K'ung Keih, the grandson of Confucius; and the "Works of Mencius", who lived between 371-288 B.C.

These four *Shoo* in the original Chinese, with an underlying translation abundantly and carefully annotated, prefaced by all the historical and critical apparatus required in order to an understanding of the Books themselves, occupy the two volumes now published. Of the first volume, 136 pages are devoted to

the Prolegomena, 218 pages to the "Analects", 27 pages to the "Great Learning", and 52 pages to the "Doctrine of the Mean", to the whole of which are appended seven indexes, occupying 79 pages. The second volume is devoted to Mencius, whose works in seven books occupy 378 pages, leaving 246 pages for the Prolegomena and Indexes. From this statement it will be seen that less than half the matter contained in the four *Shoo* belongs to Confucius and his disciples, and that nearly three fourths of this Confucian part of the collection are embraced in the "Analects". Nor will "The five *King*", promised by Dr. Legge in at least eight more volumes, give us any great additional amount of matter from Confucius himself. The "Analects" must accordingly stand as our chief witness on all points pertaining to the Confucian system.

In the Prolegomena to the first volume Dr. Legge has given us a biography of Confucius, which claims to be more correct than any which has yet appeared in any European language. He was born 551 B.C., in the north-east part of China, in the State Loo, within the present province of Shan-tung, where also, after a life of much wandering and many sorrows, he died 478 B.C., at the age of seventy-three.* China was then in its feudal state, composed of thirteen principalities, in many respects independent of each other, with a large number of smaller dependencies; the central imperial sovereignty, as in Europe during the Middle Ages, being hardly more than nominal. The family to which Confucius belonged was of high rank, but at the time of his birth was reduced to poverty. At the age of twenty-one he set himself up as a teacher and reformer. For about twenty years of his life, at different times, he was wandering from province to province, striving to secure the application of his principles to the affairs of state. Several times he was in office, and accomplished important reforms. From 515 to 501 B.C., and again from 483 to 478 B.C., when he died, he resided without office in his native province, devoting himself to study and teaching. On the whole, his career was one of hardship, disappointment, and defeat. He had, indeed, many disciples, at one time, it is said, as many as three thousand; but he died under a cloud, complaining that, "of all the princes of the Empire, not one would adopt his principles and obey his lessons". But no sooner had he died than his name began to receive that reverence which finally culminated in worship. At first he was worshipped only in his native province of Loo, but in 57 A.D. it was enacted that sacrifices

* The dates commonly given are 552 and 479 B.C.

should be offered to him throughout the Empire; and since 628 A.D. the custom of erecting temples to him has prevailed. In every city of the Empire, down to those of the third order, there is now a temple to Confucius.*

There are three religions in China: the mystic Rationalism of *Taou*, who was born about fifty years before Confucius; Buddhism, which was imported from India in 65 A.D.; and Confucianism. The first two are tolerated by the Government, and embrace, no doubt, a decided majority of the people; but Confucianism is the State religion, and determines the character of the Chinese civilization. There is but one path to public office, of whatever grade, and that lies through the schools and colleges of the Empire, whose only text-books are these nine classics, which Dr. Legge is now translating. To understand China, therefore, one must master the system of Confucius, as embodied in these works.

As to the classes of persons to be benefited by these editorial labors of Dr. Legge, foremost of all stand, of course, the managers and patrons of Christian missions, and especially the candidates for missionary service, amongst the Chinese. Hereafter they may go less blindly to their work, having gauged intelligently both the strength and the weakness of the system to be encountered. The Christian apologist is also helped. Of late the most formidable attacks on Christianity have been directed against it not as absurd or worthless, but only against its lofty assumption of absolute and exclusive authority. As a religion it is praised, but denied to be *the* religion of the race. Permission is given it to take its place amongst other religions of the world, all of them more or less worthy of acceptance; but it can have no throne of undivided dominion. The man of Nazareth may continue to have his disciples; but so also may Zoroaster, Sakyamuni, Confucius, Socrates, and Moham-med. Thus, instead of striking Christianity down in the open field, the plan now is to smother it in a new Pantheon, steaming with incense to all the gods. Hence, in certain quarters, a greatly increased enthusiasm in regard to the lives and teachings of the heathen sages. Hence, also, in the interest of this new eclecticism, an immense exaggeration of the merits of these sages. Something has even been said of a new gospel, to be culled from the teachings of these men, which shall rival the Gospel of Christendom. To meet and frustrate this changed strategy of our adversaries, we must explore thoroughly for ourselves the sources from which this new gospel is threatened

* See Davis's China, 2: 6.

to come. So far as concerns Confucius and his system, Dr. Legge, if his life and strength are spared, will leave us nothing to be desired. Meanwhile, it may be well to call the attention of Christian scholars to those more important points, which have already been brought out with refreshing distinctness.

And, first of all, it is clear that Confucius cannot justly be called a great philosopher, nor can he be regarded even as a great man. The Chinese brain, as indeed the brain of the whole Mongolian race, is not speculative, but intensely materialistic and utilitarian. And Confucius, as Dr. Legge says, "was a Chinese of the Chinese". On no subject whatever, whether in physics or in metaphysics, did he speculate. He never concerned himself about either the origin or the end of things. He had no theory of creation. About man even, he never inquired either whence he came, or whither he was going. He not only added nothing to philosophy; he did not even pursue it as a study. Indeed, there was no philosophy in China to be studied; and all he aimed at was the revival of certain ancient traditions of his race. What those traditions were, how meagre, cold and formal, we shall notice presently.

Nor can Confucianism be looked upon as a religion. Doubtless there was then in China, handed down from the earliest times, a worship of God, as well as of departed ancestors; but Confucius put no emphasis upon it. The personal name of God, *Te* or *Shang Te*, in use before his time, Confucius nowhere employs, but always the word "Heaven" instead. If no atheist himself, as probably he was not, certainly he so ignored religion in his teachings as to prepare the way for the atheism which has, since his day, gained so strong a foothold in China. In regard even to the continued conscious existence of human spirits after the death of the body, he refused to speak explicitly. When inquired of once, whether the dead have knowledge of the worship rendered them, his answer was: "If I were to say that the dead have such knowledge, I am afraid that filial sons and dutiful grandsons would injure their substance in paying the last offices to the departed; and if I were to say that the dead have not such knowledge, I am afraid lest unfilial sons should leave their parents unburied. You need not wish to know whether the dead have such knowledge or not. There is no present urgency about the point. Hereafter you will know it for yourself." Not that he would do away with this worship of ancestors, which had been practised for centuries; he commended it rather as "an institution to be devoutly observed". But his faith had no fervor in it. Of religious feeling in any direction, he gave no sign. Spiritual

things had no charm for him, no power over him. In the "Analects" [6 : 20], when asked, "What constitutes wisdom?" he replied: "To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and while *respecting* spiritual beings, to *keep aloof from them*, may be called wisdom". His own departure out of life was one of the most melancholy on record. He died apparently without one thought about his future, without consolation, and without hope. Some days before the event he was heard singing to himself:

"The great mountain must crumble;
The strong beam must break;
And the wise man wither away like a plant."

Constitutionally unreligious himself, like the race to which he belonged, he passed away without leaving behind him one new impulse to faith, one new aspiration after God, one new hope for eternity. The system has proved too cold and barren even for China. Hence the imperial embassy during the first century of our era in quest of a new system, resulting in the introduction of Buddhism, whose adherents now outnumber the disciples of Confucius.

And this leads us to remark, in the third place, that the Confucian system is only ethical, and poor at that, concerning itself much more with manners than with morals. The rules of propriety are far more prominent than the rule of right. Artistically elaborate and painful ceremony constitutes no small proportion of the lessons taught. But there are still graver defects. The proverbial deceitfulness of the Chinese people is not without its warrant in the example of the sage. It is written of him, without rebuke, that he once deliberately broke a solemn oath on the ground that it was extorted from him. Once, according to the "Analects" [17 : 20], he feigned sickness in order to avoid an unwelcome visitor. "Joo Pei wished to see Confucius, but Confucius declined, on the ground of being sick, to see him. When the bearer of this message went out at the door, he took his harpsicord and sang to it that Pei might hear him." And yet he praises sincerity and truthfulness. The *lex talionis* is also laid down in the writings of Confucius in the strongest terms and in its greatest extent. When asked, "What course is to be pursued in the case of the murder of a father or mother?" Confucius replied: "The son must sleep upon a matting of grass, with his shield for his pillow; he must decline to take office; he must not live under the same heaven with the slayer. When he meets him in the market-place or the court, he must have his weapon ready to strike him". This

bad lesson of the sage has not been lost upon his countrymen. The Chinese are noted as a revengeful people. With all their submissiveness to government, they are ever prompt to take the law into their own hands, and so whole districts are often distracted by private feuds. There are seven grounds of divorce in China, among which are ill temper, thieving, and *talkativeness*. That Confucius put away his own wife, as alleged, in order to have more time for study, Dr. Legge thinks has not been proved.

Man, according to Confucius, is *naturally* virtuous. His vices come chiefly of ignorance and bad example. What he needs, therefore, is not Divine assistance of any sort, but only a good teacher and pattern of virtue. The duties of universal obligation are determined by the five relationships of life: between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and between friend and friend. These duties, Confucius said, had been best taught and best observed by "the ancients". His ethical injunctions assumed accordingly the form of traditional precepts. Humanity at large was ignored in his system. He knew no world outside of China. He labored for nothing but Chinese virtue on the basis of Chinese example and precedent. The best feature of the system is the emphasis which it puts upon personal character. If a sovereign would have wise and good subjects, he must first be wise and good himself: then his ministers and subjects will also be wise and good. So in the family, a wise and good father will have a wise and good son. In treating of husband and wives, however, the duty most insisted upon is that of the submission and obedience of the wife to the husband. Nor is the relation between parents and children so much that of mutual affection, as of dignified and stately authority on the one side, and distant reverence and fear on the other. In short, formality and coldness characterize the whole system from beginning to end. There is no tender regard for womanhood, and no place for the sweeter charities of life. The eulogists of Confucius have indeed boasted, that he gave utterance to the Golden Rule of doing to others as we would that others should do to us. This is a mistake. The famous maxim of Confucius, which occurs twice in the "Analects", is altogether negative in its character, not enjoining beneficence, as does the Golden Rule of our Saviour, but only forbidding injury. In the "Analects" 15: 23 it is written: "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" And Confucius answered: "Is not *reciprocity* such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not

do to others." When asked what was to be thought of the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness, he replied: "With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness". ["Analects" 14: 36.]

That Confucius has accomplished much for China, is not to be disputed. The zeal with which he insisted upon personal culture, even though that culture contemplated so exclusively the mere proprieties of life, has not been without its fruits in the lives of the people. But his tone was cold, and his range was narrow. His final aim was the state. And his theory was, let the individual be first reformed, then the family, then the province, and then the empire. He looked no farther out than China, no higher up than the ground. No mere moralist ever had so large an audience as Confucius has had for these twenty-three hundred years in China. And the result is, these two national virtues most remarkably developed: submission to government, and obedience to parents. It is to these virtues that the nation is indebted for its marvellous longevity. So much has Christianity to build upon, but it has no more. It has to confront in China a race of men more moral by much than the heathen average, but intensely conceited, scornful towards all outside Barbarians, and exceedingly torpid in feeling, and dull of vision, in regard to all things unseen and eternal.

We might have dwelt at much greater length upon the points touched upon in this brief notice of the Chinese classics. But those for whom more especially we have written, will of course make the acquaintance of Dr. Legge for themselves. The final result must be: for the Church, a deeper sense of the difficulties to be overcome in evangelizing China; and for the world at large, a much lower estimate of Confucius and his system, than has prevailed amongst those who have tried so hard to find another master than Christ.

ART. VII.—ROGER BACON IN THE LIGHT OF NEW DOCUMENTS.*

By EMILE SAISSET, Prof. of the History of Philosophy in the Faculty of Letters, Paris, &c.

IN the last century there still existed at Oxford, beyond the town, in a suburb on the other side of the river, an old tower which was pointed out to strangers as having once been the study and observatory of Friar Bacon.† According to tradition, it was to this place that he retired in order to study the heavens and read in them the secret of the affairs of earth. It was there that he sought the *great work* in the society of his good friend Friar Thomas Bungey and other necromancers and sorcerers whom the legend associates with him :

"The nigromancie thair saw i eckanone,
Of Benytas, Bengo and friar Bacone," &c. ‡

It was, without doubt, in the most hidden corner of this mysterious retreat § that Bacon and his friend constructed that famous head of brass, which spoke and delivered oracles. Tradition describes the two monks as questioning the miraculous head : they ask for the revelation of some way of surrounding

* This article was written for the *Revue des Deux Mondes* upon the appearance of two recent publications : *Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses œuvres, ses doctrines, d'après des documents inédits*, par M. Emile Charles, Paris, 1861. *Fr. Roger Bacon Opera quædam hactenus Inedita*, London, 1860. [The article is reprinted in Saisset's *Précurseurs et Disciples de Descartes*, Paris, 1862. Of the author's work on *Modern Pantheism*, 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1863, we gave a notice in the April number of our *Review*. For the translation of this valuable essay on Bacon we are indebted to Col. Joseph Howland, Matteawan, N. Y. Eds.]

† This tower was used as a post of observation during the civil wars, and an engraving of it may be found in Joseph Skelton's work : *Oxonia antiqua restaurata*, t. ii, p. 2, Oxford, 1823.

‡ See the *Enchanted Mirror* of Douglas, a Scotch poet of the end of the fifteenth century.

§ Mr. Gordon, an Englishman of great learning and courtesy and formerly a student at the University of Oxford, writes us as follows : "I give you a story which when I was a boy used to be current among my comrades at the university. Doctor Cyril Jackson, dean of Christ Church and later tutor to the Prince of Wales (George IV) never passed under the arch of Roger Bacon's tower without fearing it would fall in and crush him. The fact is there was an old prophecy to the effect that this tower would fall whenever a greater man than Bacon should pass beneath it."

their precious Albion with an impregnable wall. At first the head remains mute; then, just at the moment when the discouraged magicians allow their attention to be distracted by other cares, the head suddenly speaks and reveals the great secret. Alas! they did not hear it. Who knows but that more than one worthy Englishman of our own time, in meeting with this legend, will not regret that Friar Bacon's brazen head was not preserved to these days that it might tell its secret to the attentive ear of Lord Palmerston. How many false alarms and how much needless expense would have been spared the English admiralty! From what an amount of anxiety would the mind of Mr. Gladstone have been relieved. But every thing in these singular traditions, in which national feeling conspires with the fancies of the legend in order to caricature a man of genius into a sorcerer, ought to be thrown aside. Roger Bacon was an Englishman in his genius and in his sympathies, as he was by birth. His great idea, that which commends his name to posterity and brings him near the illustrious chancellor, his fellow-countryman and namesake, is profoundly British: it is the idea of the genius of man subduing nature to his will—the conquest of the universe by his industry.

How happens it that England, so celebrated for the pious worship she pays to her great men, should have for so long a time allowed the thoughts and writings of Roger Bacon to remain forgotten, and have abandoned the memory of one of her most illustrious children to the caprice of tradition? I do not venture to assert with M. de Humboldt, that Roger Bacon was "the greatest apparition of the middle ages";* but, unquestionably, he is worthy of a place, in the age of St. Louis, beside St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure and Albert the Great. His two compatriots, the monks Duns Scotus and Ockham, have their monument, while the greatest of all the English monks still waits for his.

We must pass from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth before we can meet with any serious work relative to Roger Bacon. In 1733, Doctor Samuel Jebb, a clever and learned man, at the solicitation of the court physician Richard Mead, published the first edition of the *Opus Majus*. His work is creditable, though not without faults of both commission and omission, since he inserts chapters in the *Opus Majus* which form no part of the work and suppresses, by some unaccountable oversight, the whole of a book of the highest importance, the seventh, containing the ethics. This is all that

* *Cosmos*, t. ii, p. 398.

England has done for Roger Bacon up to the present time; she has left to a Frenchman, to one of our countrymen, an enthusiastic scholar as well as an eminent philosopher, the task and the honor of taking up the labors of Samuel Jebb and of initiating an activity of research in favor of the illustrious Franciscan of Oxford which will not cease, God willing, till full justice shall have been done and Roger Bacon shall have recovered the place he merits in the history of the human mind. In 1848, M. Cousin, while absorbed in his labors on the philosophy of the middle ages, discovered in the library of Douai an unpublished manuscript of Roger Bacon. This valuable memorial interested him. "We cannot forget", he says, "that ingenious and unfortunate Franciscan, who, at the end of the thirteenth century, appreciated the great importance of languages, enriched the science of optics with a map of valuable observations and experiments even, pointed out the imperfection of the Julian Calendar, planned the Gregorian reformation, either invented gunpowder or discovered its composition; who, finally, for being more enlightened in physical science than his age, received the name of *Doctor Mirabilis*, was reputed a sorcerer and suffered the long and absurd persecution which has made his memory sacred to posterity. We attached the more value to the discovery of an unpublished work of Roger Bacon, because a careful examination had convinced us, that if Roger Bacon belongs to England by birth, it was in France and at Paris that he completed his studies, took his doctor's degree, taught, conducted his experiments and discoveries, and was twice condemned to a more or less just confinement by the General of his order, Jerome d'Ascoli, in that famous monastery of the Franciscans or Cordeliers which occupied the spot where the School of Medicine now stands."*

With his mind filled with these great recollections, M. Victor Cousin applied himself to the study of the Douai manuscript and was not long in recognizing it, under an incorrect title and in the midst of other documents, as one of the principal works of Roger Bacon, the *Opus Tertium*. It was known that after sending the *Opus Majus* to his protector, Pope Clement IV, Roger Bacon wrote a second book entitled the *Opus Minus*, intended as an epitome and complement of the first; but it was less well known, and the fact had been lost sight of since the time of Samuel Jebb, that Roger Bacon had made a third and far greater endeavor to collect the entire body

* *Journal des Savants*, March, 1848.

of his thoughts and discoveries in the form of a sort of encyclopedia. This last effort of his genius is the *Opus Tertium*. To M. Cousin belongs the credit of having first brought it to light and of having made public its most interesting features. This is not all : since 1848 M. Cousin has rendered additional service to the memory of Roger Bacon by discovering, in the library of Amiens*, a manuscript containing a sort of commentary by Roger Bacon on the natural, philosophy and metaphysics of Aristotle. This manuscript is an important one. In it we see Roger Bacon struggling with the great problems of metaphysics. Now this gives us a view of his genius which has hitherto been completely unknown to us. For this reason, M. Cousin, having concluded his researches respecting the unpublished manuscripts of Roger Bacon, addressed a noble appeal to the learned men of France and England. He called upon some young and conscientious student of the philosophy of the Middle Ages to undertake seriously the study of the manuscript of Amiens, promising him an ample and rich harvest as his reward ; he stimulated the patriotism of the scholars of Oxford and Cambridge in beseeching them to complete the publication begun by Samuel Jebb. Neither England nor France was deaf to these pressing entreaties. The works of Roger Bacon have been included in the vast collection which is publishing by order of the English parliament.† Still more recently, a professor of the University of Dublin has recovered in part the complement of the *Opus Majus*, and we are given to expect the early publication of the entire fragment.‡ Finally, we have a French scholar, M. Emile Charles, who gives us a complete monograph§ on the life, works, and doctrines of Roger Bacon. It is the fruit of six years of industrious research. Nothing was able to weary the patience or dampen the ardor of this young Benedictine of philosophy. Long and expensive journeys, toilsome tran-

* Amiens has been enriched with the books and manuscripts of the ancient abbey of Corbie. See the *Journal des Savants*, August, 1848.

† The title of this collection is: *Rerum Britannicarum mediæ ævi Scriptores*, or, Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Age, published by the authority of Her Majesty's Treasury, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls.—The publication of the inedited writings of Roger Bacon has been confided to Mr. J. S. Brewer, professor of English literature in King's College, London. As yet we have only one volume, which appeared in 1859 and contains the *Opus tertium*, the *Opus minus*, the *Compendium philosophiæ* and, as an appendix, the tract *De Nullitate Magiæ*.

‡ On the *Opus majus* of Roger Bacon, by John Kells Ingram, fellow of Trinity College, professor of English literature in the University of Dublin. Dublin, 1858.

§ *Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses œuvres, ses doctrines, d'après des textes inédits*, by Emile Charles, professor of philosophy in the Faculty of Letters of Bordeaux ; 1 vol. 8vo.

scriptions, laborious decipherments—no species of trial discouraged him. No known manuscript escaped his researches. He sought for new ones in all the libraries—in the Bodleian Library, the British Museum, the Sloane Collection, the Ashmole Museum, the Imperial Library, the Mazarin Library, in all the colleges of Oxford, and in all the collections of London, Paris, Douai and Amiens. The result of so much care, labor and study is a work of the highest character, which, after a brilliant defence at the Sorbonne, the Faculty of Letters of Paris crowned by a unanimous vote.

But the subject is far from being exhausted, and much remains to be done before the form of Roger Bacon can be brought out distinctly from the obscurity of centuries. It has seemed to us, however, that we have already sufficient material to warrant an attempt to sketch the character of the *Admirable Doctor*, to recount the vicissitudes of his destiny and set forth the nature of the work, too long forgotten, of the most daring genius to which the Middle Ages gave birth.

1.—*The Life of Bacon.*

The birthplace of Roger Bacon is known with certainty: it was Ilchester, in Somersetshire. We are in comparative doubt as to the year of his birth, though it was probably 1214. He belonged to a noble, rich and honored family. His elder brother played a part in the civil discords of the reign of Henry III, taking the side of the King against the barons.

Roger, as a younger son, and being ardently devoted to study, was destined for the church, and was sent by his family to the University of Oxford. Merton College and Brazenose College still contend for the honor of having educated him. Even at that distant day Oxford was noted for its taste for languages and the mathematical sciences, and especially for a particular spirit of independence and liberty, in speculative inquiries as well as in practical matters. Roger found there the masters who best suited the natural bent of his genius and character—Robert Bacon, a member of his own family (probably his uncle), Richard Fitzacre, the Dominican, Adam de Margh, Edmund Rich, and, above all others, Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, a theologian passionately devoted to letters, of an energetic and bold character, so well known on account of his quarrels with Pope Innocent IV, whom he finally went so far as to pronounce a heretic and antichrist.

Roger Bacon's spirit freely expanded itself in this atmosphere of curious science and unrestrained criticism. We find him

figuring by the side of his kinsman Robert in a solemn scene, in which his political boldness is a prelude to the more dangerous temerities of his later life.

In 1233, on St. John's day, King Henry III had an interview with his discontented barons. He was obliged to listen to a long sermon and severe reprimand. The preacher who had been chosen for this duty was the friar Robert, Roger Bacon's kinsman. The sermon barely finished, the monk directly addressed the King and declared to him that a permanent peace would be impossible unless he banished from his councils the Bishop of Winchester, Peter Desroches, the object of English hatred. "The audience cried out at such audacity;—but the King, by a strong effort, was enabled to restrain himself. Perceiving that he was calm, one of the clerks of the assembly, even then celebrated for his wit, ventured to address him with the following raillery: 'My Lord the King,—Do you know which are the dangers to be most feared in navigating the open sea?' 'Those know', replied Henry, 'who are in the habit of making such voyages.' 'Well, I will tell you', said the clerk,—'those dangers are rocks and reefs' (*les pierres et les roches*), thereby intending to designate Pierre Desroches, the bishop of Winchester."*

This audacious jester was no other than Roger Bacon, at that time nineteen years of age. Having finished his studies at Oxford, he went to Paris in order to complete his education. This was the universal custom of the time. The University of Paris attracted the Englishman, Roger Bacon, as it had attracted the German, Albert, the Italian, St. Thomas, the Belgian, Henri de Gand. We are not in possession of any details respecting Roger Bacon's first sojourn at Paris; but it is certain that during it he applied himself to profound study, received the degree of doctor, and began to acquire a great reputation.

It is not known whether Roger Bacon entered the order of St. Francis during his first residence at Paris or only after his return to Oxford. That such a man should voluntarily have become a monk, and a Franciscan monk, was utterly incomprehensible to an illustrious scholar, to whose venerable old age the men of the writer's own generation may have had an opportunity of personally paying their respect, and who knew by experience what fetters and what regrets a calling prematurely adopted bears along with it. "What did he among the Franciscans?" exclaims Daunon, with an accent which seems

* Chronique de Matthieu Pâris, p. 265.

to reflect a secret and bitter remembrance of his own experience. "What place had a man of genius, eager to discover the light and to unveil it to others, among these monks?"* The reflections which the old Oratorian adds are not less curious. "Roger Bacon, if he wished to embrace the monastic state, would have done better to have connected himself with the Dominicans, inquisitors, it is true, and persecutors outside their convents,—but ambitious of attracting to and retaining within their order all who distinguished themselves by scientific or literary, religious or philosophical productions. Of such they have possessed, encouraged and honored a very great number, while directing the intolerant zeal of their institute against those who did not belong to them. The Franciscans, on the contrary, always governed, if St. Bonaventure be excepted, by generals of slender talents and little learning, felt only humiliated by the presence and the reputation of the men of merit who had strayed in among them. Roger Bacon suffered more than any other from the effects of this envious malevolence, and it must be admitted that no one ever gave greater provocation, since he was then, and is still, by the scope and splendor of his genius, the most illustrious of the Franciscans."

Something might perhaps be said to tone down the rather vivid coloring of this picture of the two rival orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic; but how is it possible not to sympathize in the pathetic regrets of old Daunon, when we reflect on the persecutions which are about to assail our Franciscan, trouble his whole life, restrain the flight of his genius, check the course of his labors and attack his writings and even his memory?

It is now certain † that Roger Bacon suffered two distinct persecutions,—one which lasted about ten years, from 1257 till 1267, St. Bonaventure being general of the Franciscans; and another still longer and more cruel, from 1278 till 1292, during the generalship of Jerome d'Ascoli, who became pope (in 1288) under the name of Nicholas IV. What was the reason of these repeated severities? If we interrogate the historians of the order, Wadding for example, we find them almost silent on the subject. It would appear as though they wished to bury in the same forgetfulness both the sufferings and the

* See the article by M. Daunon, interrupted by his death, in the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, t. xx, p. 230. A worthy inheritor of his learning, M. J.-V. Le Clerc, has completed it with learned bibliographical research.

† See M. Cousin, *Journal des Savants*, numbers of March, April, May, June, 1848. —Compare M. Emile Charles, *Roger Bacon, sa vie*, etc., p. 11, et seq.

glory of their victim. Did Roger Bacon sin against morals? No, his life was pure and innocent. Did he assail the dogmas of the faith? Far from it—Christianity never had a more sincere believer nor the church a more devoted adherent. Had he refused to recognize the authority of the holy see? Not at all. He even went so far as to rely upon a pope, who was a friend of letters, in his efforts to rid himself of the bonds in which his convent held him.

What then was his crime? A few words in Wadding, very discreetly chosen, tell what it was. He was condemned, he says, *propter quasdam novitates suspectas*. In truth, Roger Bacon was essentially an innovating spirit. Like all of his kind, he was dissatisfied with his age. He complains especially of the exclusive authority which is accorded to Aristotle. Instead of studying nature, he says, twenty years are lost in reading the reasonings of one of the ancients. "As for me", he boldly adds, "if I had the disposal of the works of Aristotle, I would burn them all up, for this sort of study is only a loss of time, and it engenders error and propagates ignorance to an extent which passes all conception".* Not that Roger Bacon fails to appreciate the genius of Aristotle; but, he observes, it is necessary to understand him before you can admire him, and in order to understand him you must read his writings in the original, and this is what the most reputed doctors of this time are incapable of doing. They admire a false Aristotle, disfigured by imbecile translators.

Roger Bacon spares no one. Some have imagined they discovered in his attack upon Albert the Great and St. Thomas a trace of the nascent rivalry between the monks of St. Francis and the followers of St. Dominic. This is a mistake. Roger Bacon is not less bitter against Alexander of Hales, the oracle of the Franciscans, than against Albert the Great. "I except no Orders", he remarks, in these very terms: *nullum ordinem excludo*.† He has no patience with the subtlety, dryness, and prolixity of the theologians, with their stupid, interminable *Summæ*. According to him, all that is valuable in Albert the Great might be condensed into a treatise of not one twentieth part the bulk of his writings. And elsewhere, in even a sharper tone, he says: "Very high commendation is bestowed on the Sum of Friar Alexander of Hales, and indeed it is ponderous enough to break down a pack-horse; but this greatly admired Sum was never written by him". And as for St.

* *Compendium Theologiae*, pars. i, cap. 2.

† See M. Charles's book, p. 107.

Thomas—*Vir erroneus et famosus*, is what the irreverent Franciscan calls the Angel of the School. Without pity for the Christian theologians, he treats the Arabians hardly any better: Avicenna is full of errors; Averroes has borrowed from others all that is good or true in him—from his own resources he has drawn only errors and chimeras. "And people pretend", exclaims Roger Bacon, "that nothing remains to be done in philosophy, that it has been perfected in these latter days, quite recently, at Paris"! What an illusion! Science is the fruit of time; and, moreover, it can never become either an easily acquired or a common possession. "What the vulgar praise is necessarily false",* harshly observes Roger Bacon. Neither does he hide from himself that it is the destiny of men of genius to be despised by the multitude and to suffer persecution. What matters it? We can reciprocate the contempt of the vulgar. "The multitude has always been despised by the great men it has disowned. It was not present with Christ at the Transfiguration; only three disciples were chosen. It was after the multitude had followed the preaching of Jesus for two years that it abandoned him, and cried out, 'Crucify him'".† But there is nothing in such a prospect to shake the courage of Roger Bacon. "Those who have sought to introduce any reformation in science have always been exposed to opposition and liable to meet with obstacles. Yet the truth has prevailed, and always will prevail, till the day of Antichrist".‡

We can easily understand how a spirit and character of this order were out of place in a convent. The monks could make nothing of this strange brother, who passed his life in his tower at Oxford, observing the stars and making experiments in physical science. They suspected some horrid mystery—perhaps a secret intercourse with evil spirits. They whispered to each other, that Friar Roger boasted of having invented wonderful machines—an apparatus by which a man could rise into the air, and another for moving over the water without rowing, and with a speed never before heard of. They talked about incendiary mirrors, capable of destroying a whole army in an instant, and an automaton possessing the faculty of speech—an android of most prodigious power. Now, could all this be accomplished without a little magic? Could a man having such intimate relations with the infernal powers be at the same time a disciple and servant of Christ? Had he not borrowed from his friends the Arabians, followers of Mohammed,

* *De mirabili potestate*, 47.† *Opus Majus*, p. 6.‡ *Ibid*, p. 13.

the horrible and devilish doctrine, that the appearance of the prophet and the origin and progress of religions are determined by the conjunctions of the planets,—that the Christian dispensation, in particular, depends on the conjunction of Jupiter with Mercury; and, finally—O, prodigy of error and iniquity!—that the conjunction of the moon with Jupiter will be the signal for the destruction of all religions?

Such were the rumors of the convent, and, as is usually the case, a little truth was mixed with a great deal of falsehood. The Superiors, being informed of these charges, sent the accused friar from Oxford to Paris, where a system of severe surveillance and meddlesome inquisition was commenced which lasted ten years, and was occasionally pushed so far as to include the most humiliating punishments. One must hear Roger Bacon himself relate his tribulations to his Holiness in the preface to the *Opus Tertium*, discovered by M. Cousin, and which recalls the *Historia Calamitatum* of Abélard. In the first place, he was not permitted to write, nor, with greater reason, to teach. What a trial for a man who was devoured with a passion for imparting his ideas, and who continually repeated the saying of Seneca: "I love to learn only that I may teach others." He was reduced to solitary meditation; no books were allowed him, and his mathematical instruments were taken away. If he employed himself in the simplest calculations, if he wished to prepare any astronomical tables, above all, if he tried to lead any young novices to the observation of the planets, he caused great fright, and found all these noble and innocent exercises interdicted to him as the works of the devil. The least punishment he incurred in case of disobedience was fasting on bread and water.

While Roger Bacon wasted away in the midst of these indignities a ray of light suddenly came to illuminate his cell and rejoice his heart. The inauguration of a new pope is announced. He is a Frenchman, Guy Foulques,* a generous and liberal spirit, a friend of letters and Bacon's friend. Before entering the church he had had experience in both war and jurisprudence. Chosen by St. Louis as his secretary, he rapidly became archbishop, cardinal and afterwards the pope's legate in England. While there he heard of the monk of Oxford

* I do not know why M. Charles italianizes the name of Foulques and constantly calls him Guido Fulcodi. Fulcodi may pass, but why Guido? Guy Foulques was born at St. Gilles on the Rhone. He took orders after the death of his wife, was archbishop of Narbonne in 1259, cardinal-bishop of Sabine in 1261, was sent to England as legate by Urban II for the purpose of healing the quarrel between Henry III and the barons, and was finally made pope in 1265. See the notice by Daunon and M. Cousin's writings.

whose labors excited admiration mingled with jealousy and fear. Not being able to communicate directly with the friar, he made use of a common friend, Rémond de Laon, and learned through him that Roger was preparing a great work on the reformation of philosophy. When Roger was exiled to Paris, Foulques wrote to him several times but without success, the prohibition of the superiors being absolute.

We may imagine how great was the joy of the poor Franciscan, when he heard of the exaltation of his protector. Hope once more entered his soul. The evidence of this joyfulness may be found in the *Opus Tertium*. "Blessed be God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath raised to the throne of His kingdom an enlightened prince desirous of serving the interests of science! The predecessors of your Blessedness, occupied with the affairs of the church, harassed by rebels and tyrants, had no leisure to give to the encouragement of liberal studies; but thanks be to God, the right hand of your Holiness has displayed its triumphal standard, drawn the sword from its scabbard, thrust the two contending parties down to hell and given peace to the church. The times are propitious for works of wisdom."*

Notwithstanding the strict watch kept on all his actions, Roger managed to send letters to the new pope: a knight named Bonnecor undertook to deliver them and add all necessary explanations. Clement IV was not long in replying; we possess his letter,—Wadding, the historian of the Franciscans, having copied it from the archives in the Vatican:

LETTER FROM POPE CLEMENT IV TO ROGER BACON.

"To our beloved son the friar Roger, surnamed Bacon, of the order of the Franciscans: We have received with gratitude the letter of your devotion, and have carefully noted the verbal remarks which our dear son the knight Bonnecor has added by way of explanation, with as much fidelity as prudence. That we may better know what you desire to accomplish, we will, and we command you, in virtue of our apostolic authority, that, without regard to any contrary injunction of any prelate whomsoever or any constitution of your Order, you send us without delay the work we desired you to deliver to our dear son Rémond de Laon, when we were legate. We desire you, moreover, to explain yourself in your letters respecting the remedies, which ought to be employed in those dangerous diseases you describe to us, and that in the most secret manner and without delay you apply yourself to the performance of this duty."

"Given at Viterbo, the 10th day before the Calends of July, in the second year of our pontificate."

* *Opus tertium*, cap. 2, Douai manuscript. The extracts from the *Opus tertium* may now be compared with the edition lately published in London, previously alluded to.

In reading this letter, which reflects so much honor on Clement IV, it will be remarked that he does not venture to require the release of his favorite. He, the vicar of Christ, the successor of Gregory VII, humbles himself so far as to request secrecy on the part of a monk of St. Francis,—so great was the prestige of this formidable order, which forced the heads of the church and emperors and kings to keep careful accounts with it: an immense army, at once disciplined and factious, whose destruction was planned by several popes, who had neither the courage nor the power to accomplish it, and which at one time thought itself on the eve of overturning the settled order of things in Europe by the establishment of a sort of universal republic of which the general of the Franciscans was to be the head. Thus the letter of Clement IV was far from putting an end to Roger Bacon's trials. It re-animated his courage, but instead of improving his condition it rather made it worse.

He was not allowed to see any one; all communication with the outer world was forbidden him, and his strength began to fail under the amount of fasting and penance required of him. With all this he applied himself to the execution of his task, but the great question was how he should obtain the books, money and parchment even which were necessary. He needed assistance in his experiments and calculations, but it was refused him; he required copyists and he knew not where to find them. If of his order, they would have handed over his writings to the superiors; outside of his order there were only the copyists of Paris, a set of mercenary creatures noted for their faithlessness and who would not have failed to make public those writings whose first perusal was intended for the pope alone. Finally, he needed money, and this was the most difficult want to supply. A simple monk, Roger possessed, and could possess, nothing. He excused his Holiness, "*who, seated on the throne of the universe and burdened with a thousand cares had not thought of remitting a small sum*"; but he cursed the agents who had not had the wit to say any thing to the pontiff and who were unwilling to spend a single farthing. He in vain promised to write to the pope and assure them of the repayment of any advances they might make. He wrote without success to his brother, who had been very rich but whom the war had ruined, and to numerous prelates, to *those people whose faces, but not whose hearts, you know*, he bitterly wrote to the pope, but everywhere he met with refusal; even his honesty was suspected. "How often have I been taken for a dishonest man! How often have I been turned away, and how often deceived with vain hopes! What shame and

anguish have devoured my very soul!" In desperation, he finally applies to some of his friends who were almost as poor as himself; he induces them to sell a portion of their modest estate and to mortgage the remainder at an usurious rate, and by dint of such efforts and through such humiliation he finally succeeded in raising the miserable sum of sixty livres!

And all this time, as the last historian of Roger Bacon pointedly observes,* while the poor Franciscan in his cell by the Porte Saint-Michel was wearing himself out in efforts of every kind, his rivals in glory and genius were living in the favor of popes and kings. St. Thomas was dining at the table of St. Louis, and Albert the Great was bestowing on the Emperor that ostentatious hospitality, which tradition has so fantastically embellished.

In addition to these indirect hindrances, there was added cruel personal treatment. Any course of action was considered admissible which might have the effect of making him renounce his projects. Bacon, supported by the letter from his Holiness, refused to submit. In this struggle, violence was pushed to the last extremity; it was so serious that he did not dare tell his story in a work which had to pass through the hands of copyists. "I will perhaps reveal to you", he says to the Pope, "some true particulars of the cruel treatment I have received, but I shall write them with my own hand, on account of the importance of the secret".†

It was in the midst of all these obstacles, and this treachery and violence, that Roger Bacon contrived to write the *Opus Majus*, and to transmit it to the Pope by a young man named John, his beloved disciple. The Pope finally decided to interfere. By his order Roger Bacon was released; he was at liberty to revisit his native land, see his dear city of Oxford once more, and resume the execution of his vast scientific projects in the society of his friend Thomas Bungey. Unfortunately, this period of favor and liberty was very short. Hardly a year had passed when Clement IV died, and his successor was a pope who owed his tiara to the influence of the general of the Franciscans. Deprived thenceforth of all support, Roger Bacon again fell beneath the weight of the spirit of prejudice and hatred he had for an instant exorcised.

Persecution had in no way changed him. He continued to both speak and write, and, to his reprobation of the popular philosophers and the authorized theologians, he added the bold-

* Emile Charles, 25, *et seq.*

† *Opus Tertium*, cap. 2.

est attacks upon legists and princes, upon prelates and the mendicant orders, daring to denounce even the ignorance and dissolute manners of the clergy and the corruption of the Court of Rome. The storm which had been gathering burst over his head in 1278. To St. Bonaventure, who, in spite of his surname of "Seraphic Doctor", had not shown any especial tenderness towards Roger Bacon, but who at least imparted to his rule a portion of his own comparative elevation of mind and gentleness of character, had succeeded Jerome d'Ascoli, a man of energetic, narrow, and inflexible character. Jerome proceeded to Paris for the purpose of convening a general chapter of the order. The first person obliged to appear before was Friar Pierre Jean d'Olive, accused of participating in the errors of John of Parma, and of the *Eternal Gospel*. After him came Roger Bacon's turn. We know nothing of the trial except that the opinions of the rebellious friar were condemned, and that he himself was thrown into prison.

In vain Roger Bacon addressed himself to Pope Nicholas III. Jerome had anticipated him with his Holiness, and the unhappy Franciscan's cries of distress were stifled. This new and most terrible trial, respecting which we have no particulars, lasted fourteen years. It was not till 1592, after the death of Jerome d'Ascoli—who had been Pope since 1288, under the title of Nicholas IV—that the new general of the order, Raymond Galfred, or Gaufredi, gave Roger Bacon his liberty. The unfortunate man was no longer in a condition to abuse it; he was nearly eighty years old. He died at Oxford very soon afterwards. The hatred which had persecuted him all his life pursued his writings after his death. His books were nailed to boards, so that they could not be read, and were left to rot amidst dirt and dampness.

II.—The Method of Bacon.

We must not expect to find a general system of philosophy in the *Opus Majus*, or in any other of Roger Bacon's works. There is in this respect a striking resemblance between the monk of Oxford and his great namesake, the Lord Chancellor of England. Read the *De Argumentis* and the *Novum Organum*—you will look in vain for a new system of metaphysics, but you will find a superior method and superior views respecting the reformation of philosophy and the constitution of the human mind. And so in the writings of Roger Bacon you will meet with a method and views of a general character; but what claims our admiration is the fact that the Franciscan of

the thirteenth century extols the same method and rises to the same views as the contemporary of Galileo and Kepler.

There is, however, a remarkable difference between the two Bacons, and the advantage is entirely on the side of Roger. The Lord Chancellor possessed unquestionably a great mind, and was a great promoter of science; but it cannot be denied that he lacked an essential gift—one which Descartes and Pascal possessed in the highest degree—he lacked that gift of invention which gives to the human mind the power of penetrating the mysteries of nature. Bacon of Verulam discovered nothing of real importance. Admirable when he is describing the true method—when he praises its advantages and prophesies its conquests—it might be said that he loses his wings as soon as he attempts to enter the sphere of application. He does not cease to be ingenious and brilliant, but great in invention and really fruitful he is not.

Roger Bacon possessed greater fertility of genius. He was not only a promoter of science, he was an inventor. Even if he neither understood nor described the method of observation and induction with that clearness, coherency, and power which we cannot sufficiently admire in the later Bacon, it must be admitted that he made use of it with more assiduity and greater success. The genius of the Lord Chancellor observed nature from a height above it; that of the Franciscan dwelt with it in intimate and familiar intercourse. So nature confided some of its secrets to him. If Roger Bacon had been born in the sixteenth century, he would have been a Kepler or a Galileo. Add to this, too, that Roger Bacon, without showing much originality in metaphysics, is a greater metaphysician than Bacon of Verulam, who is not one at all. Roger certainly did not invent a new system respecting the nature and origin of things; but he took part in the great metaphysical controversies of his time, and there also he has left traces, of which the history of the human mind ought to take note.

What is perhaps most extraordinary in him, is the clear and profound perception he had of the views of the philosophy of his age. Remember that this was the thirteenth century. This was the golden age of scholasticism, the heroic epoch of the great doctors,—of Alexander of Hales, their refragable doctor and of St. Thomas Aquinas, the angelic doctor; drawing after them Duns Scotus, the subtle doctor, and Henri de Gand, the solemn doctor. The Aristotle of Boëtius, and the petty combats of the dialectics of the eleventh century, are forgotten. The horizon has become enlarged; all the essential

problems of philosophy and theology have been set forth ; Aristotle is still venerated, but it is the Aristotle of the Arabians—no longer only the logician of the *Organon*, but the author of the treatises on the *Soul*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and the *History of Animals*—Aristotle the psychologist, naturalist and theologian. We see St. Thomas, the master of masters, with Aristotle in one hand and the Bible in the other, preparing to sum up all the labors of his age in one gigantic encyclopaedia, and to write for the instruction of future ages that immortal *Summa*, in which all the problems of science and faith are resolved into their elements, regularly discussed and magisterially solved ; and in which profane wisdom, represented by *Philosophy*, contracts an apparently indissoluble union with sacred science—a unique monument in its order, proportions and the greatness of its general design, as in the delicacy, abundance and precision of its details.

Truly, if science ever held forth the image of the eternal and the definitive, it was in the age of St. Thomas. Yet there was one man wearing the habit of a monk of St. Francis, who was not deceived by these magnificent appearances ; who, in examining the foundations of the edifice, was able to discern and lay his hands upon those portions which were weak and decayed. And this same man, sketching in his prophetic thought the plan of an edifice far more vast and substantial, in complete self-reliance also vigorously commenced its execution.

Roger Bacon brings forward three principal accusations against the scholastic philosophy. He reproaches it, in the first place, for its blind credulity as regards the authority of Aristotle ; then, for its gross ignorance of antiquity, both sacred and profane,—reaching such a point that even its Aristotle is a counterfeit Aristotle ; and, finally,—and this is his chief complaint,—he accuses it of moving in a circle of abstractions, of ignoring all that is real, and of entirely neglecting the observation of nature ; of being, in consequence, artificial, subtle, disputatious and pedantic ; and of shutting up the human mind within the schools, far away from nature and God's works. We have here in fact the groundwork of the victorious polemics, which the revival of letters and a later age have directed against scholasticism. Bruno, Campanella, Ramus, Bacon of Verulam himself, did not more clearly perceive the vices of the philosophy of the middle ages. They made the same charges against it. Only Bacon the Franciscan lost his case against his age, because he was too soon in the right, whilst Bacon the Lord Chancellor gained his, not

because he pleaded better, but because he found better judges. Nothing can equal the vehemence of Roger Bacon when he protests against the yoke of Aristotle. What is more arbitrary, says Roger, than to declare on a certain day that a certain philosopher is infallible? "Hardly half a century has passed, since Aristotle was accused of impiety and banished from the schools. And to-day he is our sovereign master. What is his title? He is wise, it is said;—be it allowed; but he did not know every thing. He did for his age all that it was possible to do, but he did not reach the farthest limits of wisdom. Avicenna has committed serious errors, and Averroes is open to criticism on many points. The Saints themselves are not infallible; they often made mistakes and often retracted; witness St. Jerome and Origen."* "But, the schools say, we must respect the ancients."—"Oh! unquestionably, the ancients are venerable and we ought to show gratitude to them for having prepared the way for us; but we ought never to forget that these ancients were men and that they often fell into error: and, moreover, the more ancient they are the more errors they commit; for, in reality, the youngest are the oldest; the men of this generation ought to surpass in wisdom those of ancient days, since they inherit all the labors of the past."

This is the language of a monk, about the year 1267. As at this day we encounter this saying, then so new, bold and ingenious,—*the youngest are in reality the oldest*,—does it not seem as though we heard the author of the *De Augmentis* exclaiming: *Antiquitas seculi juvenus mundi*, or the author of the *Pensées*, comparing the human race to one man who never dies and who is constantly learning and advancing?

In this common resistance to Aristotle, Roger Bacon has this advantage over the men of the Renaissance and those of modern times, that he has profoundly studied the great philosopher whose tyranny he repudiates and that he renders full justice to his labors. He remarks: "I would more readily pardon the abuse which is made of Aristotle, if those who invoked him were able to understand and appreciate him; but what makes me indignant is, that they praise Aristotle without having read him. Besides", adds Roger, "it is no easy matter to understand the philosophy of Aristotle. We possess only portions of his writings and even many of these are mutilated. There are many works of an infinite value which cannot be recovered. Did not Aristotle write, according to Pliny, a

* *Compendium philosophia*, cap. 1

thousand volumes? Only a very small number of them is known to us. Even the *Organon* itself is imperfect. The original of the *History of Animals* consisted of fifty volumes; the Latin copies have only nineteen. Only ten books of the *Metaphysics* have been preserved, and in the translation which is best known a host of chapters and an infinite number of lines are wanting. As to the sciences which treat of the secrets of nature, we have only a few miserable fragments. And is there any one capable of understanding these scattered fragments of Aristotle? They are read, but not in the original, which is not understood. The Latin versions are referred to. Now, who are more unworthy of confidence than the Latin translators of Aristotle? In the first place, we have Michael Scot, who, ignorant of Greek, employed a Spanish Jew named Andreas; then we have Gerard of Cremona, who understands neither Latin nor Greek nor his own translations; then we have Hermann, the German, who acknowledges that he did not undertake to translate the *Poëtics* of Aristotle because he did not understand it; and, finally we have William of Morbecke, the most ignorant of all, though he is now flourishing and furnishing translations to his friend Thomas Aquinas. And it is thus that this Aristotle, who is made the incarnation of all human wisdom, and who, so it is pretended, is in harmony with divine wisdom, is not understood. And is divine wisdom, is sacred antiquity, better understood? Not in the least. And what is the reason? The reason is that Hebrew is no better understood than Greek. Of the sacred text there are parts badly translated and others entirely wanting. Two books of the Maccabees are missing; we no longer possess the writings of Origen or St. Basil, or Gregory of Nazianzen. Besides, the sacred books are full of obscurities, and St. Jerome himself was not always able to understand them. And what ought to be done? Instead of disfiguring the Bible more and more, and putting it into those miserable verses with which children's memories are burdened, a serious study of grammar and the languages ought to be established in the schools. And when readers capable of understanding the original texts have been trained, search should be instituted for the monuments we have lost. Why do not the higher clergy and the wealthy send learned men to Italy and the East, to collect Greek manuscripts? Why not imitate the holy bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grossetête, who at great expense commissioned a number of competent persons to travel in search of the records of both profane and sacred antiquity? Would not this be a worthy object of solicitude for the holy see? The conversion of infidels

by missionaries speaking their own tongue; the reconciliation of the Greek church — what a magnificent prospect, without taking into account the advantages of this acquaintance with languages as regards the commerce and friendship of nations! The four philosophical languages—that is to say, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldee—ought to form part of common education. From these all the sciences have proceeded; they are the ancestors whose children and heirs we are. God gives wisdom to whom he pleases; He did not see fit to give it to the Latins, and philosophy has been attained only thrice since the beginning of the world: by the Hebrews, by the Greeks, and by the Arabians.”*

Who is it that speaks thus, who is it that so enthusiastically and vehemently commends the study of Greek and the oriental languages, the restoration of the monuments of antiquity and a criticism of texts based on an exact philosophy and universal erudition? Does it not seem as though we were transported to the School of Florence, under the auspices of the Medici, in the society of Marsilius, Ficinus, Pico della Mirandula, and Politian, or even into the full assembly of the College of France in the time of Turnèbe and Budæus?

Like these great renovators of the human mind, Roger Bacon is full of enthusiasm for all that is beautiful and noble in antiquity. He even goes so far, Christian as he is and monk by vocation and mode of life, as to place the moralists of Greece above the doctors of the school. “It is strange that we Christians should be incomparably inferior in morality to the ancient philosophers. Let us read the ten books of the *Ethics* of Aristotle, the innumerable treatises of Seneca, Cicero, and so many others, and we shall perceive that we are in an abyss of vice and that the grace of God alone can save us. Zeal for chastity, gentleness, peace, constancy, and all the virtues was great in all the philosophers; and there is no man so outrageously corrupted by his vices as would not renounce them at once if he were to read their works, so eloquent in their praises of virtue and their invectives against vice. The worst of all vices is anger, which destroys all men and the whole universe; yet even the most passionate man, if he were to read with care the three books of Seneca, would blush to give way to it.”† Roger Bacon has an especial liking for Seneca. He cannot praise him enough for having recommended an examination of one’s conscience every evening. Behold, he exclaims, what an admirable argument for morality! A pagan, without the light

* *Opus tertium*, cap. 10, Douai manuscript.

† *Opus tertium*, cap. 14.

of grace and faith has reached this point, led thither only by the force of his reason.*

But if the study of the ancients, when conducted with independence and enlightened by erudition and criticism, is a fruitful study, there is one still more fruitful and far more necessary: this is the study without which all others are vain—the study of nature, the contemplation of God's works. Here it is that we meet with the deadly vice of the scholastic philosophy. It consumes itself away in vain disputes, it sharpens and refines and confounds itself in subtleties; it ignores life. There is but one remedy for this evil, experimental science. On this subject Roger Bacon wrote some memorable pages, which, four centuries beforehand, successively announced the *Novum Organum* and the *Discours de la Méthode*. We will call attention in the first place to a few detached thoughts which would hold their own perfectly well among the best aphorisms of Lord Bacon.

"I call experimental science that which disregards reasoning; for the strongest arguments prove nothing so long as the conclusions are not verified by experience."

"Experimental science does not receive truth from the hands of sciences which are superior; she alone is mistress and the other sciences are her servants."

"In effect, she has the right to command all other sciences, since she alone establishes and consecrates their results."

"So experimental science is the queen of all the sciences and the limit of all speculation."†

These are only rapid glances and, as it were, flashes of genius. The following thoughts are more connected and more fully developed: "In all research we must employ the best possible method. Now this method consists in studying the different parts of a science in their necessary order, in placing those in the first rank which actually ought to be found at the beginning, the easier before the more abstruse, the general before the particular, the simple before the compound; in addition, the subjects of our study should be those which are most profitable in view of the shortness of life; finally, we ought to exhibit the science with all clearness and certainty, without any mixture of doubt and obscurity. Now all this is impossible without experiment, for we have many different ways of becoming acquainted with truth, namely, by authority, by the exercise of our reason and by experience; but authority has no value if we do not recognize it, *non sapit nisi detur ejus*

* *Ibid.* cap. 75, Douai manuscript, fol. 82.

† *Opus tertium*, in the Douai manuscript.

ratio, it does not make us understand any thing, it only makes us believe; it imposes itself upon the mind without enlightening it. As to reasoning, it is impossible to distinguish sophistry from demonstration except by experiment and practice." What admirable words! This proud independence, this hatred of obscurity, this need of clear and distinct ideas, this love of order and simplicity,—are not these distinguishing traits of the *Discours de la Méthode* and the very expressions of Descartes himself?

Roger Bacon makes a distinction, as the *Novum Organum* did later, between two sorts of observation: one passive and vulgar, the other active and learned. The latter alone deserves the name of experiment. "There is a natural and imperfect sort of experiment", he says, "which is unconscious of its power, which takes no note of its processes and which is fit for artisans and not for learned men. Far above this, far above all speculative science and all arts, there is the art of making experiments which are neither feeble nor incomplete".* But under what condition will experiment attain precise results, dealing, as it always does, with fugitive and changing phenomena? Under the condition that it always calls to its aid instruments of precision, and, before every thing else, mathematical calculation. "Natural philosophers ought to know", says Roger Bacon, "that their science is fruitless unless the power of mathematics is applied to it, without which observation languishes and is incapable of any certainty".† Bacon himself had progressed so far on this new and daring course that in a tract *De multiplicatione specierum*, which had occupied, so he states, ten years of labor, he had attempted the work reserved for Descartes and Newton—the reduction of all the phenomena of the reciprocal action of bodies to mathematical laws.*

Armed with experiment and calculation, science may rise above facts; for facts, considered in themselves, are not the object of science. Facts have their proper utility, but science aims at something higher than the useful: it aspires to truth. It is not satisfied with facts, it must needs lay hold on laws and causes, *canones, universales regulæ*. "If Aristotle, in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, pretends that the knowledge of reasons and causes is not to be attained through experiment, he speaks of experiment of an inferior kind. That which I have in view extends as far as causes, and by the help of observation it discovers them. Then only is the mind satisfied, all uncertainty vanishes and the philosopher reposes in the intuition of truth." ‡

* *Opus tertium*, cap. 13.

† *Opus majus*, Jebb's edition, p. 199.

‡ *De Coelestibus*, cap. 1, Mazarin manuscript.

The laws of nature once discovered, speculation has finished its work and the application of those laws is the labor which remains. We must allow that here the ardent imagination of Roger Bacon carries him beyond what is reasonable and possible. As he admits no limits to man's possible knowledge so he places none to his power. No force in nature is so hidden that man's intellect cannot discover it and his will master it. The universe once known is the universe subdued. "Machines will be made for sailing over the water without rowers and for navigating the greater ships, with only a single man to manage them, faster than though they were filled with sailors; carriages which will rush along without any horses; machines for flying, in which a man may take his seat, touch a spring and set in motion artificial wings, beating the air like those of birds; a little instrument three inches wide and as many high capable of raising or lowering incredible weights. By the aid of this last machine one could raise himself and his friends from the bottom of a dungeon far up into the air and then come down to earth when he felt inclined. Another instrument will possess the power of dragging any resisting object over level ground, enabling one man to drag a thousand persons against their will. There will be an apparatus for walking at the bottom of the sea and of rivers without the least danger; there will also be machines for swimming and for enabling people to stay under water, bridges over rivers without piles or columns—in fact all sorts of marvellous machines and apparatus."*

The modern reader should be on his guard against dealing too severely with these brilliant promises, in which a few wild fancies are mingled with more than one prophetic expectation. Neither Kepler nor Descartes nor Leibnitz himself were able to keep themselves entirely free from illusions, and, even for superior minds, it may be necessary, in order to attain an end within the reach of human power, that they should aim to reach a point above and beyond it, and soar towards the inaccessible and infinite.

III.—His Discoveries.

Among the innumerable discoveries (we speak of those discoveries which are properly scientific), which a not too strict criticism, from Wood to M. Pierre Leroux, attributes to Roger Bacon, which are those which certainly belong to him? This is a delicate and complicated question,—one, however, respecting which the recently discovered documents are able to fur-

* The material for this sketch is obtained from the tract: *De Mirabili* and from an unpublished fragment of the *Treatise on Mathematics*.

nish us with more than one valuable piece of information; but we shall refer to these with great discretion, leaving the discussion of the subject to special and competent judges.

The best established scientific claim of Roger Bacon is to the reformation of the calendar. The fact is now incontestable that the Franciscan monk proposed this reformation to Clement IV. Copernicus also advocated it in his time, but it was accomplished only under Gregory XIII, in 1582.

"The defects of the calendar", says Roger Bacon, "have become intolerable to the wise and are the horror of the astronomer. Since the time of Julius Cæsar, and notwithstanding the corrections which the Council of Nice, Eusebius, Victorinus, Cyrillus, and Bede endeavored to introduce, the errors have only become aggravated; they have their origin in the estimate of the year, which Cæsar made to consist of 365 days, and intercalating a whole day every fourth year; but this estimate is exaggerated, and astronomy affords us the means of knowing that the solar year is less by one one-hundred-and-thirteenth of a day (about eleven minutes); and hence follows that every one hundred and thirty years * one day too much has been counted, and this error would be corrected if one day were omitted after this period."

"The church", Roger Bacon further says, "in the first place fixed the vernal equinox at the 25th of March, and now it has it at the 21st; but the equinox does not arrive at this date. This year (Roger was writing in 1267) the vernal equinox took place on the 13th of March, and it advances one day about every 125 years. Moreover, the church made a mistake at the beginning; 140 years after the incarnation Ptolemy discovered that the vernal equinox took place on the 22d of March; 1127 years have elapsed since then. It now takes place on the 13th, that is to say, nine days too early, and in dividing 1267 by 9 we obtain 140, which is the number of years at whose expiration the equinoxes have advanced one day. The church pretends that the winter solstice took place on the day of the nativity of Jesus Christ, the 25th of December: this is an error. The verification of Ptolemy having fixed it, in the year 140, at the 22d, it could not in the first year of our era be late more than a little over a day—that is to say, from the 23d to the 24th. Neither could the vernal equinox be the first year, on the 25th of March, since Ptolemy fixed it for the year 140 at the 22d of this same month; still less can it be, as is now considered, on the 21st, according to the custom of the church; in reality it comes on about the 13th, since it advances one day

* Accurately, one hundred and twenty-eight.

in 124 years. Thus we perceive the equinoxes are not fixed since they do not take place on the days designated by the church".

The errors relative to the lunations are commented on by Roger Bacon with not less sagacity and precision. "The present calendar", he says, "badly indicates the new moons; in 76 years the new moon gains upon the time fixed by the calendar 6 hours and 40 minutes;* at the expiration of 365 years the error will amount to one day". In adding other errors to this one Roger Bacon arrives at the conclusion, that after 4266 years the moon will be at the full in the heavens and new in the calendar, and he concludes by addressing to the pope this energetic and eloquent adjuration: "A reformation is necessary. All persons versed in calculations and astronomy know it and laugh at the ignorance of the prelates, who maintain the present condition of things. The infidel philosophers, Arabian and Hebrew, the Greeks who live among Christians, as in Spain, Egypt, and the countries of the East and other places, abhor the ignorance which Christians evince in their chronology and the celebration of their solemnities. And yet Christians now possess sufficient astronomical knowledge in order to build upon a sure foundation. Let your Reverence give orders and you will find men capable of remedying these defects, those of which I have spoken, and others besides (for there are thirteen in all), without counting their infinite ramifications. If this glorious work should be carried out during the pontificate of your holiness, the result would be the accomplishment of one of the grandest, most beneficial, and most beautiful enterprises which was ever undertaken by the church of God".

Roger Bacon does not confine his astronomical views to the single subject of the calendar. He attacks the system of Ptolemy at all points, and, which is greatly to his credit, he attacks it on the side which at a later day attracted the severe notice of Copernicus, finally calling forth the new system of the world. The Cosmos of Ptolemy, with its infinite articulations, with its eccentrics and its epicycles, seemed to him artificial, complicated, too much under subjection to the outward appearance of things and infinitely removed from the simplicity of nature.

If in astronomy Roger Bacon is the forerunner of Copernicus, it may be said that in optics he prepares the way for Newton. It is perfectly true that the works of the Arabians in both sciences, particularly those of Alpetragius and Alhazen, were of the greatest service to him; but he has the distinction

* With greater exactitude: 6 hours, 8 minutes.

—an eminent one for the time—of having described the delicate and complicated mechanism of the eye with rare precision and of having suspected the action of the retina. Neither is the service slight of having held the position against Aristotle that the propagation of light is not instantaneous, * and that the light of the stars proceeds directly from themselves and does not come to them from the sun, and, in addition, of having made an attempt to explain the stellar scintillation, and also the very curious phenomenon, still so much discussed, of falling stars. In his opinion these meteors are not real stars but are bodies comparatively small, *corpora parva quantitatis*, which traverse our atmosphere and become ignited by the rapidity of their motion.

In optics the invention of spectacle glasses and of the microscope and telescope has been attributed to Roger Bacon. And, in fact, we discover in the preface to the *Opus Tertium* that, in sending his work to Clement IV. Roger charged John, his beloved disciple, to deliver to his Holiness a lens of crystal; † but this suggestion is rather vague. What is beyond dispute is that Roger carefully studied the phenomena of refractions, particularly those which combine to produce the rainbow, and sought the law of the deviation of luminous rays traversing the atmosphere.

We find greater difficulty in deciding how far he advanced in chemistry. Did he discover phosphorus, manganese, and bismuth? Did he invent gunpowder? The chemical formula certainly is in his writings, but he may have taken it from the Arabians, as he did many other recipes and observations. Professional men know, besides, that between even a fortunate observation of details, an exact chemical formula, a prophetic presentiment—between all this and a genuine scientific discovery there is an infinite difference. The fact is that the alchemists, in their rather unphilosophical search for the philosopher's stone, which was never to be found, came across a great many truths which they were not looking for. Roger Bacon is far oftener an alchemist and an astrologer than a real astronomer or a chemist worthy the name. He believes in the transmutation of metals and in the influence of the celestial

* M. de Humboldt having attributed the honor of this discovery to Bacon of Verulam (*Cosmos*, t. iii, p. 86), I will cite the text of Roger Bacon: "All authors", he says, "including Aristotle, hold that the propagation of light is instantaneous; the truth is that it takes place in a very short time, which is, however, measurable". (*Opus majus*, pp. 298 and 300.)

† Puer vero Johannes portavit crystallum sphaericum ad experiendum, et instruxi eum in demonstratione et figuracione rei occultae". (*Opus tertium*, ch. 31 of the Douai manuscript.) Compare pp. 110 and 111 of the great London edition, edited by Mr. J. S. Brewer, London, 1859.

conjunctions upon human affairs. The Arabians had assured him that Artephius lived one thousand and twenty-five years, and that the chemical elixir could prolong life even further. He gives us electuaries into whose composition enter potable gold, herbs, flowers, *sperma ceti*, aloes, serpents' skin, etc.

An alchemist and an astrologer, he required nothing in order to be a magnetizer. In fact, we find in Roger Bacon the great discovery of the eighteenth century—animal magnetism; so that, while he has the glory of having been the forerunner of Copernicus, and Descartes and Newton, he has not escaped the misfortune of having anticipated Mesmer. "The soul", he says, "acts upon the body, and its principal act is speech. Now, speech uttered with profound thought, direct exercise of will, great desire and strong consciousness, retains in itself the power which the soul has communicated to it, and bears it to the exterior; the soul acts by it both upon physical forces and upon other souls which bend to the will of the operator. Nature yields obedience to thought, and man's acts possess an irresistible energy. In this consists the power of symbols, charms, and sorceries; we have here also an explanation of the miracles and prophecies, which were only natural events. A pure and sinless soul may thus command the elements and change the order of the world; it was in this way that the saints performed so many wonderful things".*

We must forgive Roger Bacon, who three centuries ago anticipated the great ideas of modern times, for resembling in more than one unworthy respect, the adventurous geniuses of the sixteenth century. We must acknowledge that he has some features which recal Cardan and Paracelsus; but there is greater justice in tracing a resemblance to Kepler. Like this great astronomer, he associates precise calculations and the speculations of genius with the caprices of an excited imagination. Like him, also—and we find this same weakness in several of our contemporaries, rather tardy disciples of the ingenious and chimerical renaissance—he introduces mathematics into religious and moral matters, explaining the Trinity by geometry, and perceiving the most beautiful analogies between the effusion of grace and that of the luminous rays. But perfect sincerity, candor, and artlessness entirely redeem these flights of fancy. The source whence Roger Bacon draws his ardor is not a foolish ambition to astonish the vulgar, nor a desire to possess material riches; no, it is a noble ambition to comprehend and render co-ordinate all parts of the immense body of truth, and to make truth itself a help and a blessing to the human race.

* *Opus majus*, p. 251. *Comp. Opus tertium*, cap. 27.

IV.—Bacon as a Metaphysician.

Was Roger Bacon an original metaphysician as well as a promoter of the true method and a discoverer in science? M. Emile Charles would willingly have us believe that he was, and to M. Charles belongs the credit of having been the first to study, in the entire collection of manuscripts, this side of the genius of Roger Bacon, first pointed out by M. Cousin, but still little known, and of rather uncertain character. We can readily understand why M. Charles should regard his subject with somewhat excessive partiality and admiration, but we ask to be excused from going with him beyond certain limits. We admit that Roger Bacon is not simply a learned man. No one can resemble less than he what we may call a specialist (*homme spécial*)—the grand metaphysical controversies of his time attracted his attention, and this is an interesting and noteworthy fact, serving to complete the idea of his character. It belongs, therefore, to the history of philosophy to inquire what were his opinions on matter and form, on individuation, on sensible species and intelligible species—and this is what is done by M. Charles, who presents us with an immense amount of matter relative to the subject, a curious collection of texts courageously gathered. But was Roger Bacon a really original metaphysician, equal or superior to his contemporaries Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas? M. Charles ventures to affirm that he was, though he occasionally contradicts himself. I believe he is nearest the truth when he contradicts himself.

The learned interpreter of Roger Bacon states the metaphysical problem of substance remarkably well; he states it in the same terms in which the thirteenth century expressed it—that is to say, in starting from the distinction between matter and form; but M. Charles has scarcely pointed out, in a somewhat superficial manner, this celebrated distinction established by Aristotle, before he hastens to declare that for him it possesses only a logical value. In his opinion, in the reality of things, the idea of substance is a simple idea. But this is a matter which calls for elucidation and proof. After having stated the question of matter and form, M. Charles expresses the opinion that the solution of it given by Bacon is *certainly the most original of his age*; then, while maintaining this high commendation, he explains it by saying that the principal merit of Bacon's ideas on substance is *that of being of the most negative character possible*; for, adds the learned author, the best theory of matter and form is that of Descartes, who suppresses the problem. Did Descartes really suppress the problem, and

can the greatest philosopher in the world suppress a problem which has its root in the nature of things and in the constitution of the human mind? It was not lightly that the profoundly penetrative genius of Aristotle imposed upon whoever would penetrate the intimate nature of any being whatsoever these two questions: "What is the substance of this being?—that is to say, the bottom, the foundation, the subject of its attributes and its modes; and, further, What is the essence of this being?—that is to say, its distinctive, characteristic attribute. Substance is what Aristotle calls matter; essence is what he speaks of as form. It is clear that the problem is perfectly serious and absolutely inevitable, unless we suppress metaphysics—a way of simplifying things very popular at the present time, but one which Descartes never used.

Even when the question is only the explanation of the material world, Descartes finds himself confronted by the problem of matter and form, and he solves it in imagining an indefinite extent, movable, figurable, and divisible, a first matter which becomes all species of bodies in receiving determinate figure and movement. So, let Descartes do his best, he was unable to suppress the problem; and if he had really banished it he would not have been a great metaphysician. How, then, can Roger Bacon have the right to be proclaimed the author of the most original doctrine on substance which appeared in the thirteenth century, if he confined himself to banishing an inevitable problem? It would be necessary, in order to justify this praise, to demonstrate either by Bacon's assistance, or by new arguments, that the problem of matter and form does not really exist.

And the same may be asserted of another problem bearing close relations to this—one greatly agitated during the middle ages—the problem of individuation or individuality. These two questions have an appearance of being new ones in the time of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. Words alone cause the error. The human mind is ingenious; when contempt falls upon some metaphysical problem, under a certain pedantic and antiquated form, it feigns to give up the contest, and assumes an air of modesty; it then artfully invents new formulas, covering up the problem which had been set aside; and now the metaphysicians again resume their labors, and new generations take a passionate interest in their systems and their strifes. I fear that M. Charles has not discovered that the problem of individuality is no other than the problem of matter and form, which itself is nothing but one aspect of the eternal problem of the realists and the nominalists.

But let us glance at what Roger Bacon says in relation to matter and form. M. Charles admires the clearness of his theory—which proves he is not hard to please in the matter of clearness. What I, for my part, manage to see in this obscure and doubtful doctrine is, that every real individual, spirit or matter, dead matter or living body, human soul or angelic spirit, so far as it is real, so far as it is substance, possesses matter and form—that is, may be regarded by the reason from the point of view of indetermination or possibility, or from that of determination or actuality. There is, therefore, spiritual matter and corporal matter, angelic matter and human matter. Consequently, it is not true that form is the sole principle of difference between beings, as many celebrated doctors contend, nor that matter, in man, is the principle of individuation,* as it pleases others to maintain.

This theory appears to be very acceptable to the historian of Roger Bacon. I should have preferred better grounds for my admiration. He says that it possesses the advantage of explaining the existence of the general laws of nature, while the other systems make these laws impossible. This is simply irony; for, according to Roger Bacon's theory, each individual having its own matter and its own form, I do not see what relation of analogy it possibly can have with other individuals. On the contrary, in the writings of St. Thomas, for example, which teach that the principle of identity among men is form, or the soul, and the principle of difference matter or the body, the general laws of the human race are explained by the identity of form; and as to individuals, they find their principle of individuation in substance or matter.† Or, if we accept the doctrine of other teachers, that all complete beings proceed from a common matter, we still have an explanation of general laws, for in this case matter is the principle of analogy and form the principle of difference. M. Charles claims that the theory of Roger Bacon has the merit of avoiding the *separated forms* (*formes séparées*) of the Angelic Doctor, a very singular and very dangerous conception, and several other difficulties which attach to the Thomist theory of individuality. Let this be granted, yet other difficulties take their place. How would Roger Bacon explain the union of the soul with the body, each having its particular matter and particular form, thereby con-

* See the extracts from the *Communia naturalium*, given by M. Charles, taken from the Mazarin manuscript, p. 368 *et seq.*

† St. Thomas is very changeable in the matter of this exceedingly abstruse question of the principle of individuation. Consult the learned work of M. Charles Jourdain, *La philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, tome i, p. 271, *seq.*

stituted two widely separated beings, without any real analogy or conceivable union? And how, we ask, are we to understand the immutability of God, if God himself is matter in as much as he is substance? I do not push the argument; but really I do not see why Roger Bacon deserves the praise for metaphysical originality which it is desired to accord him. Roger Bacon errs in attempting to suppress a problem which is inherent in metaphysics; then, instead of suppressing it, he adopts a peculiar solution, liable to a thousand objections.

The following remarkable passage from Roger Bacon, respecting the universal appears to me to contradict entirely the theory relative to matter and form which his historian attributes to him: "There are sophists", says Roger,* "who endeavor to prove that the universal has no existence, either in the soul or in things, and they argue from such an idle notion as this: That every thing that is in the particular is particular. According to them, the universal does not exist in things, and the only relation between individual objects consists in analogy, and not in participation of a common nature; between one man and another man there is no other relation than an analogy"

This is in very truth the doctrine of the universal as rightly deduced from Roger Bacon's principles concerning matter and form; this doctrine is well known: it is called nominalism. And what happens? After having pledged himself to it, Roger changes his mind, and attacks it; he distinguishes in the individual two sorts of characters—one sort absolute and individual, the other relative, resulting from the relations of this individual with all those who are united to him by a common nature, such, for example, as humanity. But if this is the case, if Socrates and Plato, besides their individual nature, participated in a common nature, it is no longer true that every being has its particular matter and its particular form. Either the matter or the form must have a general character, and, moreover, there must be something besides a purely logical and artificial difference between the matter and the form. I am astonished that so penetrating a mind as that of M. Charles should not have discovered this contradiction. He congratulates Roger Bacon upon having discarded the problem of individuation and upon having almost said as Ockham did later: *Et ideo non est querenda causa individuationis*. This is easy to say, and I also can imagine Ockham turning into ridicule the hæceities of Duns Scotus, the *magister abstractionum*, and

* Extract from the *De Communibus naturalium*, third part of the *Opus tertium*, according to the Mazarin manuscript.

the universals of realism. He only admits the existence of individuals, or rather phenomena—a very simple doctrine, I will allow, and a very convenient one, especially; one which clever men, disguised followers of Condillac, present to us at this time as the final achievement of Hegelian science; but to deny substance is not to get rid of the problem, it is to solve it in the sense of absolute scepticism.

For these reasons I cannot by any means admit the pretended originality of Roger Bacon's doctrine respecting either matter or form, or the universal, or individuation. I will allow that Roger Bacon, inclined as he was by vocation and by genius to devote himself passionately to science, possessed the rare merit of comprehending the importance of metaphysics; I will allow that he applies a taste for simplicity and a force of good sense to these matters which often inspire him very happily, as when he rejects the useless medium which scholasticism established between the mind and its objects under the appellation of sensible and intelligible species. To disperse the phantoms of abstraction is exceedingly creditable, but only under the condition that we do not proceed so far as to deny inevitable problems and certain realities. Roger Bacon inclines towards nominalism, but he so inclines without knowing it. In this respect he has not the boldness and distinctness of Roscelinus or the ingenious delicacy of Abelard; he is an undecided nominalist, and, as proof that he is not fully aware of the tendency of his system, he is of the most perfect orthodoxy in theology, truly a monk in this respect, and a monk of the thirteenth century, setting the faith above every thing else, accepting all the mysteries with humility, and, in addition, the supremacy of the pope and the superiority of canonical law over civil law. How far this is removed from the logic of one like Ockham!

This mediocrity of the metaphysical sense in Roger Bacon, conjoined with this exact theological orthodoxy, completes his character and places him in true relation to his century and the centuries which have followed. To one who should think of only the persecutions he suffered in his order, he might at the first glance appear simply as a monk in open revolt; and so also, if the boldness of certain of his opinions were all that were looked at, there might be an inclination to regard him as a free-thinker and libertine. Both views would be erroneous. Roger Bacon is neither a Luther nor a Bruno. In the midst of the most audacious of his flights towards the future he remains a Franciscan and a contemporary of St. Bonaventure. The explanation is simple enough. A man always belongs to his age on one side or another. To suppose one who had no

point of resemblance to his contemporaries is to suppose something more than a prodigy—it is to imagine a monster, an inexplicable and useless apparition. Roger Bacon submitted to the conditions of the moral life of the thirteenth century, and, going even further, he freely accepted them. He assumed the calling of a monk, and he remained a monk in the most profound depth of his belief. For him, the truth was to be found in Holy Scripture; all that remained to be done was to extract it thence or to connect it therewith; this was the service of philosophy. Holy Scripture is the closed hand; philosophy is the open hand. Why did the ancient philosophers have presentiments of the highest truths of Christianity? In the first place, because they collected through mysterious channels that first revelation which the patriarchs transmitted one to another and of which fragments were distributed to the wise of all lands. And besides, there is another simpler and more profound reason for the necessary accord between philosophy and theology: it is that they have the same origin. They are two rays from the same sun, for the reason which enlightens philosophers—that *active intelligence*, as they call it—which excites and enkindles all intelligences, is the very Word of God, the Word which was made flesh and dwelt among us.*

This is indeed a very elevated way of conceiving the harmony between science and faith. But who does not instantly perceive that this doctrine is the very same as that taught by all the great theologians of the thirteenth century? Why, therefore, does Roger Bacon manifest so profound a disdain for the work of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and St. Thomas, and for what reason did he devote his life to opening a new way for his contemporaries? The following is, in my opinion, the solution of the enigma.

Roger Bacon thoroughly understands the Christian theology and believes it to be absolutely true. Now, what is theology but the regular and rational solution of all the great problems which concern humanity? In the dogmas of Christianity, and even among the obscurities of its mysteries, there is a secret metaphysical science. Is the Trinity any thing else than an explanation of the nature of God,—an incomplete explanation, it is true, light mingled with shade, but accommodated to our feeble vision, while we wait till it be capable of supporting the full glory of the truth seen *facie ad faciem*. Do we desire to conceive the origin of man and of all things? Theology explains it by the creative power of the word. And as to the

* *Opus majus*, p. 28. *Comp. Opus tertium*, cap. 24.

earthly condition of the human race, does not religion present us with the first cause in original sin,—a formidable dogma, and yet one which is fast tied to the consoling doctrines of the incarnation and the redemption, pledges of our salvation and future happiness? To gather together, and, as far as reason allows, to understand these dogmas, to seize their mutual relations and regular connection is in truth to understand the first causes and first principles of things. This knowledge is what is properly called metaphysics. If this be so, what is the most fruitful labor which human science can propose to itself? As to first causes, theology alone knows them and teaches them. There remains the region of second causes, that of man and the universe. Now, in order to understand the universe and man, is it necessary for us to speculate in an abstract manner about the material cause and the formal cause, to invent *intentional species*, *hæcceities*, *entities*—a fantastic world in which the spirit labors fruitlessly and wears itself out in vain conflicts? Or ought we to torture the writings of one of the ancients, who has been made an oracle, without knowing how to read or understand him, in order to accomplish the corruption of the faith through Aristotle and of Aristotle through faith, under the pretext of conciliating the two? No, there remains something better for us to do: it is to leave where they are the disputes of the schools and the books of Aristotle and to contemplate the universe. The great book of nature lies open before us. God has placed it before our eyes that we may be induced to read it unceasingly and seek in it the plans of his wisdom and the secrets of his omnipotence. This is the object of true philosophy.

It is thus that Roger Bacon's work appears to me. I do not find him a pantheist, intoxicated with the infinity of worlds, as was St. Bernard; still less does he appear to me as one of those narrow-minded and unyielding observers who are determined to see nothing beyond mere phenomena. His was a great and bold spirit, capable of embracing the whole horizon of the human mind, but repelled by the vices of the metaphysics of the schools; one who had a presentiment of the natural sciences to a degree at which presentiment becomes genius. Though it has at times seemed to be fading, the glory of Roger Bacon is sure. Instead of being diminished through the late researches of French erudition, this imposing figure has been at once illuminated and made grander. Roger Bacon still remains the most extraordinary of the great minds of the middle ages. A truly marvellous doctor, as well on account of the extent and variety of his knowledge on all subjects, as for the

bold independence and heroic energy of his character, he possessed, in addition to the gift of perceiving general principles, another and a superior privilege—that spirit of invention and discovery which is the portion of only the greatest among the great. It is indeed glorious to be a St. Thomas Aquinas—I mean by this, to be the exponent of a great age, its majestic voice heard through the centuries which follow; but there is a privilege still more glorious, as surely it is more dangerous: it is that of combating the prejudices of a man's own age at the price of his liberty and repose, and of constituting himself, by a miracle of intellect, the contemporary of men of genius yet unborn.

ART. IX.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

FRANCE.

THE *Bulletin Théologique* is a quarterly supplement or pendant to Pressensé's *Revue Chrétienne*. The first two numbers, 1863, contain several valuable articles: Godet on the Organization of the Theological Sciences (encyclopedia); Pronier on the same topic, criticising Godet's scheme; C. Malan (fils) on the Supernatural as the Reestablishment of True Nature—a chapter from a work he is about to publish on Miracles; a review of the Theological Literature of Germany for 1862, by Lichtenberger, and of recent French works by De Pressensé; Tissot's Analysis of the Introduction to Schleiermacher's System of Faith; a reply by Pressensé to Coquerel's objections to his article on Inspiration as not quite liberal enough; Bost on Geology in Relation to Revelation; Arnaud on the Divinity of Christ and the Trinity in the Fathers of the Church—a well studied summary. Arnaud's new Commentary on the New Testament is well spoken of by the *Bulletin*, as a good book for popular use: it will be in 4 vols., of which three are announced. Godet, in his article on Encyclopedia, gives the following scheme: I. SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY: 1. *Exegetical*, comprising Sacred Criticism, Hermeneutics, Bibl. Theology, Bibl. Archaeology, Exegesis. 2. *Systematic* subdivided into Dogmatics, Ethics, Polemics. 3. *Historical*, viz. History of the Theocracy; of Bibl. Theology; of the Church; of Doctrines; Statistics; Symbolism. II. PRACTICAL THEOLOGY. 1. *Ecclesiastical Economy*; comprising (1) Applied Ecclesiology: (2) Theory of the Ministry—the latter subdivided into Liturgies, Homiletics, Catechetics, and Pastoral Care. 2. *Theory of Missions*. 3. *Apologetics*. Pronier propounds a modified arrangement, putting Polemics into Practical Theology, under Apologetics, and the Theory of Missions under the same head, and adding Irenics. His two divisions of *Practical Theology* are Apologetic Theology and Ecclesiastical Economy. He also, in the first division, puts Historical Theology before Systematic.

Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne, April, May, and June, 1863, gives the text of the Pope's Pastoral of Dec. 11, 1862, condemning various works of Frohschammer of Munich, as teaching doctrines on the authority and independence of philosophy, subversive of the claims of Rome; it takes the broad ground that all philosophy must be subject to the church. Tamizey de Larroque criticises, in two articles, several points in Martin's History of France. Abbé Mansuet contends that Peter sent St. Mansuet to Toul. The editor, Bonnetty, continues in two articles his learned notes on the Knowledge which the Romans had of the Jewish faith. Abbé Blanc gives an account of a Temple of the Druids in the Department of Gard. M. de Borghgrave contributes an article on St. Willebord, the apostle of the Netherlands. Abbé Faydit's attempt to prove, 1695, that the Gauls knew Christianity before any other country [in the North and West of Europe?] is reprinted with notes.

The Imperial Library has purchased for 90,000 fr. Count Bédoyère's magnificent collection of works on the French Revolution, Empire and Restoration, consisting of over 100,000 different "articles"; 4,000 vols., 2,000 newspapers, 4,000 engravings, mss., etc.—the most important library on the subject in France. The Catalogue is a vol. of 688 pp.

M. Oppert has received from the Academy of Inscriptions the prize of

20,000 fr. for his important works on the Cuneiform Inscriptions. His competitor was M. Mariette, the Egyptologist. M. Oppert's last work, *Les Fastes de Sargon, roi d'Assyrie*, 721—703 before Christ, from the Assyrian texts of the palace of Khorsabad, is a beautiful folio of 50 pages, 15 francs.

Cardinal Bausset, in his life of Fénelon, relates that the latter, when sixteen years of age, was seized with a strong desire to go as a missionary to Montreal, but was kept back by the entreaties of his uncle, bishop of Salat. The *Correspondance Littéraire*, July 25, has a new document in the case, taken from the mss. in the Ministry of the Marine, being a letter addressed by Louis XIV, in 1675 (in Colbert's handwriting), to Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, in which he says, "I have blamed the action of Abbé Fénelon, and have ordered him not to return to Canada. But I ought to say to you, that it was difficult to institute a criminal process against him, or to oblige the priests of the Seminary of St. Sulpice, at Montreal, to testify against him; and it was necessary to remit the case to his bishop or the grand vicar to punish him by ecclesiastical penalties, or to arrest him and send him back to France by the first ship". According to this, Fénelon was actually in Canada; there was not then in France any other Abbé of the name.

Theological Works. Abbé J. B. Christophe, *History of the Papacy in the Fifteenth Century*. 2 vols. M. Walter, *Life, Writings, and Doctrines of Swedenborg*. The works of the Emperor Julian, translated by Talbot, and published by Plon, with notes and explanations. A. Gratry, *Commentary on Matthew*, 1st Part. Luquet, *The Sanctuaries of Rome*, fol. 50 fr. Ed. Reuss, *History of the Canon*. Abbé Guettée, *Schismatic Papacy, or Rome in Relation to the Eastern Churches*.

A new translation of all the works of Spinoza has been begun by L. G. Prat, to be comprised in 5 or 6 vols. The first volume contains the lives of Spinoza, by Lucas and Colerus, and a translation of his Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy, and Metaphysical Meditations.

A new work on Joan of Arc, refuting various errors, has been published by Villaume. Michaud and Poujoulat published her life in 1861, and Wallon in 1859.

The *Revue des deux Mondes*, May, has an article by Réville, on the School of Tübingen, giving its reconstructions of early Christian history; an interesting account of Savonarola, by Geffroy; and a Comparison of the German and French Schools upon the philosophy of Roman History, by Taillandier.

The first vol. of Véra's translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* is announced; he has already published a version of Hegel's *Logic*.

New editions of two valuable works, to aid in deciphering mss. have been recently published, Chassant's *Palæography of Charts and MSS.*, xi. to xviii. Centuries, 5th ed. 158 pp.; and his *Dictionary of Latin and French Abbreviations in the Middle Ages*, 2d ed. 170 pp. They are the most convenient and complete works on the subject.

M. Brasseur de Bourbourg, well known by his researches in American Antiquities, and his work on Mexico, in 4 vols., has published a volume entitled *Popol Vuh*, or the *Sacred Book and Myths of American Antiquity, with the heroic and historical books of the Quiché*, or, the ancient inhabitants of Guatamala. The Quiché text is given with a French version, and notes on the mythology and history of the people. It gives new and remarkable accounts of the primitive belief of this people. Some of the legends resemble those of the East Indies. M. Brasseur holds that the Nahuatl was the race which changed the history of this country in the primitive period, and that the Toltecs came from them, planting their in-

stitutions in Mexico about the beginning of our era. Other migrations continued to the 12th century. The Peruvians received their religion from the Toltecs. The volume is beautifully printed, with plates, at 25 francs.

The collection of Inscriptions made by Wescher and Fourcrat from the Cyclopean wall surrounding the temple of Apollo at Delphi, numbering about 400, will soon be published. Didot's new volume of Greek Anthology, edited by Dübner, contains poems ranging through fifteen centuries, and embracing 321 Greek authors: they comprise collections made by Jacobs, Boissonade, Bothe, and others, with the criticisms of Hermann, Meineke, Bergk, Hecker, and others, who have written on the Anthology after the two works of Jacobs. *Correspondance Littéraire*.

Abbé Thibaudier, Professor at Lyons, has published a tractate on the Vital Principle, discussing the various theories, and advocating the position that what he calls *animism* is the only orthodox view: That is, the *soul* of man is the vital and informing principle of the whole organism. This is in opposition to *duodynamism*, which recognizes a vital principle distinct from the soul; and to *organicism*, which makes life to be the result of organization. He claims that this is the view of the church, and cites in evidence the papal (Pius IX) condemnation of the works of Günther and Baltzer. Augustine says: "The soul vivifies this terrestrial and mortal body by its presence." Apollinaris was condemned for teaching that there was in Christ's humanity a vital principle alone. The fourth council of Constantinople, and that held at Francfort in 794, condemned the theory of two souls. In the Clementine Constitutions, the opinion was denounced "that the substance of the rational and intellectual soul is not truly and of itself the *form* of the human body". The Catholic church has held with Aquinas: *Anima rationalis est forma sui corporis*. Francésque Bouillier has also written in advocacy of the same view.

Rationalism in the Lutheran Church of France. Some years since, M. Leblois, a preacher at Strasbourg, declared in public that the worship of Christ was idolatry. For this he was mildly rebuked by the Pastoral Association. Colani, editor of the *Nouvelle Revue de Théologie*, an open opponent of orthodoxy, was appointed in 1861, Professor in the Protestant Seminary at Strasbourg. Hosemann, a Lutheran pastor at Paris, wrote a pamphlet exposing Colani's rationalism, to which the latter replied in vindication of his "Position in the Church". Inspector Meyer, President of the Paris Consistory, declared in the *Espérance* (July, 1861), that an honorable man could not hold office in a church, whose fundamental dogmas he opposed: and has since published a *Simple Exposé du Debat*, 1862.

The largest publishers in the world are MM. Mame & Son, of Tours; they employ 1000 hands, 700 in binding alone. They have in stock 3,000,000 books, bound or in boards, besides an immense reserve in quires. At the late London Exhibition, their bindings carried the palm for cheapness and taste.

Abbé Glaire's French version of the New Testament, Paris, 1861, has been approved by the Congregation of the Index. Scio's Spanish version, Martini's Italian, Alliote's German are also sanctioned.

M. Curmer, the editor of the charming edition of the Imitation of Christ, and of the *Lièvre d'heures* of Anne de Bretagne, is preparing an illustrated work, *Évangiles des dimanches et Fêtes de l'année*, in the highest style of art, with miniatures and drawings from the most beautiful illustrated manuscripts of France, Italy, and Germany.

A beautiful Missal, made in the fifteenth century for Jaques Juvénal des Ursins, Archbishop of Rheims, a chef d'œuvre of the early French miniature painting, of 227 leaves, was purchased by Prince Soltikoff in 1849, for

10,000 francs. It has been recently sold to the eminent bookseller, Firmin Didot, for 36,000 francs, and presented by him to the city of Paris. The agent of the British Museum bid against him, but Didot had determined that it should not leave France. He has also just published a treatise on this Missal.

The first 13 vols. of the *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, par Dom Bonquet, etc., are to be reprinted—250 copies only, for 468 francs. These vols. have become rare; Graesse gives their value at 2,500 francs. The first vol. appeared January 1, 1862, to be completed in two years.

M. Renan's *Life of Jesus* is making a great sensation in France and England. Less critical than Strauss, less destructive than Baur, it is still imbued with the pantheistic tendency—making Christ to be a moral enthusiast, somewhat after the French type. An English translation is announced for publication in New York.

ITALY.

The French government is publishing the works of the epigraphist, Count Borghese, deceased the last year in Italy. His chief work, the *Fasti Consularii*, has been expected for a long time.

A History of the Popes has been published at Florence in 6 vols.: *Storia de' papi esposta dal Professore Stanislao Bianciardi*. The author is said to be a man of learning and ability; he has previously written *Veglie del prior Luca*, and *Gallo de Caifasso*.

Giacinto Macri, *Metaphysical Principles of Ethics*. Palermo.

Abbot Bernardi, of Florence, has found a number of letters of Alfieri, which are to be published.

L. Molino, *Realismo razionale, ovvero Filosofia pura, religiosa, sociale*. Napoli, pp. 302.

C. Greth e P. G. Ulber, *Antropologia*, pp. 444: *Logica*, pp. 308.

E. A. Cicogna's extensive work on Venetian Inscriptions is completed by the publication of the 25th fasciculus.

Church and State. The last Italian Parliament had an animated discussion respecting the theological faculties at the Italian Universities. In all the universities of Italy there are but twenty-one theological students, because the bishops prohibit clerics from studying theology in the universities, and therefore the expense of maintaining some fifteen theological professors is, it is alleged, superfluous. The deputy Giorgini proposed a middle course, which has been accepted, and these chairs will gradually cease to exist.

Waldensian Periodicals. Since the withdrawal of the *Buona Novella* from the field as the organ of the Waldensian Church and of Italian evangelization, Dr. Revel has begun to edit a little quarterly—*Evangelical Messenger of Italy*—with the letters of colporteurs and evangelists.

The *Provedenza del Popolo*, of Bologna, has been discontinued, owing to the vexatious sequestrations to which it was subjected. Naples sends out a new evangelical periodical, *La Civiltà Evangelica*, edited with much ability, and arranged to suit the popular taste, by Signor Perez, the ex-Jesuit, who has been for some time evangelizing in the South. The news of the work that is going on in all quarters is given in an unsectarian spirit.

The number of codices of the *Divina Commedia* of Dante exceeds 500—the larger number being from the middle of the 14th to the middle of the 15th century. The larger part of course are in Italy; next comes England with 60; France has 40; Spain and Portugal 12; in Germany are very few. The Oxford Bodleian Library has 15; the British Museum 12. Flo-

rence has 159, of which 87 are on the Laurenziana. Rome has about 70. Professor Witte, of Halle, has collected 407 of these codices, and has published the *Inferno*, based on 4 mss., at Rome, Florence, and Berlin, with various readings, and a photographic portrait of Dante.

SWITZERLAND.

M. Gaussen, of the Theological School of Geneva, died June 18, aged 73 years. He was the successor of Cellier, at Satigny, where he wrote his *Parables of Spring*. At Geneva, 1815 to 1830, he was the leader in the religious awakening and the revival of a better theology. He was universally honored for the purity of his life, and his fidelity to his convictions. He is best known in this country by his *Theopneusty*, and his work on the *Canon*. He also published *Daniel*, and volumes of *Sermons*. He was a thorough mathematician.

Professor De Candolle in *La Semaine Religieuse* (Geneva) gives a list of all the foreign members of the French Academy since 1725, restricted to eight at a time. From 1725 to 1861, there have been eighty-one, and one remarkable fact about them is, that not more than fifteen have been Roman Catholics—all the rest were Protestants, with the exception perhaps of one from the Greek-Russian Church. Of these, ten were from Switzerland, five from Holland, twenty-seven from England, nineteen from Germany, ten from Italy, two from the United States, etc.

SCANDINAVIA.

J. Clausen, *The Life and Writings of Laurentius Valla: a Contribution to the History of Humanism*, pp. 302, Copenhagen: B. E. Malmström, *Literary and Historical Studies*, Upsal; Andr. Fruyell, *Contributions to the Literary History of Sweden*. Part 7, Stockholm.

A Scandinavian literary periodical, under the auspices of Professor Dietrichson, of Upsala, has been started. It is written in Danish, and bears the title "Northern Periodical for Literature and Art."

BELGIUM.

The *Acta Sanctorum*, 54 vols. folio, is to be reprinted at Brussels, at 25 francs the volume for the first 500 subscribers, and 35 for later purchasers. The work is not completed, reaching only to the 15th of October in the saints' days. It is edited by J. Carnandet, aided by the Bollandists.

Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove has brought out the missing part of the First Book of Froissart's Chronicles, which he discovered in the Vatican library.

Gachard's History of Don Carlos is completed—a work of research.

The 3d Part of Laurent's work on Church and State has been published at Brussels; it is on *Revolution*.

The first volume of the rare and valuable Memoirs of Francis d'Enzinas has been published in Latin and French by the Société de l'Histoire de Belgique, Brussels. Enzinas, the learned Spaniard, published it at the request of Melancthon; it was translated into French, in 1558, revised by Calvin. The new edition is edited by Campana. The *nom de plume* of Enzinas was Dryander. In these Memoirs he gives an account of the persecutions of the Protestants in the Netherlands.

SPAIN.

Nicomedes Mt. Mateos, published at Madrid, 1861-2, 3 vols. 4to, on *Spiritualism*, a Course of Philosophy.

Mr. Rivadeneyra, an eminent printer and publisher of Madrid, is preparing for the press a new edition of *Don Quixote*, carefully edited by a collation of the old editions. He has conceived the whimsical idea of printing this edition at Argamarilla de Alba, in the prison in which Cervantes wrote the famous romance. He considers it a species of monument to Cervantes, and will issue a limited number of copies in two forms—the first in 32mo, in four volumes; the second in large handsome type, and on paper which is being made expressly, in imitation of the old hand-made paper, in 8vo.

The works of the Spanish Reformers are being republished by two learned men, Don Luis de Usóz y Río and Benjamin B. Wiffen. Twenty volumes have appeared already, and in the series are to be found a great number of publications which in consequence of being condemned by the inquisition, and burnt by the executioner, have become extremely rare. Very few of our readers would care, perhaps, to procure, much less read through, the whole series. Those, however, who wish to see a *Compte Rendu* of the whole, may find such a series of articles which M. Guardia is now writing in the *Revue Germanique* (published in Paris). Much new light will be thrown on this part of the history of the great Reformation.

GERMANY.

Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Parts 3 and 4, 1863. The first article by Professor Erdmann, of Halle, is an admirable account of the theology and philosophy of Duns Scotus, bringing out the main points of difference between the Thomists and Scotists. He makes the emphatic point in the system of Duns to consist in this—that he criticised the scholastic method, he reflected upon its processes. Written by an acute philosophical critic, it is of value to the student of the history of doctrines and of thought. R. Baxmann, of Bonn, reviews the question as to the time when the Book of Daniel was written, in view of the criticisms of Bleek, Auberlen, Dörner, Hofmann and Zündel; he advocates the period of the Maccabees. Rüetschl communicates several letters of Zwingle, Farel and Viret, not before printed. Pfeiffer examines the vexed question of the site of the city of Gadara. The new edition of Credner's New Test. Canon is reviewed by Weiss, and Ranke's Hymnological Studies by Justi. The 4th Heft contains an excellent treatise by Ullmann, prepared for this country, on some features of the History of the Heidelberg Catechism; Achelis on the subject of Rom. vii; Düsterdieck on 1 Cor. xi, 12—"The woman having 'power' (veil or head-dress) on account of the angels", as illustrating Paul's use of the mysterious doctrine about the angels; Rösch, the Date of the Building of the Temple in 1st Book of Kings, vi, 1, a polemic against Lepsius, Bunsen and Brugsch; several unpublished Letters of Zwingle, and reviews of some recent works.

The third and fourth parts of the *Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theologie*, 1863, are filled with the continuation of Ebrard's elaborate investigations on the history of the Culdees; their theology and religion, church government and monastic life, and miracles, are here handled more thoroughly than in any previous treatise. The two last chapters are on the propagation and dispersion of the Culdee church.

Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Kritik (Tübingen), 2d and 3d Parts, 1863. Johann Major, the Wittenberg Poet (1533-1600), by G. Frank. A. Merx, continuation and conclusion of a Critical Investigation upon the Laws about Sacrifice, Levit. i-vii. L. Paul, Historical attestation of a Real Resurrection of Christ, after the New Testament accounts—two articles, clearly put and strongly reasoned, defending the resurrection as a historical fact. A. Hilgenfeld, conclusion of an Examination of the Theology of John, and the latest works on it. The most curious article of the number is by Dr. F. Strauss, the author of the noted work on Christ's life—upon the parable of the planting of the Seed, in Mark iv, 26-29—as compared with the analogous parables in Matthew xiii. The parable as given in Matthew, speaks of an enemy as sowing tares at the same time, etc., of which Mark says nothing. Strauss now says, that in the conflicts of the Petrine and Pauline parties in the early church, the Petrites were wont to call Paul 'the enemy', an 'evil one', and the like; and that they probably used the parable in Matthew in this way (even if Matthew's Gospel were not written in this sense, which Strauss concedes would be a rather violent supposition). Now, Mark has a parable about the seed sowing, and says nothing about an 'enemy' sowing tares, and the like. Consequently, Mark's Gospel was written by a pacific sort of man, who did not wish to engage in or fan these dissensions. And this is the "higher criticism"! The 3d Part contains Hilgenfeld on the Prophet Ezra, in reply to Volkmar, and on the Gospels and the historical Character of Christ, in reference to recent criticisms, and the views of the school of Baur. Strauss contributes another short article on the miracle of the piece of money found in the mouth of a fish by Peter (Matthew xvii, 24-27).

The *Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht*, edited by Dr. Richard Dove, of Tübingen, now in its third year, is one of the best periodicals on ecclesiastical law. The second and third parts for 1863, contain Friedberg on the History of Marriage Contracts; Schumann on Ecclesiastical Administration in Bavaria; Hundeshagen on the Theocratic State, and its Relation to the Church; Sarwey on the Legal Nature of Concordats; Jacobson, the Reformed in Prussia.

Theologische Quartalschrift, 2d Heft, 1863, (Roman Catholic). Dr. F. Speil, The Genuineness of the Book of Daniel—a long article of 60 pages. Hefele, Pope Gregory and Emperor Frederick II—a review of their relations and conflicts, with the author's wonted learning and skill. In the review of books, Ritter's Church History of Rom. Cath. is sharply criticised by Reifer; Patritius' new commentary on Mark is highly commended; Wutterich's Pontificum Roman. Vitæ (A.D. 872 to 1198) is praised for its thoroughness; and Tauner on Tradition, is eulogised as an offset to Holtzmann's work on that subject. The 3d Heft for 1863, has a long article on the Epistle to the Hebrews, by Dr. Jos. Langen, contending against Wieseler, that this Epistle was addressed to Palestinian, and not to Alexandrian readers.

We have received the following notes on lectures and books, from a Professor in a Theological Seminary, who has recently returned from studies in Europe.

"From the last official catalogue of the University of Berlin it appears that during the last semester 2708 students have attended the lectures. Of these 1925 were matriculated—432 in the Theological Faculty—515 in the Law—338 in the Medical—and 640 in that of Philosophy. The Theological Faculty now consists of Drs. Twesten, Nitzsch, Hengstenberg, Niedner, Dorner, and Steinmeyer. Drs. Benary and Piper, Licentiates Vatke and Messner, and others, give instruction as *Professores Extraordinarii*.

"Dr. Niedner is issuing for his pupils, to be used in connection with his lectures, a new and enlarged edition of his Church History. Dr. Twisten gives no promise of completing his Dogmatik—one of the best works, of this kind, so far as it goes, Germany has given us), but lectures with his usual clearness and vivacity. Dr. Dorner has given through the winter semester two parallel courses of lectures, one upon Apologetics, the other upon the Theology of the Old Testament. These lectures are preparatory to three other courses upon Special Dogmatics, Christian Ethics, and the Theology of the New Testament.

"*Apologetics* is treated, by Prof. Dorner, as an integral part of the System of Christian Doctrine, as the first part of Dogmatic Theology. Its ground lies in the claim of Christianity to be eternal Truth—lies in Christianity itself. It is the justification of Christianity in its claim to be the final, absolute religion. It is the justification of Christianity to thought; it shows, or tries to show, that there cannot be conceived a more perfect Religion. Christian Doctrines, it attempts to prove, are to be received not merely as given, but as Truth. The energy and convincing power of Truth is an axiom of Apologetics. It seeks to reconcile the Logos of the first creation, with the historical work of the Logos in his absolute Revelation. Apologetics thus conceived differs from Christian Apologies. It started, indeed, with repelling attacks. But these attacks were merely the historical occasion of its existence. It exhibits the Christian Religion as self-grounded—self-dependent. It has an offensive as well as defensive work. It seeks to show the inner lack of Truth in all thinking which is not Christian. It differs also from a mere Philosophy of Religion, inasmuch as it draws from historical monuments. The essential peculiarity of Christianity is the historical Person—the God-man. Prof. Dorner makes no attempt to construct religion or ethics out of pure thought. His lectures upon Theology are ready for the press, and will be published, though not immediately.

"In the department of General History Prof. Droysen has lectured upon Historical Methodology and Encyclopædia, and upon Modern History since the year 1789. The influence of the Amer. Revolution and of our institutions, he appreciates and acknowledges. 'When God gave America Washington, he thought also of Europe', remarked in our hearing a distinguished Professor in Berlin. The veteran historian Ranke has also been lecturing upon recent history, and with an appreciative interest in this country. We may remark, also, in passing, that one of the most brilliant and popular courses of Lectures at the College de France has been upon American Liberty from Prof. Laboulaye. The Lectures have been given on successive Mondays to crowded audiences composed largely of the most intelligent and cultivated residents of Paris. The enthusiasm of the students has been very noticeable.

"At Halle the usual high standard of philological and theological instruction has been maintained. Dr. Müller's health has been so far reestablished that he has assumed his usual share of labor. With Profs. Tholuck, Hupfeld, Müller, Jacobi, Guericke, have been recently associated Profs. Wuttke, Beyschlag, and Riehm. Prof. Wuttke is favorably known by a volume upon the History of Heathenism, and by a Manual of Christian Ethics, the second volume of which has recently appeared. Dr. Beyschlag was called from a pastorate. He has published a charming memoir of a brother of unusual promise, together with sermons and essays. He has lectured at Halle upon the Life of Christ, the synoptic Gospels, and the Epistles to the Corinthians, and has presided over homiletic exercises. Prof. Riehm was called from Heidelberg, where he published a valuable commentary upon the Epistle to the Hebrews. He is a warm friend and ad-

mirer of Prof. Hupfeld, without accepting many of the results of the latter's Biblical criticism. He has given, the past winter, a thorough and interesting course of lectures upon the Messianic prophecies, which we are glad to hear are soon to issue from the press.

"Dr. Richard Rothe, of Heidelberg, has collected his theological essays published chiefly in the *Studien und Kritiken*, and issued them, revised and enlarged, in one volume. A new edition of his *Ethik*, for some time out of print, it is said, will shortly appear. Neander's Lectures upon Ethics are also to be published in Berlin from the notes of pupils. In this way Dr. Chr. Fried. Schmid's *Christliche Sittenlehre* (Ethics) and also his *Biblische Theologie d. Neuen Testaments* have been issued, two works which well deserve translation into English.

"As Herzog's Encyclopædia approaches completion, preparations are making for a new Encyclopædia of Science (Wissenschaft) in which each subject is to be treated from a historical point of view. It is to be issued at Munich, and promises to be of great value. Prof. Dorner is preparing for it a History of Protestant Theology. The thorough Encyclopædia of Education, edited by Dr. Schmid, of Stuttgart, with the coöperation of Professors Palmer and Wildermuth, of Tübingen, has reached its thirty-fourth Hefte—article *Lesenunterricht*. It is a work of the greatest value to all who are engaged in teaching."

Zeitschrift für die lutherische Theologie, Drittes Heft, 1863. Delitzsch, Remarks on the true Masoretic Representation of the Text of the Old Testament, with reference to Bär's edition of the Psalter, 1861. C. M. Laurent, Criticism of the text of Clement of Rome, in the recent editions. K. Ströbel on the Union Formula of the Legitimists, with respect to Stahl. Rudelbach's Letters to Guericke, 1846 to 1850.

At a meeting of the clergy of the Kingdom of Hanover, in April, Prof. Ewald presented a proposition in favor of the union of all the Lutheran and Reformed churches of Germany in one National German Church, with a Synod. It was adopted. Dr. Dorner favors the movement.

Dr. Frederick Strauss, court preacher and professor at Berlin, died May 19. He was born 24th September, 1786, was pastor in Ronsdorf, 1809, in Elberfeld, 1814, and was called to Berlin in 1822, where he was intimately associated with Schleiermacher and Neander. He is known by his *Glockentöne*, Helon's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Baptism in Jordan, and other works.

The Archduke Maximilian, called to the Mexican throne, is one of the "royal authors", having published an account of his journey to Brazil, illustrated in the highest style; only one hundred copies were printed.

Berlin is well provided with institutions for education, besides its great university. The number of public academies and schools is 80; of these, seven are gymnasia, one progymnasium, seven schools for practical arts, twenty schools are under churches, three are Jewish, six for orphans, etc. The number of private schools is 102. Besides these, there 116 for the poorer classes. The teachers in the public schools number 1,341 males, 469 females, 57,213 scholars, (of whom, 30,843 were males, and 26,370 females). —*Berliner Blätter für Schule*.

A new edition of the great work of Chemnitz, Examination of the Council of Trent, in Latin, has been edited in Berlin, by Preuss. Taken all in all, it is, perhaps, the best and ablest Protestant work against Romanism. It develops the Scriptural argument with great fulness and clearness, and also the theological arguments and positions. It is a capital book for training in the Roman Catholic controversy. Our young ministers would do well to make a study of it. The editor has added an account of the

dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and a list of the works in that controversy.

Buxtorf's Concordance is republished in a more convenient 4to form, in five volumes, at two dollars each, edited by B. Baer. A Concordance of the particles, which is wanting in all the concordances, is among the welcome additions. Dillmann, author of the *Æthiopic Grammar*, is about to publish a *Lexicon Æthiopicum*—cost \$24. The Berlin Academy has projected an edition of the works of Albertus Magnus (fl. 1193–1280), to be edited by Dr. C. Jessen. Dr. A. Pohlmann (Braunsberg) has published a commentary, Part I, on the text of the commentaries of Ephraem Syrus, in the Vatican manuscripts and Roman edition. Brugsch, *Recueil des monuments Egyptiens, dessinés sur lieux*. Partie I, 4to, 50 plates. \$8.

A manuscript found in the University Library of Bonn, published by Prof. Braun, establishes the fact that Charlemagne was born at Ingelheim, on the Rhine, and not at Salzburg or Aix-la-Chapelle. It is written by John Butzbach, prior of the convent of Laach.

A large number of Luther's letters, in ms., have been discovered by Dr. Burkhardt, librarian of the Grand Duke of Saxe Weimar. They were found in the archives of the Ernestine House of Saxony. They are to be published.

A Life of Uhland is in preparation, by Dr. Notter, of Stuttgart. His works are to be edited by Vischer.

The first volume of Max Wirth's History of Germany, from the most ancient times, promises a work of great value, viewing history as the product of great causes, and not as the mere narration of incidents and accidents.

Humboldt's Correspondence with Berghaus about his *Cosmos*, is to be published in three volumes.

ENGLAND.

Herbert Spencer's Theology. A writer in the *National Review* having taken Herbert Spencer to task for maintaining "the darkening influence of sacred ideas upon the human understanding", he denies the charge in the *Athenæum* and quotes the following statements from his *First Principles*: "We have found *à priori* reason for believing that in all religions, even the rudest, there lies hidden a fundamental verity" (p. 23). "The truly religious element of Religion has always been good; that which has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice, has been its irreligious element; and from this it has been ever undergoing purification" (p. 102), etc. To this the Reviewer replies, that Mr. Spencer teaches that man can "know only the finite" and that "the infinite is the sphere of nescience and also of religion"; that with him "religion resolves itself into the acknowledgment of an inscrutable background in front of which the luminous shapes of knowledge have their play". To this Mr. Spencer rejoins, that he agrees with Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Sir Wm. Hamilton, Mansel and others, that "we can know only the finite". He says that Theism, Atheism, and Pantheism, severally "involve symbolical conceptions of the illegitimate and illusive kind"; but in saying this, he "goes no further than Mansel". He also asserts that he believes in "the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension"; and that, better than Mansel, he holds that our consciousness of this is "positive" and not merely "negative". Further, that "in this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power, we have just that consciousness in which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science coalesce" (p. 99 of *First Principles*).

ples). This has "a higher certainty than any other belief whatever". The discussion is profitable as showing the way in which Mansel's views are made use of by those who reject the Christian revelation.

Mr. G. A. Bergenroth, the only foreigner ever permitted to consult the Spanish Archives at Simancas, collected by Charles V, succeeded in deciphering the various mss. and has made copies of what pertains to England, now deposited in the Record Office, London. In a work just published he gives a Calendar of Letters and Despatches, between 1485 and 1509.

The Sinaitic Manuscript. Kallinikos Hieromonachos of Sinai writes to Mr. Davies, that he never wrote or saw the letters published in his name in defence of Simonides; that the latter never was in Mount Sinai; and that Simonides "lies, when he positively affirms that the ms. published by Tischendorf is his work". His letter is published in the *Literary Churchman*.

Dr. Edward Greswell's *Objections to the Historical Character of the Pentateuch*, and his *Three Witnesses and Threefold Cord*, are among the ablest replies to Colenso. The "threefold cord" in the latter work is the day, the month, and the year, to show that the three coincide at 4,005 B.C. as the starting point, and that the calendars of all nations point to the same beginning. Another able work is *History against Colenso*, two parts, by a Barrister.

The *Literary Churchman*, London, says "that as long as a contest is continued by the North American States which is sustained by a principle far more ferocious and unjustifiable than any thing yet perpetrated in the history of slavery in the South, English hearts will naturally so strongly condemn the greater injury, that for a time they may appear partially insensible to the less". This is in a notice of Prof. Goldwin Smith's able pamphlet entitled, *Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?* which ought to be republished here. The *Literary Churchman* represents the tone of thought and feeling among English churchmen.

The *British Quarterly Review*, representing the Nonconformists, has an article in its July number on the *Moral Aspects of the American Struggle*, written entirely in the interest of the Southern Confederacy. It protests against the Reply to the Letter of the French Ministers, which has recently been brought to this country from England. It condemns the idea that the North is fighting in the interest of freedom, and argues that reünion will defer emancipation. It speaks of the North as "besotted and blood-thirsty", and makes it alone responsible for the guilt of the war. "It is the most heart-rending and we cannot help thinking the most guilty war the world has known." And these are the words of the transatlantic descendants of the English Puritans!

Rev. N. Houghton, under the title *Rationalism in the Church of England*, reviews some of the works and positions of Alford, Arnold, Colenso, Donaldson, Jowett, Maurice, Milman, Powell, Stanley, and Williams—as representing the rationalistic tendency—a bishop, two deans, four professors and three doctors.

Geo. F. Maclear's *History of Christian Missions in the Middle Ages*, is one of the series of manuals published by Macmillan and Co., and is a very thorough and useful book.

In the Oxford Library of the Fathers, the Works of St. Justin Martyr, translated, with Notes and Indices, have been published, at 8s. The 6th vol. of Chrysostom on the Epistles, containing his Homilies on Timothy, Titus and Philemon, have also appeared in the corresponding Oxford Bibliotheca, containing the original texts.

Bagster has published, edited by Tregelles, the Codex Zacynthius, from a Greek palimpsest found in the island of Zante, containing fragments of Luke's Gospels.

New parts have appeared of the Catalogue of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, viz. Part viii of the Manuscript Codices, devoted to the Æthiopic, prepared by Dillmann; and Steinschneider's Catalogue of the Hebrew Books, 2 vols. 4to, 5l.; a Conspectus of the latter is on sale for 3s.

The History of the Martyrs in Palestine. By Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea. Discovered in a very ancient Syriac mss., and edited, with an English translation, by W. Cureton, D.D. 10s. 6d. This is the 4th part of the most ancient Syriac mss. yet known with a date, viz. History of the Palestinian Martyrs. It contained Clement's Recognitions and Titus of Bostra against the Manicheans, both of which Dr. De Lagarde has edited; Eusebius on the Theophany, which Dr. Samuel Lee edited, 1842; and the above work, referred to by Eusebius (viii, 13), and now first published in Syriac, no Greek or Latin copy being known.

B. H. Cowper has also published from the Syriac manuscripts, Miscellanies on the First and Second General Councils, etc., containing a remarkable Greek list of the bishops at Nice, and at Constantinople; a version of the Nicene canons, which "is from the oldest mss. of them yet known;" fragments from Diocles, "the first historian of Rome, from whom Plutarch tells us Fabius Pictor drew largely"; with fragments from Christian and other writers.

America before Columbus. A writer in the *Gentleman's Magazine* advocates anew the theory that America was known before Columbus, on two grounds. 1. A chart of Andrea Bianco, dated 1436, having an island in the Atlantic named *Brasil*. But this, as Mr. Bolton Corney shows in the *Notes and Queries*, was undoubtedly one of the Azores, now called *Tercera*. 2. That trade was carried on with *Brasil* two centuries before Columbus. But the only evidence here is, that trade was carried on in *brasil*-wood, or in something called *brasil*; and Mr. Corney shows that this wood was in use for even a longer period before Columbus.

The Irish Archæological and Celtic Society have published, *Book of Ancient Irish Hymns*, edited by Rev. J. H. Todd; *Adamnan's Life of S. Columba*, edited by Rev. W. Reeves; *Irish Glosses*; *Fragments of Annals*, edited by Donovan.

Mr. Edwin Arnold of University College Oxford, has published the *Book of Good Counsels*, from the Sanskrit of the *Hitopadesa*, attractively illustrated by Weir. The prose is at least as old as the Christian era, and the interspersed verses from the *Mahabharata* date back to 350 B.C., and from the *Rig-Veda* to about 1800 B.C.

In the *Evangelical Christendom*, the London organ of the Evangelical Alliance, there has been an interesting correspondence, between Dr. Dörner and Bishop Fitzgerald (of Cork), looking to a better understanding between German and English divines. Dörner objects to the English theology that it lays too much stress upon the external evidences for Christianity, and cites Maurice as saying that this has led to wide-spread unbelief. (*Evangelical Christendom*, April, 1860.) Dr. Fitzgerald replied in the same magazine, Jan. 1861, asking how we can prove that the testimony of the Holy Spirit, on which Dörner lays such stress, can be shown not to be merely subjective; and how, for example, the resurrection of Christ can be proved in any other way than by external testimony? "Our divines say that it can be proved by stringent external evidence; and can the German theologians give a better answer?" He puts the case thus: The truths of revelation are *facts*; not self-evident; not to be demonstrated *à priori*; nor to be

proved by saying it were best that such facts should have occurred; nor yet, by the assertion that the Holy Spirit leads to a belief in them. In this sense, Dr. Fitzgerald's essay in the *Aids to Faith* is also written. Dr. M'Cosh has also a "letter to the Churches of Germany", published in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1861, giving an account of the various theological parties and movements in England. In the same periodical, Dr. Dorner reviews at length, and ably, the whole Mansel and Maurice controversy. The position of Mansel he says, and shows, "involves a great and thorough contradiction" as a result of his theory about the nature of our ideas of the Absolute and Infinite. He also replies to the positions of Dr. Fitzgerald, stating the German ground, that external evidence and authority can never produce real, living, saving faith, and vindicating "the testimony of the Holy Spirit" from the charge of being merely subjective. That the word and faith are inseparable, he says, is the principle of the present evangelical theology of Germany. Neither *a priori*, nor merely logical proofs are sufficient; we must have the living presence of Christ in the soul, and the witness of the Spirit. Here alone is the final ground of assurance. The authority of the Scriptures depends on the authority of Christ, and not the converse. The essay of Dr. Fitzgerald in the "*Aids to Faith*", has some reference to these views of the German divine. It is a good thing that the matter is mooted between two such candid and able disputants.

Theological Works. Wm. Cunningham, *Discussions on Church Principles, Popish, Erastian, and Presbyterian*. Published by his Literary Executors. F. D. Maurice, *Correspondence with a Layman on the Claims of the Bible and of Science*. Rev. D. Moore, *Divine Authority of the Pentateuch Vindicated*. John Rawlings, *History of the Origin of the Mysteries and Doctrines of Baptism and the Eucharist*, as introduced into the Church of Rome and the Church of England. R. A. Thompson, *Christian Theism*. Eben. Soher, *History of the Christian Church to Constantine*. James Stark, *Westminster Confession of Faith compared with the Scriptures*. The object of this work is to show that the Confession needs to be altered to suit modern science, etc. G. L. Brown, *Lectures on the Gospel of John*, 2 vols. Milman's *History of the Jews*, 3 vols., 3d ed., revised and extended. Alford's *Four Gospels*, 5th ed. Life of William Chillingworth, by Des Maizeaux, translated by James Nichols. Life of Bishop Thomas Wilson, by John Keble. 2 Parts.

Professor Stanley of Oxford has aroused public attention by a forcible Letter to the Bishop of London, advocating the discontinuance of the subscription in the Church of England and the Universities. The formularies, he says, "offer no solutions" of modern inquiries and doubts. Archbishop Whately urged the same matter twenty years ago.

The Religious Tract Society of London offer their Commentary in 6 vols., published at 24s., for 12s. to ministers and teachers. It contains the substance of Henry and Scott, with notes from Clark, Horne, Greswell, Poole, Lowth, and others.

The *British Quarterly* has an interesting article on Bishop Butler and his recent critics. It reviews Miss Hennell's Essay on the *Sceptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy*, 1859; the objections urged by Rev. James Martineau in his *Studies on Christianity*, and by Mr. Bagebot in an article in the *Prospect Review*. The four objections considered are, 1. It is merely an argumentum ad hominem. 2. The difficulties found in nature are only incidental, but the difficulties involved in Christianity comprise the essence of Christianity. 3. Revelation should explain difficulties, and not merely give us the same over again. 4. Butler defends the immoralities of the

Bible, and so comes in conflict with the moral sense. These are all shown to be irrelevant, or to rest upon a misunderstanding of Butler's work.

The Journal of Sacred Literature. Edited by B. H. Cowper. July. Canon Stanley's Lectures on the Jewish Church. Isaiah xviii, Translation and Notes. A Sermon by the Rev. Gilbert White of Selborne—author of the Natural History of Selborne. Exegesis of Difficult Passages. The Betrayal of our Lord. Aethiopic Liturgies and Hymns, translated by Rev. J. M. Rodwell. Inspiration, by Tholuck, translated from Herzog's Encyclopædia. Contributions to Modern Ecclesiastical History, No. 1, giving extracts from the Bohemian mss. of Rev. Jos. Procházka on the Helvetic church of Lissa, above the Elbe. Introduction to the Rabbinic Bible, by Jacob Ben Chajum, translated from the Rabbinical Hebrew by C. D. Ginsburg—a valuable and curious paper.

Dr. Raffles, recently deceased, was born in London in May, 1788. His father was a highly respectable solicitor in that city. At an early age he entered the old college at Homerton, near London, and on the completion of his studies, in 1809, was appointed to the pastoral office over the church of the Congregational denomination at Hammersmith. This position he occupied for three years, at the end of which he removed to Liverpool. Among his works is a volume of poems, published in connection with his brother-in-law, the late Dr. J. B. Brown, barrister at law, and J. H. Wiffin, the translator of Tasso's "Jerusalem Delivered". This was followed by a "Memoir" of the life and ministry of his predecessor, the Rev. Thomas Spencer, which has passed through many editions. In 1817 appeared his "Letters during a Tour through some parts of France, Savoy, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands". To these publications should be added two volumes of lectures on religious subjects, a great variety of sermons, and many contributions in prose and verse to the pages of fugitive literature.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Mr. Scribner will publish in a few weeks Prof. Shedd's Lectures on the History of Doctrines, delivered when he was at Andover. They will be found to be a rich addition to our theological literature. The method pursued is in some respects different from that in kindred works. The Introduction discusses in a philosophic manner the subject of Methodology, as applied to history. The main divisions of the work are, 1. Influence of Philosophical Systems upon the construction of Christian Doctrine. 2. The History of Apologies, or Defences of Christianity. 3. History of Individual Doctrines—the bulk of the work subdivided into General Dogmatic History, and Special Dogmatic History. 4. The History of Symbols. 5. Biographic History as related to the History of Doctrines.

Professor Schaff is to edit Mr. Scribner's edition of Lange's Bible Work, which we have repeatedly recommended. It could not be in better hands. The Gospels are well under way, revised with additions, from the Edinburgh translation. The other parts will be translated in advance of the Edinburgh edition.

Gould & Lincoln (Boston) have in press, The Mercy Seat; or Thoughts on Prayer, by A. C. Thompson, D.D. Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, delivered before the Lowell Institute, by A. P. Peabody, D.D. Music of the Bible; or Explanatory Notes upon all passages of the Sacred Scriptures relating to Music. With an Essay on Hebrew Poetry, by Rev. Enoch Hutchinson. Also, Life and Times of John Huss; or the Bohemian

Reformation of the Fifteenth Century, by Rev. E. H. Gillett, 2 vols. 8vo. This last work will prove one of great interest and value. We rejoice in its speedy appearance.

Brownson's Quarterly for July has an elaborate article on Orthodoxy and Unitarianism, arguing against the latter, on rational grounds, in support of the Trinity, the Incarnation and Redemption. He gives a philosophic construction of the *Trinity*. He says, "in the divine interior eternal progression, the Father is the principle, the Son is the medium, and the Holy Ghost is the end or consummation". The divine essence beholding itself, is the generative of the Word. Some of his terminology, borrowed from Gioberti, must be perplexing to youthful inquirers. *E. g.* he says that heterodox philosophers "do not understand that methexis is methexis, that is, a participation in the Divine Ideas, or essence, *mediante* his Divine creative act, so that the methexic is as much a creation as the mimetic or the individual".

Ralph Emerson, D.D., died at Rockford, Ill., May 20. He was born in Hollis, N. H., Aug. 18, 1787; graduated at the head of his class in Yale College, 1811, became pastor in Norfolk, Ct., 1816; and from 1827 to 1854 was Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Andover. He translated Wiggers on Augustinism and Pelagianism, and contributed to the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and other periodicals.

Francis Patrick Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore, died Wednesday morning, July 8th. He was born in the city of Dublin, Dec. 3d, 1797. He came to this country at the age of twenty-four; had charge of an ecclesiastical seminary in Bardstown, Ky., for nine years; in 1830 he was consecrated as Bishop, and became coadjutor to the Rt. Rev. Dr. Conwell, of Philadelphia, and upon his decease in 1842, succeeded to his episcopal functions. In 1851, he succeeded to the archiepiscopal see of Baltimore, upon the death of Archbishop Eccleston. He was appointed by the Pope apostolic delegate to preside over the first plenary council of the United States, which was called in Baltimore in 1852, and in 1859 received the title of Primate of Honor, conferring upon himself and his successors the precedence over all other Roman Catholics in the United States. Among his more elaborate works are *Theologia Dogmatica* (4 vols. 8vo, 1839-40), *Theologia Moralis* (3 vols. 8vo, 1841-43), which are used as text-books in numerous Catholic Seminaries; "The Primacy of the Apostolic See Vindicated", "Vindication of the Catholic Church", and the article "Roman Catholic Church", in the *New American Cyclopædia*. He is still better known by his writings on Biblical subjects, and especially by his translation of the Old and New Testaments, which are held in great favor in the Catholic community.

ART. X.—CRITICISMS ON BOOKS.

THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

Aurora, sive Bibliotheca Selecta ex Scriptis eorum, qui ante Lutherum Ecclesiæ studuerunt restituendæ. Edidit F. G. P. SCHÖPFF. Tom. I-VII. Dresdæ, 1857-'60. This is a valuable collection of the tracts of some of those mediæval writers, whose general spirit prepared the way for the Reformation. They are published at a very moderate cost, only \$1.65 for the series thus far; and the works are such as are good for all times. The first volume (or tract, pp. 15) contains Hugo St. Victor's *Libellus de Laude Caritatis* (which Schöppf has also published in German translation); an exquisite essay, full of the spirit of love as the highest of the virtues. E. g. "Nescio si quid majus in laude tua dicere possim, quam ut Deum de coelo traheres et hominem de terra ad cælum elevarēs." "Vulnerasti impassibilem, ligasti insuperabilem, traxisti incommutabilem, æternum fecisti mortalem." "Caritas omnem animæ languorem sanat, caritas vitiorum omnium radices extirpat, caritas omnium virtutum origo est. Caritas mentem illuminat, conscientiam mundat, animam lactificat, Deum demonstrat." "Reliqua igitur gratiarum dona largitur Deus etiam iis quos reprobat, solam autem caritatem quasi seipsum iis tantum, quos diligit, in præmium servat."

The second tome, pp. 80, contains Nicolas de Clamengis *De Studio Theologico*, not contained in Lydius' edition, 1613, of the works of this bold theologian, but taken from the *Spicilegium* of Dacher, 1723; full of useful hints, and earnestly insisting on the study of Scripture, and making theology to be a practical science. Its suggestions still deserve to be well pondered. "Summa igitur illius, qui theologicum recta intentione amplectitur studium, ea sit, ut formam se virtutis ad imitandum cæteris præbeat: nisi enim amicus Dei sit, sua sibi secreta non manifestabit; nisi foris luce virtutis effulgeat, alios opportune ad virtutem ædificare non poterit."—The third tome, pp. 61, contains Savonarola's *Meditations on Psalms li and xxxii*, written in the last years of his life, and breathing his most elevated and chastened spirit, which Luther published in 1523; and also Savonarola's *Oratio in Articulo Mortis*, when he received the sacrament—a most simple, touching, and appropriate prayer.—The fourth tome, pp. 50, contains extracts from the works of Hugo St. Victor, who died 1140. The first essay is on the theme, that the Christian faith is not only to be believed with the heart, but confessed with the mouth, addressed to the archbishop of Seville who had denied the necessity of such confession, saying, "Christianum non facit lingua, sed conscientia". In reply, Hugo says, among other things: "Crux in fronte, confessio in ore: utrumque debetur, utrumque exigitur. Totum Christus vindicat sibi; cor ad fidem sui, os ad confessionem sui". Another extract is on faith, which is thus defined: "Fides est certitudo rerum absentium supra opinionem, et infra scientiam, constituta". It comprises *cognitio* and *affectus*: "in affectu enim substantia fidei invenitur: in cognitione, materia". It is even called a "sacrament", so loosely was the latter term still used. On the contemplation of God, he says, that this

is threefold: "in seipso, in operibus suis, et in judiciis suis. In seipso bonum; in operibus suis magnum; in judiciis suis justum. In seipso amabilem, in operibus suis mirabilem, in judiciis suis metuendum". That alone is Scripture, he says, which is inspired by the Spirit of God: "In qua, quidquid docetur veritas: quidquid præcipitur, bonitas: quidquid promittitur, felicitas est. Nam Deus veritas est sine fallacia, bonitas sine malitia, felicitas sine miseria". Similar gems of thought are scattered through these selections from this admirable mystic.

The fifth tome, pp. 76, contains Gerard of Zutphen's (Zerbolt's) plea for the Scripture and prayers in the vernacular language; the testimonies of John Gerson and Peter d'Ailly about the Brethren of the Common Life; and Gerard Magnus' *Sermo de Focariis et notariis Fornicatoribus*, pars prior. The first of these works is by one of the Brethren of the Common Life, edited from a ms. at Deventer, and it is an admirable exposition of the topic, by a man of piety and learning, with abundant illustrations from patristic literature. The value of the testimonies of Gerson and d'Ailly as to the character of the Brethren is well known. The last work is edited from Dutch sources, so that it appears in a better form than before. The corruption of the church and the need of reform are presented in a bold and clear light. The sixth tome, not yet published, will contain a sermon of Gerard. The seventh has three rare works of Rotherius, bishop of Verona, viz. *Itinerarium*, *Liber apologeticus*, and a *Sermon*.

Joannis de Wiclef Tractatus de Officio Pastoralis. E Codici Vindobonensi primum editit GOTTH. VICTOR LECHLER. Lips. 1863. pp. 48. Wycliffe, by his pastoral labors and evangelical zeal, was amply qualified to write a practical treatise on the pastor's office. He wrote about 300 sermons. He trained many men as preachers. There has been known, as coming from his pen, a short *Epistola ad simplices Sacerdotes*, published by W. W. Shirley, in the *Fasciculum Zizaniorum*, 1858. Another tract, *De Sex Jugis*, bears on the same topics. In various works mention has been made of a larger treatise: it is referred to by Lewis in his *Life of Wycliffe*, though not by Vaughan in his *Life and Opinions of Wycliffe*. Dr. Lechler, guided by the directions of Michael Denis in his *Codices MSS. Bibliothecæ Vindobonensis*, has at last exhumed and published the work so long neglected. The manuscript is from the fifteenth century. Dr. L. supposes it was written in the earlier part of Wycliffe's career, since it contains no traces of his polemics against transubstantiation; and all of Wycliffe's works after 1381 are full of this subject: nor has it any allusion to Wycliffe's version of the Scriptures, completed in 1380. It falls then probably between 1367 and 1378. It was found in a codex containing 50 other tracts of W., probably written in England and brought to Bohemia, and now in the Vienna library. It is a valuable treatise—as much so as any written on this subject before the Reformation; full of evangelical sentiments and weighty counsels. The pastoral office he views as intended to purge men of sin and to care for their souls. Pastors should love men more than the things of men. In the second chapter the worth and dignity of the office are finely set forth. The authority of the sacred Scriptures is largely dwelt upon, and they are cited with great frequency. The life of Christ is held up as an infallible mirror in contrast with a degenerate church. The style is vivid and lucid, and sometimes there are gleams of irony. The whole treatise is a worthy addition to the literature of the reformers before the Reformation.

A Critical History of Free Thought in Reference to the Christian Religion. By ADAM S. FARRAR, A.M. New York: Appleton. 1863. pp. 487.

The Hampton Lectures are bearing ripe fruit year by year. This new course for 1862 is one of the most scholarly, laborious and useful of the series since 1780. The works of Lardner and Leland, Rose and Pusey, and the translations from Tholuck and Kahnis, have been the chief English helps to the understanding of these controversies. But Mr. Farrar traverses a much wider field. He gives the history of free thought from the beginning. Lecture I. is on the subject, method and purpose of the whole course: he here divides the history into four crises, in the struggle (1) with heathen philosophy A.D. 160-360; (2) with sceptical tendencies in scholasticism 1100-1400; (3) with the literature of the Renaissance in Italy 1400-1625; (4) with modern philosophy in the three forms of English Deism, French Infidelity and German Rationalism. Lect. II. is on the literary opposition of heathen writers: Lect. III. on the Renaissance: Lect. IV. on English Deism, one of the best: Lect. V. Infidelity in France, and unbelief in England after 1760: Lect. VI. Germany from 1750 to 1835: Lect. VII. Germany since 1835, and France during the present century: Lect. VIII. England during the present century, with a summary and inferences.

On the score of learning the author shows assiduity and comprehensiveness. A very useful part of the book is the copiousness of its literary references, to fortify his own positions and to guide students in their investigations. The plan of the work does not of course allow any very extended criticism of individual authors, or many extracts from their works. But they are described with fairness and intelligence. Mr. Farrar writes, too, in a candid spirit; with an evident anxiety not to do injustice to any, even the most violent opponents of the Christian faith. His general divisions, groupings and summaries are good, and such as the subject-matter demanded. It is not a philosophical work; it does not discuss the fundamental differences of philosophical schools with sharpness or thoroughness; it is rather a literary and historical work, written by a sincere Christian, a good thinker and a fair-minded man. His account of the German schools is open to the objection, that he has not fully mastered the systems he describes, and trusts to second-hand accounts rather than consults the original authorities. He could not, e. g., get access to Rothe's works. One difficulty is imposed upon the writer by the form of lectures in which he was compelled to treat his subject; he is obliged to banish to notes at the end of the volume some of the more important elucidations and developments of his positions, which should have been wrought into the text in such a historical composition. He would have made a much better and more symmetrical book could he have recast the whole in the form of a consecutive narrative, freed from the rules and trammels of the lecture. But even in its present shape, it is an indispensable work to all interested in the conflicts between revelation and philosophy.

Palmoni; or, the Numerals of Scripture a Proof of Inspiration. A Free Inquiry. By M. MAHAN, D.D. New York: Appleton & Co. 1863. pp. 176. The Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Episcopal Seminary, New York, here enters upon a course of recondite investigations into the mystic and typical significance of the numerals of Scripture. He certainly brings to light some very curious and unexpected parallelisms, symmetries and results. Patience and ingenuity are here, as elsewhere, rewarded. The Old Testament history is divided up into six periods, or days; these again are subdivided by signal epochs; and then, in the names and dates of the epochs are found striking applications of certain numerals, which are supposed to have a fixed sense. Thus the number 8 signifies the resurrection, and 7 rest; 3 is the symbol of essential, and 4 of organic perfection; 6 of

earthly imperfection, 5 of military organization, 9 of paternity, etc., etc. The work will be consulted by the inquisitive; but these mystical significances, when carried so far, are so slippery, and each new writer assigns such different significations to the numerals, that we can hardly hope that the laudable desire of the author, to construct an argument for plenary inspiration on this basis, will meet with any considerable success.

The Work of Preaching Christ. A Charge. By Bishop McIlvaine. New York: Randolph. 1863. An excellent discourse on the central theme of the Gospel, by one whose evangelical eloquence and venerable years lend weight to all his utterances.

Sermons Preached before His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, during his Tour in the East, 1862. By ARTHUR P. STANLEY, D.D. New York: Chs. Scribner. 1863. pp. 272. Published by arrangement with the Author. Besides the fourteen sermons contained in this beautiful volume, about half of it is taken up with an account of some of the localities visited during the tour—containing careful and interesting notices (with plans) of the Mosque of Hebron, the Samaritan Passover, Galilee, Hermon and Lebanon, and Patmos. The sermons were preached, three in Egypt, four in Palestine, three in Syria, three on the Mediterranean, and one in Windsor Castle. They are very short, averaging some seven pages only in length; but they are very much to the point, and each one of them breathes the spirit of the land or scene in the midst of which it was written and delivered. There is no attempt at oratorical effect, but a simple and earnest unfolding of truth, with faithfulness. Such a unique series, so well composed, is worthy of publication. By his previous journeys and studies, and by his remarkable talent for description, the author was admirably fitted for this work, which will win for him the favor and thanks of a wide circle of readers in this country as well as in England.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

The Capital of the Tycoon. Three Years' Residence in Japan. By Sir RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, K.C.B. 2 vols. New York: Harpers. 1863. The position of the author of these interesting volumes as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan, gave him unusual opportunities for acquiring information, and also lends weight to his positions. The work is well got up, with maps and numerous engravings. It describes the social customs and habits of the Japanese with minuteness and fidelity, and gives entertaining notes of travel. But as even the Daimios do not visit each other, a foreigner cannot get admission into the private life of this secluded and jealous people. The history of the events of the last few years shows the perplexities and difficulties that attend the European attempt to force the subjects of the Mikado into some kind of sociability and intercourse. Sir Rutherford counsels warlike measures. His book means, that England needs a market in Japan, and intends to have it. He speaks contemptuously of the Japanese power of resistance. The events now transpiring lend new interest and value to all the facts here presented. That the resistance of Japan to the European projects will be obstinate cannot be doubted. Some vague accounts of the Government are given in chapter xxxiv, but little really is known of the details about officers and administration. The Mikado, the spiritual head, has only the shadow of power. The Tycoon is the real lord. Some 600 Daimios—princes, give a kind of feudal character to the government. The three great obstacles to progress

are said (ii, 301) to be, "a *political economy* opposed to free trade; a *religious intolerance*, founded on purely political considerations; and lastly, a *rampant feudalism*". The style of the work is cumbrous.

Memoir of the Life and Character of Hon. Theo. Frelinghuysen, LL.D. By TALBOT W. CHAMBERS, D.D. New York: Harpers. 1863. pp. 289. The numerous friends of the honored and lamented Frelinghuysen will find in this excellent biography a worthy portraiture of one whose memory will be long held in honor in the records of patriotism, philanthropy and religion. He was distinguished as a lawyer, as a senator, and as a thinker; but his crowning glory was in his high Christian character, kept unstained in the midst of all the temptations and struggles of political life. Dr. Chambers has executed his task with taste, fidelity, and judgment. It would have been easier to make a larger volume. It is a biography which will be cherished, and the example here embalmed will bring forth fruit for years to come. Would that the work might be put into the hands of every aspiring young man, embarked amid the perils of a legal and political career. Mr. Frelinghuysen's faithfulness to his political associates was extraordinary. His letters to Henry Clay are admirable in spirit and manner. The account of the closing scene of his life, when faith triumphed over all fears and doubts, touches the deepest sympathies of the Christian heart.

The Foundations of History, a Series of First Things. By SAMUEL B. SCHIEFFELIN. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1863. 12mo. pp. 264. The author of this work is a Christian merchant of New York, widely known for his literary tastes, extensive travel, and philanthropic spirit. This work was prepared by him in furtherance of a plan of the Board of Publication of the Reformed Dutch Church to furnish a series of Christian school books, designed to restore Christianity to its proper place in education. It is a brief outline of History from the stand-point of the Bible. It is the fruit of extensive reading, and gives a large amount of valuable instruction in a condensed and well arranged form. Parents and Sabbath-school teachers, especially, will find this an excellent help. The maps and embellishments add to its value. The publisher has brought it out in a very attractive form.

A Sergeant's Memorial. By his Father. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1863. pp. 242. This is a book of rare interest. It is a brief memoir of John H. Thompson, son of Rev. Joseph P. Thompson, D.D., of this city. Under a high sense of Christian duty he gave himself to his country, and died in her cause. His was a sweet and lovely character; and delicately and affectingly does a father's hand portray it in these pages. Would that "The Sergeant's Memorial" were in every household in the land! It is a fit companion to Dr. Stearns' touching memoir of his son, Adjutant Stearns.

The Bivouac and the Battle-Field; or, Campaign Sketches in Virginia and Maryland. By GEORGE F. NOYES, Capt. U.S. Volunteers. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1863. pp. 339. Capt. Noyes belonged to the army of the Potomac, and followed its fortunes till the close of the campaign under General Burnside. He records simply his own personal experiences and observations, the every-day incidents of camp life and battle-field. The narrative is graphic, and affords many hints and details which render the book valuable to the multitude of volunteers who are called into their country's service.

MORAL AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

The Social Condition and Education of the People in England. By JOSEPH KAY, Esq. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1863. 12mo, pp. 323. This volume gives a very dark picture of English society. The facts stated, the statistics given, and the result reached are full of painful interest. And yet the testimony is from a source which entitles it to full belief. The author was "commissioned by the Senate of Cambridge University, England, to travel through Western Europe, to examine the comparative social condition of the poorer classes of the different countries. His book was published in London in 1850". We have here only the portion which relates to England's poor. His summing up we give in his own words: "The poor of England are more depressed, more pauperized, more numerous in comparison to the other classes, more irreligious, and very much worse educated than the poor of any other European nation, solely excepting Russia, Turkey, South Italy, Portugal, and Spain". The statistics of pauperism tell a fearful tale. In England and Wales alone 450 millions of dollars were expended in seventeen years (from 1832 to 1848) for the relief of "abject paupers", and this does not include the extensive relief afforded by private charity, and by the different "unions". And from 1851 to 1861, England's and Ireland's paupers had increased about *five per cent annually* before the cotton famine commenced, and since then, in consequence of so many being thrown out of employment, the ratio has undoubtedly been larger still. The educational interests of England are in a most deplorable state. The schools for the common people are wretched in the extreme; so miserably conducted and supported, and so wretchedly arranged, furnished and ventilated, and having such incompetent teachers "as to make it certain that in many cases they are doing very great harm to the children who frequent them". And less than half the children between the ages of five and fourteen are attending any school. The author gives the number who cannot read and write in England and Wales at nearly 8,000,000. The ignorance and moral and social degradation of the peasantry almost exceed belief; *one half* of them cannot read or write, have no moral or religious culture or convictions, and indulge in the grossest forms of sensuality. The tables of crime given by the author show a rapid increase of crime among the laboring classes, and what is remarkable, they establish the fact that the rural districts are more immoral than the cities, and the manufacturing and mining districts. And Mr. Kay affirms, "that the greatest part of immorality is the direct and immediate effect of the utter neglect of education". From 1836 to 1848, nearly 450,000 were committed for crime, in England and Wales; and more than 90 in 100 of this number were "uninstructed" persons. If England continues to neglect the education of her masses much longer, the results will prove most detrimental, if not destructive to her social and religious condition. The social condition of the laboring class in this country, as it respects the means of education, intellectual and moral development, and independence, comfort, and thrift, is immeasurably superior to that of England's masses. Our readers will be interested in Dr. Wines' article in the present number of this REVIEW, on the "Sources of Crime". Bad as we are in this country, we are yet far better off than England.

Life on a Georgian Plantation. Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation, in 1838-1839. By FRANCES ANNE KEMBLE. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1863. pp. 339. Nothing that we have read on the subject of slavery has given us a more vivid and painful impression of the

essential evils and cruelties of the system than this calm, frank, and severely faithful testimony of an impartial and intelligent observer. The position and character of the witness, and her relations to the system at the time the Narrative was written, as well as the testimony itself, impart peculiar interest and value to the work. It cannot fail to make a decided impression on the upper classes in England.

Dr. Joseph P. Thompson's discourse on *Christianity and Emancipation* is a clear and concise exhibition of the argument against American Slavery from the spirit of the Old as well as of the New Testament, and from the history of the Christian Church. John Jay's address on the *Great Conspiracy* (second edition), is a forcible argument against the rebellion, and in favor of the Union. Mr. S. Cromwell's letter on *Political Opinions* in 1776 and 1863, bears on the question of arbitrary arrests, and adduces instructive historical parallels. The above pamphlets are published by RANDOLPH, who is doing a good work in this way.

Government and Administration. A Sermon by Rev. WILLIAM AIKMAN, Wilmington, Del. A timely discourse, in which the duties of citizenship are clearly set forth, and forcibly urged, in the light of the Bible; and the distinction attempted in certain quarters between the administration and the government itself, is shown to be unscriptural and groundless.

The Righteousness, the Satisfaction, and the Reward of a True Soldier's Life. A Discourse by Rev. J. S. HOYT, Port Huron, Mich. The character and service of Lieutenant Vandeburg—another Christian hero who has fallen in the defence of his country—are beautifully and eloquently delineated in this memorial sermon.

EDUCATION.

Science for the School and Family. Part I. Natural Philosophy. By WORTHINGTON HOOKER, M.D. New York: Harpers, 1863. Illustrated by some three hundred engravings. A new book by Dr. Hooker will be welcomed by all teachers and pupils. This work is carefully prepared for instruction—simple, clear, and fully illustrated.

The Elements of Arithmetic. Designed for Children. By ELIAS LOOMIS, LL.D. New York: Harpers, 1863.

Primary Speller. By MARCIUS WILLSON. New York: Harpers, 1863. Both these work are well done.

A Class-Book of Chemistry. By EDWARD L. YOUNG, M.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1863. pp. 460. The author's series of works on Chemistry are highly appreciated by those most competent to form an opinion of their merits.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

An Outline of the Elements of the English Language, for the Use of Students. By N. G. CLARK, Professor in Union College. New York: Scribner, 1863. pp. 220. Professor Clark has produced an excellent and useful work, in which his aim has been to bring out "the vital connection between the language and the physical and intellectual elements of the English character". It will serve as an introduction to the larger treatises of Marsh, Müller and Craik, at the same time that it initiates the student into the subject in an attractive way. It is just the book for profitable use in academies and colleges, and for the general reader. Though it goes over

a good deal of ground, it is clear and simple. We hope that the author may find encouragement to proceed with his project of treating the literature in the same general method. The Illustrative Specimens, chiefly from Craik, are well selected. The book is very neatly got up.

Pearls of Thought. Religious and Philosophical, gathered from Old Authors. Second Edition. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1862. pp. 252. An excellent little book. The selections are made with good taste and judgment, and the choice thoughts gleaned are conveniently arranged for reference.

Peter Carradine, or the Martindale Pastoral. By CAROLINE CHESBRO. New York: Sheldon & Co.; Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1863. pp. 399. Miss Chesbro's writings are pervaded by a sound and elevated moral sentiment, and by a noble purpose, which impart to them a value not often found in works of mere fiction. "PETER CARRADINE" strikes us as superior to any of her former works. "The story seldom wanders beyond the limits of the country neighborhood wherein the scene is laid, but among the 'Martindale folks', we find a variety of character, motive and action that calls the author's best talent into vigorous play." The story is one of homely experience, but it is well told, and the impression it makes is strong and good.

Romola. A Novel. By GEORGE ELIOT, Author of "Adam Bede", "The Mill on the Floss", etc. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1863. 8vo, pp. 250. "ROMOLA" is less exciting than the former works of the author, but on some accounts more interesting. The scene of the novel is the city of Florence at the close of the fifteenth century, and it brings into view some of the historical characters and events of that turbulent period. The plot is simple and well executed; the delineation of character shows decided genius as well as the practised hand; the flow of the narrative is natural, and the conclusion, although very sad, is highly instructive. On the whole we consider it the least exceptionable and the ablest of all Miss Evans' works. Among historical novels it takes a foremost place.

Live it! Down. A Story of the Light Lands. By J. C. JEAFFRESON. No. 233 of Harper's Library of Select Novels. Fifty cents. pp. 248. A novel, with a decided religious bent; exalting the established church in contrast with "the connection"; full of incident and minute description; prolix and yet interesting. Aunt Adelaide is a beautiful, saintly character; the villain of the book is described with spirit; its hero is natural, and its heroine attractive; and Mr. John Brownhead is a genuine specimen of English nonconformity, dissatisfied with its social position.

The Young Parson. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1863. 12mo, pp. 384. This book describes the experiences, especially the trials and tribulations of a "Young Parson" from the time of his first settlement at "Gainfield" till his dismissal, after four years of faithful and unappreciated labor. The picture is a dark one, but we fear it has too many counterparts in ministerial life. The story is admirably told. The sketches of clerical and parish life are faithfully made; the characters are set forth with discrimination; and there is a mingling of humor, satire and pathos, which makes the book a very readable one. "Little Phoebe, the cripple", is an original character, and most touchingly drawn. "The Young Parson" will revive recollections of "Sunny Side" and "Shady Side" in many a Pastor's family, and cannot fail to contribute to the exposure and correction of evils as common as they are trying in ministerial experience. We heartily wish the book might find its way into every parish in the land, and be read and noted, and its lessons inwardly digested.

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J. M. SHERWOOD.

Presbyterian & Theological Review,

For 1863.

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